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 1 
Introduction 
The Chr Michelsen Institute (CMI) (Lead agency), Copenhagen Development Consultants 
(Copenhagen DC) and the German Association of Development Consultants (AGEG) undertook 
during 2005 a Multidonor Evaluation of the emergency and reconstruction aid that had been 
provided to Afghanistan  between 2001 to early 2005, on behalf of Denmark, Ireland, the 
Netherlands, Sweden and the United Kingdom.  
 
The fieldwork for the evaluation was undertaken in Afghanistan during March and April 2005, with 
smaller teams visiting different Afghan regions in addition to interviews made in the capitol Kabul. 
This included studies of the main sectors supported by the five donors, being education, health, 
livelihoods and water and sanitation, and two studies of cross cutting issues, being gender and 
environment. 
 
The data collection was undertaken in the following Afghan provinces: 
 
Education and Water and Sanitation studies in Nangarhar and Laghman provinces  
Gender and Livelihood studies in Kabul, Parwan and Bamyan provinces  
Health study in Zabul, Kandahar and Herat provinces  
The environment study was desk based, but drew on the consultant’s previous research in a 
number of provinces. 
 
The studies were conducted by the following consultants: 
 
 Education Sector   Holger Munsch 
 Environment   Daud Saba 
 Gender    Sadiqa Basiri  
Health Sector   Merete Taksdal 
Livelihoods Sector  Sarah Grey 
 Water and Sanitation Sector Richard Ellert 
 
Given the richness of these sectoral and issue related studies and their possible usefulness for the 
Afghan reconstruction and development process it was  the wish of the evaluation team to make 
these studies available as a CMI Report.  
 
The full evaluation report and a short version (also translated into Dari and Pashtu) are available 
from Danida Evaluation Department, or to be downloaded from: 
 
http://www.um.dk/da/menu/Udviklingspolitik/MaalOgResultatstyring/Evaluering/Evalueringsrappo
rter/2005/2005.05+Humanitarian+and+Reconstruction+Assistance+to+Afghanistan.htm 
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1. Introduction 
The evaluation of the education sector had to be concentrated solely on the sub-sector of primary 
education, as covering the whole sector would have been too ambitious. Findings on aid channels, 
the financial contributions of donors, and the identification of the main aid providers were derived 
from documents, mainly the report on “Aid Flows to Afghanistan”. The main actors supporting 
primary education in the eastern zone of Afghanistan were UNICEF, SCA and 
DACAAR/DAARTT. Extracted amounts of funds represent rounded off figures. The comparison of 
the efficiency of aid providers is based on the cost of school buildings, because the 
programmes/projects of UNICEF and NGOs follow different implementation patterns.  
 
The objective, as defined in DANIDA’s TORs, was to learn about beneficiaries’ feelings about, 
reactions to and perceptions of aid and assistance received from donors and their implementing 
partners. This has been achieved through interviews and the collection of a substantial amount of 
anecdotal information. 
 
Visits and interviews were conducted with directors at the Ministry of Education in Kabul, with 
directors of two Provincial Education Offices (PEO) and one officer at the District Education Office 
(DEO) in Nangarhar and Metharlam; with the Danish advisor at the Grant Management Unit at the 
MOE; with officers of the UN (UNICEF, UNHCR, UNESCO, WFP) in Kabul and of the UNICEF 
office in Jalalabad; with the IOM in Kabul; the governor of Nangarhar and the governor of the 
district Kama / Nangarhar; with parents / teachers / principals / shura members in six villages and 
towns in the districts Sorhgrood / Kama / Behsood / Chaparhar / Jalalabad of Nangarhar and in six 
villages and towns in the districts of Metharlam-Central / Quarghai of Laghman; finally, an 
interview was held with the American PRT office in Jalalabad.1 
2. Education in Afghanistan and contributions of donor 
countries 
After two decades of war and especially after the Taliban regime, the education sector in 
Afghanistan is facing severe difficulties. Afghanistan has one of the lowest literacy rates of all 
developing countries: only 28.7 % of the population over the age of 15 can read and write, which 
places Afghanistan on the sixth place from the bottom on the scale.2 
2.1. State of affairs – education in Afghanistan 2001 to 2004 
High enrolment 
The demand for education has been much higher than Afghan and foreign educationalists had 
expected by the end of 2001. When the Government launched the “Back to School” campaign in 
2002 with the support of UNICEF, authorities initially expected 1.7 million students in primary 
schools. More than 3.0 million students were actually enrolled in schools from grade 1 to 12. It was 
                                                 
1 The retrieval of documents from aid actors in the field was successful only in a very few cases; project 
proposals or log frames were not accessible.  
2 UNDP: AFGHANISTAN - NATIONAL HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2004, Security with a 
Human Face: Challenges and Responsibilities; Key Findings – chapter 2, p.4  
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estimated that 1.5 million children were deprived of any educational opportunities, that 1.0 million 
students had access to basic minimum school facilities, while 2 million studied in inadequate 
learning spaces such as tents or outside in the open air.3 The figures for 2003 indicate an enrolment 
of 3.9 million students for grades 1-12, increasing to approx. 4.4 million in 2004. 4 Over 6 million 
students were expected in 2005,5 while approx. 85 % of these enrolments would be at the primary 
and secondary level.6 
 
 
 Figure 1: Student Enrolment 1940 – 20037   Figure 2: Cumulative Enrolment by Gender8 
 
 
Afghanistan has never dealt with such high numbers of students in its history. Looking at primary 
education level data, a dramatic increase in enrolment can be observed: from 550,000 in 2001,9 to 
2.8 million in 2002, to 3.5 million in 2003 and 3.9 million in 2004. This increase is due to the 
massive influx of returning refugees and to the increasing willingness of parents to send their 
children to school. This has positively affected the retention rate. Nonetheless, there remains a 
tremendous disparity in enrolment between boys and girls: only 30 % of the students in 2002 and 40 
% in 2003 were girls; effectively 1.2 million girls were enrolled compared to 2.5 million enrolled 
boys.10 This relation of nearly 1:2 applies still today.11  
Disparities 
Regionally and gender-wise, a significant disparity can be noticed: in Kabul, the rate of enrolment 
of girls is 81 % (including all schools) whereas in other provinces (mainly in the south) it can be as 
low as 15 %. More precisely, primary enrolment figures from the NRVA 2003 (based on household 
                                                 
3 “Education Sector Summary - Program Strategies and Summary Requirements”; Program Secretariat, MOE, 
28 November 2002. 
4 C. Naumann: “Compilation of Some Basic School Statistics”, WFP CO AFG, Education Unit – Source: 
UNICEF RALS (Rapid Assessment of Learning Spaces), 2003/4 data. 
5 Latter figure: GOA, Education and Vocational Training – Public Investment Program, NDB SY 1384-1387, 
29.03.05.  
6 GOA-MOE, MOHE, MOLSA: Education and Vocational Training; Public Investment Program, Submission 
for the SY 1383 1385 NDB, March 2004. 
7 Source: “Securing Afghanistan’s Future”, A Government/International Agency Report, March 17, 2004, p. 
21. 
8 Op.cit. 
9 Afghanistan Statistical Yearbook 2003, Central Statistics Office (CSO). 
10 National Human Development Report, chapter 2, p. 69. 
11 see Naumann: Compilation ..., p.4. 
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interview data) indicate a wide disparity between provinces’ enrolment rates for all children (age 7-
13) and enrolment rates for girls (age 7-13), such as for example: Kabul 49 % (girls 34 %), 
Laghman 62 % (girls 41 %), Nangarhar 64 % (girls 46 %), Kandarhar 22 % (girls 1.4 %) or 
Hilmand with 42 % (girls 6.5 %).12 
The problem of school facilities 
It is estimated that during the long conflict 80 % of schools in Afghanistan were either damaged or 
destroyed. In 1978, there were approximately 1,150 primary and 350 middle schools in 
Afghanistan. Only six years later, these numbers had fallen to 210 primary and 78 middle schools.13 
According to the 2003 Statistical Yearbook, there were roughly 2,500 schools in 2001.14 Given that 
in 2002 there was a total of 5,063 schools, it was estimated that for the anticipated 3 million 
students a total of 7,500 schools would be necessary (i.e. 2,500 additional schools).15 However, 
enrolment numbers in 2002/3 had already surpassed the 3 million mark, highlighting the serious 
lack of school facilities. Out of the 5,063 existing schools , 3,500 were in need of major repair work. 
The available data for 2003/4 shows approximately 7,000 schools, or to be more precise, so-called 
“learning spaces”, of which about 70 % were (formal) government schools and 30 % were non-
formal schools (community based schools, home schools, etc.).16 With over 5 million children 
returning to general education it is estimated that in 2005 (including religious schools, technical and 
vocational schools, teacher training colleges, basic literacy schools) over 6 million students have to 
be taught. In view of this number, there is a need for a further 1,700 new schools to be built. This 
will increase the number of schools to about 10,000.17 
The problem of teachers 
Given the stark increase in both enrolments and the number of additional schools being built, 
Afghanistan consequently faces a shortage of teachers. In 2001 the Statistical Yearbook counted a 
total of 23,276 male teachers. In 2002, the MOE facilitated a big influx so the number increased to 
64,850 teachers, yet 28,000 more were needed.18 The Statistical Yearbook of 2003 counted 74,600 
teachers (27 % female teachers), relying on figures from the MOE and UNICEF.19 The MOE 
proposal for the EVT programme in 2004 indicated that 102,000 teachers were employed, but also 
that current student numbers require a total of 146,000 teachers in order to meet immediate needs. 
 
Moreover, from early 2002, MOE project proposals and summary papers as well as Securing 
Afghanistan’s Future and NHDR indicated the need for an improvement in the quality of education. 
Most teachers had been hired under extreme time pressure after the end of the Taliban regime, and 
had little or no experience at all in teaching and lacked professional competency. About 60,000 of 
these teachers were school graduates of grade 12 and below.20 Subsequently, 26,000 teachers 
received pre- and in-service training. Since 2003, some 52,000 teachers have received short term 
training courses, which included pedagogy, language arts and mine risk education etc.21 The 
                                                 
12 Results and discussion of education data collected in the Afghanistan National Rural Vulnerability 
Assessment 2003; WFP, SC-US, APEP, USAID, December 2004. 
13 Education in the Doldrums – Afghan Tragedy, S.B. Ekanayake, 2004. 
14 Afghanistan Statistical Yearbook 2003, Central Statistics Office.  
15 Policy for the Rehabilitation and Development of Education in Afghanistan, MOE, 9/2002, p.6. 
16 A Guide to Government in Afghanistan, AREU/World Bank, 2004 and Statistical Yearbook 2003. 
17 Education and Vocational Training – Public Investment Program, 29.03.05, p.5 
18 Policy for the Rehabilitation and Development of Education in Afghanistan, op.cit. 
19 It should be noted that data in the education sector are not always coherent and reliable. 
20 Education and Vocational Training – Public Investment Program, 2004, p. 6. 
21 Education and Vocational Training – Public Investment Program, 29.03.05, pp.7 and 15.  
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development of a new curriculum for grade 1 and 4 (completed in 2004), and 2 and 5 (completed by 
end of 2004), requires the further training of about 50,000 teachers. 
 
Government employed teachers who are registered on the public payroll of MOE at both the District 
Education Office (DEO) and at the Provincial Education Office, are paid according to their 
qualification (grade) and the public pay scale. The average monthly salary in 2002 was $45 US, 
plus an additional food allowance, which was often not paid. 22 A relatively large number of teachers 
received either no salaries at all or inadequate salaries to sustain a minimum standard of living. At a 
very early stage (2002) the Government therefore realised that teachers’ living conditions needed to 
be improved. To attract more teachers and retain the current ones, the government planned the 
creation of teacher cooperatives and the provision of medical benefits and housing and 
accommodation arrangements. However, with the fiscal difficulties in the current phases of national 
reconstruction, the government even had trouble providing teachers’ basic salaries. The MOE 
therefore suggested during that time that the government had to find means outside the regular 
budget to pay those salaries.23  
 
In addition to the problems and challenges already mentioned, improving the Afghan educational 
system also involves other aspects of the educational infrastructure, such as school furniture, 
educational supplies, water and sanitation in schools, science and laboratory equipment for 
secondary schools, food for education, curriculum and textbook development, equal access to 
schools, adequate salaries for teachers, functioning education management and administration 
(financial, budgetary and procurement arrangements), private sector participation, promotion of 
tertiary education, human rights/peace education, applying adequate monitoring and evaluation etc. 
Curriculum development 
Since 2003 a new curriculum framework has been put in place by the MOE Material Development 
Unit, with the assistance of UNESCO, UNICEF and others, and, since 2004, of Denmark.  The 
syllabi for grade 1 and 4, including the textbooks, were developed and tested. The new books (22 
titles in two languages) will be distributed in the new school year of 2005. Textbooks for grades 2 
and 5 have just been completed and are on tender for printing. Books for grades 3 and 6 will follow 
in 2005/6, while textbooks above grade six are under current development.24  
The stages of development of educational policy  
The GOA/MOE started from an early stage in 2002 to develop a policy to improve the overall 
educational system. The programme Education and Vocational Training (EVT) was given the 
highest priority by the government (under Pillar 1 of National Development Framework - NDF) and 
thus all educational programmes will be financed by the National Development Budget (NDB) and 
its Public Investment Programme (PIP). Annual EVT programme papers25 and project proposals 
have subsequently been produced with the support of the Consultative Groups26 (CGs) and the 
                                                 
22 See “A Guide to Government in Afghanistan”, Footnote 19, p.159. 
23 MOE: Education Project Profiles – Major Projects of One Year Duration; 10/2002, p.33. 
24 GoA: EVT-PIP NDB SY 1384-1387, 29.03.05 and Danish MoFA: Report on Review of Danish Support to 
Education in Afghanistan, 17-23.Octoer 2004.  
25 Starting with the Policy for the Rehabilitation and Development of Education in Afghanistan; MOE, 9/2002 
up to the EVT-PIP Program NDB SY 1384-1387, 29.03.05.  
26 CGs were established to facilitate government in the implementation on national programs highlighted in 
the NDF; each CGs are represented by government (leading the chair), donors, agencies and relevant INGOs; 
see: The A to Z Guide to Afghanistan Assistance; AREU; 2004 and Draft of ToRs for the E-CG, dated 
January 28, 2003. 
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Technical Working Groups.27 The EVT-PIP programme of 2005 addresses and covers a huge 
number of necessary educational sub-programmes/projects and lays the foundation for long term 
planning in this sector.  
 
It is obvious that from a state of emergency and more or less ad hoc planning activities, the 
government could only work out more precise planning strategies/papers and education programme 
proposals step by step. In 2004, the government reached the rehabilitation/ reconstruction phase and 
at the same time entered its development phase.  
NGOs in the field of education 
During and even before the Taliban regime, many NGOs had filled the gap when and where the 
government had failed to provide education. 28 There is now a broad critical discussion on NGOs 
within the government concerning their role as implementing agencies.29 Some argue for phasing 
out the contributions of NGOs as they lack the qualifications to provide proper services. However, it 
is a fact that since 2002, NGOs have assisted in repairing or constructing about 3,000 school 
buildings and the training of 27,500 teachers.30  
Vision and strategy  
In 2004, the government’s vision stated as its mission ensuring that all children complete 
compulsory education (9 years), and have the opportunity to continue to higher levels. The 
Government will work in 3 strategic directions: (i) expand access and raise the quality of primary 
and secondary education countrywide; (ii) build a higher education system that responds to 
Afghanistan’s reconstruction needs, creates new professional and income opportunities for Afghans, 
and meets international standards; and (iii) expand citizens’ access to vocational and informal 
education, with a specific focus on vulnerable populations. Progress along these three pathways will 
be underpinned by substantial changes in the governance and management of the basic and higher 
education sectors. These will involve 1) a rationalisation of the role of the Ministries, 2) a broader 
sharing of planning, decision-making and financial responsibilities at all levels of government 
(national, provincial, district) and communities, and 3) securing long-term partnerships with private 
actors, such as the business community, educational foundations and NGOs.31 This is in line with 
the MDG indicator pattern for 2015 and the outcome and progress of set targets will be measured 
accordingly. 
Implementation strategy of educational policy and programmes 
The four ministries MOE, MOHE, MOLSA and the MWA share mandates in the EVT programme. 
The Education CG, mentioned above, which is headed by the MOE, plays an important role in 
deciding and steering the EVT process. Representatives of donors, the UN, INGOs and international 
oraganisations are members of the panel and contribute to deciding on policy issues, budgetary, 
planning and implementation needs.32 The TWGs are involved in detailed planning and preparing 
the first implementation steps. Besides the central departments at MOE, more actors at different 
                                                 
27 TWGs are working groups which are tackling policy decisions arrived from CG-meetings which have to be 
implemented accordingly; see revised ToRs TWG, March 27, 2003, Afghan homepage. 
28 Afghanistan – State Building, Sustainable Growth and Reducing Poverty, WB, 2005. 
29 NGOs working in the construction sector in particular have been criticised for corruption. 
30 ACBAR Statement for the Afghanistan Development Forum, Kabul, 4-6 April 2005.  
31 See “Securing Afghanistan’s Future”, p.22. 
32 See: Draft of ToRs for the E-CG, dated January 28, 2003 and representatives mentioned in CG minutes of 
2003. 
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levels and with different functional responsibilities are involved in the implementation process: the 
Provincial Education Office (PEO), District Education Office (DEO), schools, the UN, INGOs, 
NGO. A clear distinction of functional responsibilities to manage the EVT programme, as the WB 
indicates as well in “Investing in Afghanistan’s Future”, has to be determined; this should include 
NGOs and the private sector.33  
 
The EVT-PIP programme is partly financed by the government’s core budget (e.g. salaries for 
teachers) and its external budget/development budget (technical assistance). Operating expenditures 
(e.g. salaries) have to be met by government revenues, while capital investment in schools and 
school equipment etc. is financed by the development budget, which also relays donor contributions 
as well disbursements of ARTF. The complex funding mechanism is explained in the following text 
box below: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2. 2 State of affairs – contributions of the five donor countries 
Aid channels  
In order to implement interventions in specific sectors, the five donor countries have channelled 
their funds using the organisational capacity of different programmes or implementing partners such 
as ARTF, UNHCR, UNICEF, UNDP, WFP, ICRC, IOM, various NGOs and others. Focusing on 
assistance within the evaluation period, the five donors have mainly funded projects of the Afghan 
Reconstruction Trust Fund, United Nations organisations and international and national NGOs, and 
only in a few cases directly those of the Ministries, such as Denmark with its direct budget support 
to the MOE in four of its sub-programmes. 
                                                 
33 WB: Investing in Afghanistan’s Future, February 2005, Report No. 31563-AF, p.33 following. 
The national budget has two components (see the figure below). The core budget includes all funds 
flowing through the Treasury, while donors directly execute the external budget. For the first time in 
2004/05, the definition of a core budget unifies the budget flowing through the Treasury, with total 
expenditure fully funded by domestic revenues and external assistance (fast disbursing loans, project 
loans and grants, and reimbursements from ARTF and LOTFA). Within the core budget, operating 
expenditures include the wage bill, most non-salary recurrent costs, and some capital expenditure. 
Development expenditure includes all technical assistance, most capital expenditure, and some 
recurrent costs (for example, health services contracted out). Operating expenditure is structured 
around ministries, while development expenditure consists of projects structured around 
development programs (from the National Development Framework and the National Priority 
Programs).  
All projects in the core budget have an identified source of financing, while some projects in the 
external budget are partially funded. The Government expects that it will mobilize more resources 
than budgeted expenditure: the expected additional funding is set aside for the National Priority 
Programs and for co-financing existing projects and will be allocated during the fiscal year. 
Further progress towards an integrated budget involves securing funding for projects earlier in the 
year so that more projects are included in the original core budget (which requires projects to be at an 
advanced stage of design), and channeling a higher share of external assistance through the Treasury 
so that monitoring and reporting processes are standardized. Further integration of the budget also 
requires that ordinary expenditure matches some of the features of development expenditure, 
including having a multi-year horizon and program basis. 
 
Source: WB, Afghanistan - State Building, Sustaining Growth, and Reducing Poverty, February 2005, 
p.51. 
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Contributions to education 
According to the “Aid Flows to Afghanistan” study 34 the overall assistance amounted to 792 
million Euros, of which the United Kingdom disbursed 47 %, Sweden 16 %, the Netherlands 12 %, 
Ireland 3 % and Denmark 13 %. A general trend shows that from 2001 onwards, humanitarian / 
rehabilitation aid spending has decreased over the years while development funds increased.35 The 
majority of grants of all donors were mainly used for both humanitarian assistance and development 
(although Ireland had spent a little more on rehabilitation). This indicates that donor assistance 
already combines relief and development aid. 
 
Focusing on the donor contributions to the Afghan National Development Budget-funded Education 
and Vocational Training programme (EVT), it can be noted that Denmark spent roughly 6 % of its 
overall assistance on EVT, Ireland 5 %, the Netherlands 1 %, Sweden 10 % and the UK 3 %.36 
Apart from these contributions to the education sector channelled through NDB, additional financial 
support for education was given to international and local NGOs.  
 
The study also shows the top 12 recipients / aid providers for each donor country. 37 As far as the 
education sector is concerned, the study indicates that for improving education in Afghanistan, 
Denmark’s assistance focused on projects and programmes by UNICEF,38 DACAAR/DAARTT 
(MOF as an aid channel); Ireland supported the organisations UNICEF, GOAL, Concern and 
Trocaire; the Netherlands supported UNICEF; Sweden SCA and UNICEF; and UK assistance also 
went to UNICEF. Moreover, the EVT-filtered data in the database39 of the study of lists many more 
implementing organisations.  
Main implementing agencies in education 
Identified funds from the database show that Denmark has supported educational programmes and 
projects over the concerned period with a total of € 11.9 million, out of which DACAAR/DAARTT 
received € 2.7 combined. According to data from DAARTT, the organisation received € 0.9 million 
from this split, which is 7 % of Denmark’s indicated contribution. Through a bilateral agreement 
Denmark also substantially supported MOE’s EVT program with 15.7 million US $ (equiv. to 14.6 
million Euros) for substantial contributions in the EVT sub-sectors: a) curriculum development, b) 
teacher education and development, c) educational material development and d) physical 
infrastructure. A fifth component assists the ministry in the management and coordinated utilisation 
of external aid, to assist in building the ministry’s planning and management capacity.  
 
Ireland provided its three international NGOs and UNICEF with € 2.3 million for education, of 
which € 900,000 was allocated to UNICEF’s education programme; 
 
The Netherlands  channelled its aid funds through the International Rescue Committee (IRC) to 
DACAAR and SCA with a total amount of €1.4 million; SCA received around € 330,000 for its 
education and health projects. 
 
                                                 
34 J. Cosgrave, Rie Andersen: “Aid Flows to Afghanistan – A study of Aid Flows from Denmark, The UK, 
The Netherlands, Sweden, and Ireland to Afghanistan from January 2001 to June 2004 inclusive”; December 
2004. 
35 Op.cit., p.43 and following. 
36 op.cit. p. 49. 
37 op.cit. p. 39. 
38 UNICEF usually receives its funds from UN member countries directly; only earmarked funds were 
included in the databank of Aid Flows Study. 
39 All data were extracted by the author from the Aid Flows Database. 
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Sweden funded SCA’s whole programme over the period with € 22 million,40  
UNICEF received € 19 million overall, including 16.4 million for its “Back to School” campaign. 
 
The UK contributed € 13.6 million, mostly for ISAF’s school rehabilitation, Ockenden 
International’s primary school programme and UNICEF’s curriculum development and teacher 
training programme. UNICEF’s programme was thus partly covered by roughly € 6.3 million. 
3. Sector-specific observations  
3. 1 Policies and implementation strategies 
As has already briefly been described in the overview of the educational situation in the whole 
country (“State of Affairs”) the fast-growing number of school age children following the “Back to 
school” campaign has put the government under severe time pressure to increase not only the 
educational infrastructure, but most importantly to create and develop basic preconditions for an 
adequate educational system in the first place. In order to attain these goals, the government has put 
in place its national EVT investment programme, consisting of the following steps: 
a) Increasing access to basic education through sub-programmes in: school construction and 
rehabilitation, provision of furniture and educational supplies, water and sanitation in schools, 
science and laboratory equipment for high schools, food for education;  
b) Improving the quality of education through sub-programmes in: curriculum, textbooks and 
teacher development;  
c) Providing vocational training, literacy, accelerated learning and non-formal education through 
corresponding sub-programmes; and similar sub-programmes for  
d) Promotion of girl’s education,  
e) Promotion of inclusive education,  
f) Strengthening education management and administration, and  
g) Private sector participation in educational development.41  
 
By strengthening education management and administration, the government explicitly expresses its 
willingness to implement its EVT programme by promoting all educational levels (provincial and 
district). 
 
The government’s EVT programmes (MOE, MOHE, MOLSA) contain a total of 6 sub-
programmes,42 which are supported by a relatively large number of projects. The projects are partly 
funded by the government’s core budget and partly by donor development funds. Screening the 
EVT-PIP programmes throughout the period concerned, it seems that the government faces limited 
financial resources. In 2004, existing projects required an expenditure of 278.6 million US$ of 
which 172 million were not allocated. The financial gap for newly planned projects amounted to 
roughly $149 million; all in all, the total of unmet expenditure requirements amounted to $321 
million. 43 The EVT programme 2005 (dated 3/2005) indicated a total requirement of 611 million 
US$ out of which 44 million US$ of the required funds were met and 566 million US$ were at that 
time not financed/secured.  
 
                                                 
40 According to Aid Flows, p. 37 and 39.  
41 See “EVT-PIP, 2004 and 2005. 
42 A sub-programme ‘Early Childhood Development’ is also included. 
43 See “Education and Vocational Training”, Public Investment Programme, 2004, p.19. 
CMI REPORT AFGHANISTAN: FINDING, SECTORS  ANDTHEMES REPORT R 2005: 15  
 13 
The budgetary shortcoming rela ted to filling this financial gap can be illustrated with the only 
available data (end 2003), the Technical Annex from Securing Afghanistan’s Future. The main 
actors/contributors for e.g. the sub-programme School Construction and Rehabilitation, such as 
WB, UNICEF, USAID, Denmark, Japan and SCA, disbursed funds covering 52 % of the required 
expenditure of 37 million US$. Disbursed funds given to the Teacher’s Quality Improvement sub-
programme (with its main supporters UNICEF, Denmark, USAID, JICA) covered up to 25 % of the 
required 5.7 million; the Curriculum Development programme received about 30 % of its required 
4.2 million (UNESCO, Denmark, UNICEF) and for the textbook programme disbursements from 
UNESCO, Denmark, UNICEF, USAID about 57 % of the necessary funds were received.44 
 
In addition, the fund flow mechanism between MOE and MOF, including disbursements from 
ARTF, does not function properly due to procedural problems between MOE and MOF. All in all, it 
is a combination of interlinked problems and arises as follows: a) first, the not clearly determined 
arrangement of implementation (grouped into prioritised projects) and second, the limited 
implementation capacity at all levels to realise the huge package of projects on MOE’s side, 
including the PEOs, DEOs etc. (and the other three line ministries involved); and b) the not very 
effective fine matching/alignment between government’s operational and development budgets.45  
This obstruction, combined with a concern about a rather unrealistic budgeting practise, MOE’s 
management capacity, could explain why some donors suggested that the main problem for the 
education sector is not a lack of funding, but the ability to implement existing programmes 
effectively and to plan future programmes.  
 
Besides the matching problems, additional slow implementation slows the usage of funds by 
recipients. Finally, ARTF disbursements from donors often did not require fixed periods for 
implementation, because donors did not fix the implementation period of their contributions.46  
 
Denmark, as one of the five donor countries, is, besides WB and UNICEF, the only country to 
support these sub-programmes through earmarked support for the development budget of 15.7 
million US$ over the period 2003 to 2006.47  
 
However, for each sub-programme of the EVT programme objectives, expected outcomes are 
defined and targets are to be achieved for the specified periods. Unfortunately, even the latest 
document did not equally specify how these objectives would be implemented by determined 
activities and by whom. The author did not find any further implementation strategy papers or 
operational plans, either on the national or on the provincial or district levels. How the 
achievements would be monitored and evaluated and what type of M&E system would be used 
were not visible during the evaluation. However, the EVT programme and other documents (e.g. 
from UNICEF) indicated that a modern Educational Monitoring Information System (EMIS) was to 
be installed from 2004 onwards and would be set in place by UNICEF by 2004/5. At the MOE the 
Planning, Monitoring and Supervision Department indicated that this system had been installed but 
the staff had problems in using it properly. A school base-data survey was carried out by MOE and 
UNICEF; data are nearly processed and will be ready by summer 2005. E-CGs will be in a position 
to decide further on the action plan for EMIS in its future meetings. Perhaps, and symptomatically 
or not, the two PEO directors in the two eastern provinces had no real knowledge of the existence of 
an EMIS system or whether such a system was established and in use.  
 
                                                 
44 Technical Annex of Securing Afghanistan’s Future, p.39. 
45 See: Investing in Afghanistan’s Future, p. 19 and information from Danida advisor.  
46 See as well Aid Flow, pp.35/6 
47 Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs: Program Document – Primary Education Programme Support 
Afghanistan 2003-2006, 12/2003. 
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Moreover, there are no indications if and how a nationwide needs assessment was conducted. 
Presumably the only available data from two former surveys were used (NRVA and MICS).48 In 
fact, the implementation capacity of the educational system for realising the EVT programme and 
all its sub-programmes and projects was not strong or clearly defined and lacked professionalism. 
According to quite a number of parents, teachers and headmasters interviewed, weaknesses in 
education planning processes were indicated. Government officials from Provincial Education and 
District Education Offices shared this opinion too.  
 
At present there is a twofold remuneration system for teachers. Generally, teachers working with 
NGOs in formal schools (these schools are of course registered and belong officially to 
government) are paid from two sources: besides the basic salary that they receive from the 
government, they also receive a top-up of between 1,000 and 2,000 Afghanis from their NGOs. The 
basic salary of a government-employed teacher with grade 12 (which is the majority) or even below 
is about 2,700 Afs., according to the current pay scale.49 However, since government food 
allowances are not always provided, the salary is actually reduced by approx. 900 Afs to only 1,800 
Afs. Only teachers of NGO-supported schools - which is a minority, only those NGOs who have 
been in Afghanistan for some time, such as SCA and others - receive presumably a total of 3,700 to 
4,700 Afs.50 As a consequence, qualified teachers in government schools look for other 
opportunities (running shops etc.) or better employment conditions in NGO schools. To attract 
teachers to serve in government schools, especially in rural and remote areas, the president launched 
a new decree to increase teacher’s salaries in early spring 2005. 51  
3. 2 Coverage and actors involved 
What is most striking is the fact that the number of enrolled students and the number of schools and 
teachers (m/f) have dramatically increased. Nevertheless, there is an even more pressing demand. 
Indicative research from the latest available data (MOE, WFP-Education Section, UNICEF, SCA) 
for the province of Nangarhar52 show the following status: 
 
Nangarhar:  
Enrolled children (prim/sec): 2001: 99,000 to 2004: 324,166 (32% girls); +227 % 
Number of schools (prim/sec): 2001: 213 to 2004: 243;   +14 % 
Male teachers (incl. sec.): 2001: 3,008 to 2004: 4,053;   +35% 
Female teachers (incl. sec.): 2001/2: 22 to 2004: 733;   +33%  
 
When DAARTT became an offspring of the Danish organisation DACAAR in mid 2003 its 
objectives concentrated on beam production and house repair as well as on the rehabilitation and 
construction of school buildings (plus furniture).53 The organisation is active in 10 provinces. 
During the period concerned, DAARTT has constructed one school building (for 336 students) in 
Nangarhar and 5 (1 rehabilitation) for around 1,960 students in Laghman, using Danida funds. The 
implementation of these projects was based on contracts with Danida. DAARTT also helped to 
                                                 
48 National Risk and Vulnerability Assessment of 2003 (through MRRD) and the Multiple Indicator Cluster 
Survey of 2003 (UNICEF). 
49 Example: a teacher with grade 12 certificate earns: 69 Afs (basic), plus 900 Afs (incentive for grade 12 leaving 
certificate holder), plus 1800 Afs (food allowance): in total 2,796 Afs per month. 
50 Similar examples were also given by a few NGO managers, who have run schools for some time.  
51 Personal information from a Deputy Minister. 
52 Data from following sources: Afghanistan Information Management System (AIMS): www.aims.org.af ; 
CSO: Statistical Yearbook 2003; and UNICEF: RALS – Data, Excel sheets, 2003; Data were not congruent. 
Shown statistics were supported by Mr. C. Naumann, WFP-Education Unit, Kabul.  
53 DACAAR constructed/rehabilitated from 1989 to 2003 buildings funded mainly by DANIDA and EU.  
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develop needed skills among MOE’s Construction Department staff, on how to plan and build 
schools in rural areas.  
 
The Swedish Committee Afghanistan, an organisation in education, health, agriculture, disabilities 
and emergency established in the early 1980s, showed a broad spectrum of educational activities in 
its primary and secondary schools in 18 provinces and support of 412 schools 54 (with 270,000 
students, girls 36 %; 7,400 teachers, female teachers 21 %). Of these 412 schools, about 360 had 
some sort of school buildings, while the rest were still in open air, mosques, or private houses. SCA 
constructed school buildings (230 since 1992), provided school material, libraries and stationery, 
trained teachers through in-service courses and trained communal school committees. Ten schools 
were supported in Nangarhar, 37 in Laghman. During the period concerned five new school 
buildings were constructed in Laghman. Based on the available data for 2003 and 2004, SCA taught 
and employed the following number of students and teachers in their schools in Nangarhar and 
Laghman: 
 
SCA, Nangarhar 10 schools (prim/sec):  
Enrolments b/g:  2003: 3,493 boys – 5,629 girls; 2004: 4,604 boys – 6,337 girls. 
Teachers m/f:    2003:  101 males/112 females 2004: 107 males/97 females 
SCA, Laghman 37 schools (prim/sec): 
Enrolments b/g:  2003: 19,504 boys – 10,967 girls;  2004: 19,970 boys – 11,074 girls. 
Teachers m/f:    2003:  516 males/251 females  2004: 632 males/132 females 
 
As far as teacher development is concerned, SCA offered courses in teaching competencies, subject 
knowledge (also special courses for women), in-school courses and school management. In 2004, 
SCA trained a total of 1,710 teachers, including 528 female teachers. 190,000 students have 
received textbooks and basic packages of stationery and science kits. SCA’s aid policy is to focus 
its overall activities primarily on former war zones, and Nangarhar and Laghman belong to this 
category. 
 
UNICEF as the biggest supporter and facilitator of opportunities for children in fields such as 
health and demobilisation, likewise plays the biggest role with regard to education. This especially 
applies to the training of primary school teachers, including the provision of teaching and learning 
materials, handing out school materials to students and the rehabilitation and construction of 
primary schools. UNICEF establishes home-based schools, sets up temporary learning spaces and 
provides safe water and sanitation facilities in schools. UNICEF’s task of supporting schools at the 
primary level is apparent in the rehabilitation / construction of schools that already existed before or 
during the Taliban regime. Secondly, after the Taliban regime, UNICEF created a reasonable 
number of community based schools, some of which were home school types;55 they also 
established temporary learning spaces. With this strategy, UNICEF enabled remote areas to 
participate in education. 
 
For its “Back to School” campaign in 2002, UNICEF rehabilitated /constructed 45 schools in the 
eastern zone56 by sub-contracting local NGOs. In the following year, 74 schools (and 51 in 2004) 
were rehabilitated or constructed. In Nangarhar, for example, 115 national primary schools57 were 
                                                 
54 Formerly 487; some 70 schools were handed over to Government.  
All figures are from SCA Annual Donor Reports, Kabul Management Office and the extracted School Data 
Summary Sheets 2003-2004. 
55 Home schools are for boys and girls, but this school type is the most suitable one for girls; to date not all 
have been formally registered at PEO. 
56 UNICEF defines the eastern zone as comprising Kunar, Laghman, Nangarhar, Nuristan. 
57 CSO data sheet, 2003. 
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counted in 2002. UNICEF also established 32 CBS/home schools.58 In Laghman, with only 83 
national primary schools, UNICEF initiated 107 CBS/home schools, showing that 2002 had been 
the most important year for the campaign.  
 
In 2004 Nangarhar already had a total of 311 CBS59 with around 10,500 enrolments (boys/girls 
nearly equal). Moreover, UNICEF supported 270 male teachers and 20 female teachers. Nearly half 
a million teachers and students received learning materials and approximately 3,200 teachers 
received training in the whole eastern zone. 
Danida’s contribution to the MOE  
Since 2003, Danida, with its assigned management advisor at the Grant Management Unit, has 
played an active role in substantially supporting60 a) the technical departments (Compilation and 
Translation Department, Material Development Unit) in managerial restructuring; b) the 
development of an advanced plan for launching a large scale in-service training programme, based 
on a one-month package to provide a minimum upgrading qualification for the very large 
proportion of serving teachers (possibly up to 100,000); c) partial support for educational material 
development such as textbooks and their printing, d) partial support for physical infrastructure; 8 
schools in rural areas were successfully constructed under a contract with DAARTT, as mentioned 
above, for example.  
Efficiency and timing 
To evaluate the costs of school buildings and possibly to orientate on cost standards or benchmarks 
is problematic, because the costs of building materials and properties differ greatly from country to 
country. The WB EfA-Fast Track Initiative working group has, therefore, developed a specific 
proxy indicator. It is defined as the cost of constructing, furnishing and equipping a primary 
classroom, which is indicated at US$ 8,000.61 This indicator was used by comparing the costs and 
expenditure of the aid providers concerned to compare the construction of school buildings, as 
detailed cost calculations were available from DAARTT and SIDA. The MOE (Department of 
Planning) also provided rough estimations and approximations on construction costs during the 
interview. Time constraints prevented the author from visiting the Department of Construction of 
the MOE, since in this specific field NGOs are obliged to apply for approval of their construction 
plans and costs before starting implementation. The construction cost records of DAARTT and 
SCA were deemed reliable, as follows. 
 
According to DAART’s documents, expenses amounted to US$ 86,000 for one school in Nangarhar 
and US$ 503,000 for five schools in Laghman.62 This included latrines, drinking water, a 
guardroom, boundary walls and furniture. The cost of school buildings varies, of course, due to the 
different availability of local material and the distance from provincial centres. The building for the 
Landa Buch primary girls’ school in Nangarhar/Kama (a standard MOE type), with 8 classrooms, 
excluding furniture, for example, cost US$ 81,000, including a 15 % valuated local labour 
contribution and collected stones. The total administration costs were 12 %. In comparison, other 
standard 8-room schools of DAARTT in the same area cost about US$ 75,000. A 12-room building 
                                                 
58 UNICEF homepage, www.unicef.org . 
59 UNICEF in the Eastern Region of Afghanistan 2004 – Deliverables.  
60 Beside UNICEF, WB, UNESCO, USAID and others. 
61 Only WB works with the set benchmark of US$ 8,000; internationally, the benchmark should not exceed 
US$ 10,000. For general information about benchmarks see: Guidelines for Assessment and Endorsement of 
the Primary Education Component of an Education Sector Plan, WB-EFA FTI Secretariat, January 26, 2005. 
62 Figures based on DAARTT documents, April 2005. 
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was recently constructed for US$ 96,000. The comparison of costs of one DAARTT classroom 
corresponds to the EfA indicator (benchmark). 
 
SCA, however, worked with standard calculations. A school building of 8 rooms, including 4 
administration rooms in stone/masonry and including a valuated local contribution, were calculated 
at US$ 74,378. Administration costs were estimated at 15 %, local contribution of labour and 
material at 20 %.63 SCA costs for one classroom corresponded with the EfA indicator.  
 
However, in the village of Maloo in Nangarhar, building construction had recently started, financed 
through the NSP programme and the first under this programme in the eastern zone. Parents and 
teachers said that the cost of their 8-room school would be US$ 46,000. Village craftspeople were 
employed by the CDC for the construction labour and one NSP consultant, through BRAC, 
prepared the technical drawings. Related labour costs and the cost of furniture were not yet 
calculated. The estimated US$ 20,000 cost of furniture would be reliable and assuming US$ 20,000 
for labour costs would show a similar sum to DAARTT’s and SCA’s classroom costs and would 
correspond with the EfA benchmark. 
 
According to information from UNICEF’s Kabul Headquarters,64 the indicated building costs 
would range from US$ 120,000 to US$ 150,000 for a school with 8 classrooms (which would be 
preferred by MOE Dep. of Construction), including latrines, library, four administration rooms, 
store room, playground and boundary walls. The exact amount would depend on the location and 
availability of building materials on the building site. 
 
The UNICEF office in Jalalabad65 estimated costs for smaller schools with a capacity of around 
150 students (mostly 4 rooms) at roughly US$ 40,000, which means that the costs for an 8-room 
school would be very similar to the construction costs of DAARTT and SCA. This would be within 
the margin of the given EfA benchmark, too. 
 
From interviews with the MOE, the information received from their Department of Planning 
indicated that construction costs are estimated at US$ 100,000 for a 12-room school, US$ 150,000 
for 16 rooms and US$ 240,000 for 24 rooms. 
 
The timing of interventions of all aid providers seemed to be right. One must not forget that 
UNICEF and SCA have supported the education sector for a long time and that DAARTT was 
established only in 2003. However, DACAAR’s construction department had also constructed 
buildings since the early 90s up to 1999.  
3. 3 Transition from emergency to development 
First of all, it needs to be stressed that opinions about the current state of the education sector differ 
enormously. Government employees from the education sector maintained that they were 
somewhere in between all three phases of emergency, rehabilitation and development. Naturally, 
the location, whether in rural or urban areas, also contributes to differences in opinion. Already 
before the war (see S.B. Ekanayake), Afghanistan had been a country with a low literacy rate. The 
problem of regional disparities in education has long been known. This leads to the presumption, 
shared by many officials, that Afghanistan today finds itself partly on the development stage as 
                                                 
63 SCA: Cost Estimate for SCA Standard School Building, 3/2005. 
64 Education Department, Interview on 12.04.05.  
65 ER Status UNOPS UNICEF Schools (January 2004) list 2003: Details about 74 schools’ rehabilitation and 
construction in the eastern region of Afghanistan during 2003. 
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well. Moreover, war and the Taleban regime caused severe damage to the educational infrastructure 
and administration. 
 
Teachers, parents and shura members of visited areas said most of the damaged schools are more or 
less rehabilitated and they did not find themselves in an educational emergency phase; nonetheless, 
additional schools are needed.  
 
Similar observations have led SCA, for example, to develop a strategy (still on the way) where 
future activities reflect the transition from rehabilitation towards development. Since DAARTT’s 
foundation in 2003, school rehabilitation has been one of its main activities, followed later by new 
school building construction. Last year UNICEF changed its policy of direct support to schools into 
support through the Provincial Education Office. Only the supervision of schools remains a direct 
involvement. 
3.4 The role of the five donors 
All five donor countries have clear development policies to support countries in the third world by 
achieving the goals of EfA. Locally set objectives are developed in consultation with stakeholders 
in those countries. 
Danida 
Three main principles guide Danish assistance to Afghanistan: Afghan ownership, support through 
the national budget, and good governance and participation. Danida concentrates on a few sectors in 
rehabilitation and is an important donor in the education sector. As mentioned above, it supports 
DAARTT, UNICEF and MOE. The main part of its aid for primary education is applied through a 
bilateral agreement in which Denmark substantially supports MOE’s EVT programme. Five 
essential components contribute to educational development: a) development of educational 
material, b) curriculum development, c) teachers’ capacity development, d) the physical 
infrastructure, and e) assisting MOE in managing and coordinating the utilisation of funds of 
donors, as well as support for building up managerial capacities. 
 
Danida’s principle is to channel its aid through existing public administration whenever possible. 
This is practised in the aforementioned bilateral agreement between Denmark and Afghanistan and 
laid down in the project documents. According to our latest information it plans to continue its 
support until 2009.  
DCI 
DCI recognises that basic education is an important part of promoting participation in social and 
economic development. DCI’s overall aim, therefore, is to assist the partner in building a 
sustainable education system according to the needs of the people and the related country. DCI 
supported its three NGOs (GOAL, TROCAIRE, CONCERN) and UNICEF in its education 
programme. While two of the three NGOs have been more active in relief, livelihood and civil 
society developments in the northwest/west, only GOAL - which formerly was also active in the 
north and west - started a school project in Kabul during the years 2002/3. As UNICEF launched 
the “Back to School” programme, within the 4-year period 25 % of the total contribution to 
Afghanistan came from Ireland. 
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DFID 
The UK made a five-year commitment at the Tokyo conference. It supports mainly public sector 
reform, financial management, security sector reform, humanitarian sector reform and sustainable 
livelihoods and private sector development. DFID is also a donor with strong support for education 
in developing countries and contributed about 50 % of funds to UNICEF’s “Back to School” 
campaign throughout the period concerned. 
MFA-Netherlands 
The Netherlands supports developing countries that develop and implement credible education 
plans. Education is at the centre of Dutch development policy. The Netherlands’ common goal is to 
eliminate gender disparities in primary and secondary education by 2005 and to ensure that by 
2015, children everywhere, boys and girls alike, are able to attend and complete their schooling. 
 
The Netherlands made a considerable contribution to the ARTF for paying salaries and to UN 
organisations such as UNHCR, UNMAS, OCHA and IOM. Funds were allocated for training for 
police and the police academy, for election, mine clearance etc. The MFA assisted the education 
sector through the organisations IRC, DAARTT and SCA, which received 38 % of the amount 
committed to this sector. 
Sida 
Sweden, like other countries, is a strong supporter of the global EfA policy. Swedish support to 
basic education began with support for school construction, continued with teacher training and 
textbooks, and is today channelled directly into developing countries’ own budget for their overall 
education programmes. 
 
Afghanistan will continue to need extensive humanitarian assistance. In that respect, SIDA will 
continue to provide support to mine clearance, food safety, health, the return of refugees and last but 
not least education. Aid has been channelled to ARTF, the UN (mostly to UNHCR, UNOPS, 
UNICEF), ICRC, IOM and some Swedish NGOs. Sida supported the education and health sector as 
part of its continuing assistance. SCA is an example of this. SCA received financial assistance of 
around € 20 million for its whole programme, for its education sector 34 %; and UNICEF € 16 
million for its ‘Back to School’ campaign over a period of 4 years. 
 
Sweden is currently reorienting its policy from emergency and rehabilitation/ reconstruction more 
towards development.  
3.5 Quantity and quality of aid as perceived by beneficiaries 
By the end of 2004, DAARTT’s contribution to the construction of 6 schools in the area concerned 
covered over 1,300 students and SCA with 47 schools and nearly 24,000 students. UNICEF directly 
supported about 600 CBS, recently increased the number of temporary learning spaces and strongly 
supports public schools through the PEOs; and has thus substantially contributed to increasing the 
number of schools by 370. For example, the 74 schools which were rehabilitated and constructed 
during 2003/04 offer education to 57,000 additional children. 
 
Both provinces (with 450,000 students) benefited when DAART constructed buildings for 1,300 
students and 24,000 students had access to literacy in SCA schools. One should not forget that 
through the 600 CBS (UNICEF and some NGOs) and temporary learning spaces, thousands of 
additional students had the chance to start their education. 
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SCA and UNICEF contributed additional training for 4,900 teachers and 360,000 students received 
material and stationery. 
 
Generally, beneficiaries were grateful for the chance to get an education. Yet their expectations and 
needs surpass the recent improvements in education. Their expectations of government were quite 
high. They expressed some dissatisfaction with the education delivered by some NGOs (which were 
not specified), and argued that the quality of the implementation ought to be monitored by 
government officials (through PEOs and DEOs). In addition, government employees expressed the 
view that better control of NGOs was needed and that foreign donors should not cooperate directly 
with NGOs without the inclusion of the government. 
 3.6 Cross-cutting issues 
The gender disparity in the enrolment of students was and remains obvious, not only in the targeted 
areas but nationwide. Even before 2001 both the SCA and UNICEF focused their interventions on 
girls’ education; after the end of Taliban rule, both strongly supported girls’ education and 
international gender policy. This can be seen in the steep increase in girl enrolment, as shown 
earlier for Nangarhar/Laghman. Both organisations developed clear gender policies and strategies 
for enhancing the access of girls to education.  
 
It is not only the limitations in educational infrastructure or the lack of schools that prevents girls 
from joining schools. The lack of girls’ schools is visible, yet cultural reasons also play a part. 
Parents stop sending their daughters over long distances to school at the age of nine to ten years. 
The lack of female teachers also provides a strong reason for absenteeism. Girls from poorer groups 
are also deprived. The results of the NVRA show high dropout rates for girls after grade two. 
4. Findings 
4.1 The relevance of the interventions 
Reviewing all this information, there is no doubt that Afghanistan is in serious need of foreign aid 
for at least the next 10 years. The figures and facts above have indicated a lot of areas of the 
education sector that need to be improved in order to absorb the presently more than five million 
children at school, and the high number of children who still have no access to education because of 
a lack of facilities.  
 
Based on roughly 30 interviews in the two provinces Laghman and Nangarhar and in Kabul with 
officials from MOH, UN and international NGOs, with NGO members, beneficiaries (parents, shura 
members, teachers) and government employees from PEO/DEO etc., good-hearted statements and 
assessments for the sector concerned can be derived. 
 
Given the fact that Afghanistan ranks six from the bottom in the group of comparable developing 
countries, it needs to intensify its efforts greatly to implement its educational programme, 
specifically to improve its quality of education, otherwise it will not reach its ambitious goals for 
2015. Therefore more accurately timed, precisely planned and coherently and correctly 
implemented interventions for education by all actors (at national, provincial and district level, 
including private sector and NGOs) are necessary.  
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Needs of beneficiaries in relation to government policies and strategies 
After a long period of violence and war, parents and shura members of villages and towns have 
realised the growing importance of education for their children. This reflects the views in 
communities where education ranks second in priority in the top four perceived needs of 
beneficiaries/villagers after the need for drinking and irrigation water.66 
 
From 2002, when the ‘Back to School’ campaign started, to 2004, Afghanistan faced a tremendous 
increase in the student population from 2.8 million to over 4 million; the number in 2004/5 has 
already reached over 5 million. A lack of schools, qualified teachers (male and female) and poor 
quality education is visible and evident. Even more obvious is the relatively high number of 
enrolled girls over the years. But this must also be seen in relation to the considerable number of 
girls who are still not enrolled because of lack of facilities (schools with female teachers) or other 
factors, for example because of cultural reasons. 
 
The government’s policy (shown in its EVT programme) reflects the needs of the people. 
Moreover, as a result of the cooperation of relevant ministries (MOE, MOHE, MOLSA), and 
despite hardly any meetings of CGs-Education in 2004, the EVT programme is a solid package of 
sub-programmes and projects, which is able to serve the people, as long as the education system is 
well tuned.  
4. 2 The framework for the Interventions 
Coordination 
The government’s, or rather the MOE’s, first few steps to plan and start educational programmes 
and attempts to create activities from scratch after the Taliban regime was only possible because of 
the strong support from donor countries and their Consultative Groups established relatively early in 
2002. It took the government some time to get settled and to work on policy matters and to 
coordinate educational issues between the four main ministries in education. Their visions, missions 
and ideas were finally realised in a very large EVT programme 2005 (from 2005 to 2008), which 
has to be funded mostly with external aid.  
 
Nonetheless, the implementation of this EVT programme needs much better and clearer 
coordination, which has up to now not been sufficient and effective. An overarching coordination 
and implementation strategy from the top down to school level was not found. 67 As previously 
observed, the author has not found any clear indication of the existence of descriptions of roles, 
tasks/activities/outputs, functions, responsibilities and performances between MOE as policy maker 
and service providers at different levels. The existence of differentiated coordination panels to link 
national and regional interests following prioritised projects was not seen. Coordination exists to 
some extent at a national level, except for the fact that CG meetings at MOE have taken less time 
than expected. It is also clear that the available minutes of E-CGs did not always show working 
orders/notes of who or which actors at subsequent levels should coordinate further and should 
implement tasks in which given time frame.  
 
The cooperation and coordination between MoE and our concerned aid actors was based on 
agreements. All of our actors in education worked closely with the ministry and were mostly 
members of CGs or TWGs. It appeared that the TWGs at MOE worked more pragmatically. 
                                                 
66 As a result of the interviews in the field. 
67 As the director of the PEO of Laghman mentioned: “With enough funds and stable planning structures there 
would be a chance to overcome the emergency stage towards development”. 
CMI REPORT AFGHANISTAN: FINDING, SECTORS  ANDTHEMES REPORT R 2005: 15  
 22 
 
Formerly mentioned constraints in a limited capacity for implementation at MOE in general, 
imprecise implementation arrangements, the weak alignment of government’s operations and 
development (ARTF-MOF-MOE): all these limitations are of course caused by coordination 
constraints, which have repercussions on the ground, such as when the governor (Nangarhar), 
officials from PEOs and DEOs and school principals of the two provinces complained of the need 
for investment in new schools and teaching and learning material/equipment. 
 
Active coordination between relevant aid actors themselves is rarely seen at the regional level. In 
Nangarhar, District Sorghrood, for example, it was found that CBS-type schools of international 
NGOs and formal government schools do not cooperate at all, but compete. As a principal 
explained: “There are negative side-effects with these CBS Schools which are managed by NGOs, 
because these schools attract children (girls) with additional incentives like shoes, bags etc. It has 
happened that girls have left formal schools to join the CBS supported schools. These matters 
disturb the whole system. Quite often school types of this kind collapse after incentives are no 
longer provided”. 
 
Meetings with ACBAR were attended by Provincial Board Educators and NGOs, but the outcome 
of these meetings did not seem to be very positive. Coordination between PEOs, DEOs and 
UNICEF is long established and effective. The PRT-Jalalabad will share information about their 
involvement in the development of education with NGOs through ACBAR meetings in future.  
Coherence 
Following the goals of the national educational policy, coherence can be seen where the 
international NGOs interviewed (SCA, IOM) and UN (UNICEF, WFP, UNESCO) cooperate in 
research work and surveys in the education sector at a national level. Curricula for grades 1 and 4, 
plus recently those for 2 and 5, were developed by Afghan experts under the guidance and with the 
financial support of the three UN organisations mentioned, WB, USAID and Denmark. In addition, 
the development of the new teacher training curriculum arrived as the result of good cooperation, 
despite the fact that its implementation is still being hampered. The CGs at the ministry played an 
active role overall. The teacher training curriculum deve lopment took place with the active 
participation of the aid providers. This indicates that, at a national level, the coherence of the 
activities of actors is more operational. 
 
It appears that when it comes to the realisation of educational tasks at a provincial and district level, 
willingness to cooperate decreases. Still, there is hope for improvement, given that aid actors/ 
implementing partners share information at least on meetings at the ACBAAR office in Jalalabad. 
Even PRT is shaping its education activities to national education policy. 
Connectedness 
Connectedness exists between societal structures and governmental educational institutions in the 
areas visited. Reasonable contact and understanding between aid providers and teachers/ parents of 
children of their well-monitored schools was observable.  
 
Communication and the relation between beneficiaries (shura/parents), the DEO, PEO are based on 
mutual understanding. If a village needs a school, then parents and shura members send their 
request to both of them. With some considerable delay, the whole process would take 1 to 4 years, 
depending on how tough and enthusiastic the village people are in fighting for their plans. The 
author had the impression that the bureaucratic procedures were very time consuming.  
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Beneficiaries of interventions are prepared to contribute 10-20% of the costs of school buildings 
(e.g. land, labour). This is also the government’s proclaimed expectation, a precondition for 
involvement in establishing schools. Communities are not able to contribute to improving the 
quality of education, yet the maintenance of buildings can be entrusted to them.  
 
It seemed to be a common goal of aid actors and implementing partners to provide education in 
remote areas through building up school facilities by establishing community based schools (CBS) 
or home schools to offer fast access to education. This policy of establishing CBSs and other 
temporary learning spaces is a longstanding practice and has recently become government policy. 
 
Connectedness between governmental structures at a national and regional level seemed to be weak 
because of a limited capacity for the implementation of EVT programmes in general. Moreover, the 
slow or late use of disbursed funds delayed investment in schools and additional technical 
equipment (teaching and learning materials, laboratories, libraries etc.). This is obviously because 
of weak information channels between the educational structures.  
4.3 The interventions carried out by aid providers 
Effectiveness 
Comments in interviews in the two provinces regarding the effectiveness of the three aid providers 
(DAARTT, UNICEF, SCA) were very positive. Schools of SCA – for clarification, these schools 
are registered and belong to the government, from which teachers receive a basic salary that is 
topped up by SCA – are slightly better equipped compared to “normal” government schools, and 
the spirit and motivation of teachers were much higher. A low motivation of teachers was quite 
often found in government schools, as a result of the low government salary they receive and their 
low social status. Moreover they are not in a position to earn their living and have to look for 
alternative opportunities.68 This undermines the whole education system of Afghanistan. 
 
Nevertheless, the weighted annual average salary of existing and new teachers (as multiples of per 
capita GDP) shows a figure of 2.7,69 whereas the WB benchmark indicates 3.3 for reaching the 
EfA/MDGs goals in 2015. This is perhaps achievable, but needs accurate follow-up in the years to 
come. 
 
Earlier complaints about the quality of implementation of NGOs in general have not been an issue 
with the NGOs concerned. Those interviewed raised this with regard to NGOs which were/are 
active in the building/construction sector. 
 
At a national level, the effectiveness of the management and implementation of the public school 
system seemed unsatisfactory. Not only was there a lack of educational infrastructure such as 
schools and school equipment, but teaching and learning equipment was missing, as described 
earlier. Teaching standards were weak and an improvement in basic pedagogic and teaching 
methods, subject teaching etc is urgently needed. The curriculum for grades 1 and 4 is now 
available (those for grades 2 and 5 have just been completed, the sixth will be developed soon) and 
a first batch of new textbooks were or should have been supplied at the beginning of the new school 
year. However, in most of the schools in the provinces concerned, textbooks were still urgently 
                                                 
68 Nearly all those interviewed, regardless of whether they were employed by government or not, were aware 
that teachers cannot live on the income they get from the government. Evidence is shown in the 9-day strike 
of 2000 teachers in the province of Farah in early Spring this year, where the government accepted some of 
the teachers’ demands. 
69 See: Investing in Afghanistan’s Future..., p.26. 
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needed. During the evaluation, adequate and reliable measurement methods or indicators of output 
results such as learning achievements of students were not found.70 All the above-mentioned 
indications conclude that the quality of Afghanistan education needs serious improvement.  
 
The target of reaching approximately 10,000 schools 71 will probably be achieved by the end of 
2005, as the director of the planning department indicated conclusively. 
 
The private sector was not taken into account in evaluating primary education during the period 
concerned. But it would be necessary for the future to assess and evaluate its possible contribution 
in the education sector, once the private sector has been more clearly defined in an overarching 
sector implementation strategy. 
 
With regard to provincial levels and the views of principals from bigger schools in Jalalabad and 
Metharlam, the fact that perhaps only 15 % of teachers are qualified and the lack of professionalism 
of supervisors is a considerable reason for the poor qua lity of education. There are too few teachers 
to serve all the schools in the provinces.  
 
Concerning a general lack of infrastructure one has to note the fact that offices of PEOs and DEOs 
were poorly equipped and often data were not easily accessible. 
 
Finally, a major concern is the immensely high teacher/student ratio in general. In Laghman in 
particular, the ratio in schools was on average 1:60-70, but in some schools it was even higher. 
Nangarhar schools had a ratio of 1:50-70. 72 In all the schools vis ited, open-air classes were 
predominant. Quite a number of teachers run double shifts and on top of this, they sometimes have 
to split normal teaching hours to allow more students to attend school.  
 
Teacher-parent associations rarely function well, although this is a known tool for retaining students 
at school, as well as reducing dropout rates. 
 
After the end of the Taliban regime, there was no modern educational monitoring system of any 
kind at either a national or a provincial level. The current education information data system (hand-
counted) provides data too slowly and too late. Reaching or achieving the goals of the MDGs is 
therefore questionable, because yearly progress cannot be measured adequately. Unlike UNICEF, 
the SCA uses its own very efficient and effective monitoring system. Differences in these two 
systems seemed to be not that great, however. UNICEF’s RALS system (Rapid Assessment on 
Learning Spaces) receives data on enrolled children and so on, based on extrapolations from 
household surveys. It is highly recommended that MOE’s EMIS should be established in provinces 
and districts as well. As one school principal put it, “it would also be nice if UNICEF trained them 
(PEO and DEO) in using this monitoring system here in the province”. 
Efficiency 
Measuring the efficiency of educational programmes is generally a difficult task because of the 
complexity and time needed for evaluation. Nonetheless, as an example of the efficiency of the 
NGOs concerned (SCA, DAARTT and UNICEF), cost comparisons of school construction are 
discussed above. 
 
                                                 
70 Learning achievements will be measured, according to information from headmasters, by supervisors 
asking students questions related to lessons taught. 
71 See: Investing in Afghanistan’s Future..., p.28. 
72 Results from interviews. 
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The costs of school buildings were similar, around US$ 8,000, and corresponded with the EfA 
indicator (US$ 8,000); their overhead costs were reasonable at 12 to 15 %; and valuated local labour 
costs were calculated at 15-20 % of total construction costs. This is in line with cost estimates that 
the Department of Construction (MOE) expects whenever it approves new proposals of NGOs. 
UNICEF’s school rehabilitation and construction programmes run by local NGOs have shown 
similar results. 
 
Measured results of the efficiency of the UNICEF organisation in Afghanistan cannot be delivered 
because this requires a separate and additional evaluation. It can, however, be stated that when 
looking at figures of children who started their school career through UNICEF’s “Back to School” 
campaign and the activities thereafter, without these yearly campaigns it would not have been 
possible to enrol approximately 5 million students. What is debatable is the assumed high cost of 
security for its staff, which could not be figured out. Logically one can say that NGOs deliver 
services much more cheaply, but this issue of which is actually cheaper is not comparable because 
of different tasks based on different visions and missions. 
  
SCA’s programme in education can be evaluated for the year 2003. The cost of one student per 
year, including the proportional cost for overheads, is around € 23.73 This amount is almost identical 
to the cost of € 21 per student per year in the GTZ-BEFARe project in Peshawar/Pakistan in 2002. 74  
 
Finally, all contributions to SCA, DAARTT came more or less at the right time. According to the 
Aid Flow Study, almost all the donor countries channelled parts of their financial aid to UNICEF’s 
education programme (Danida only for 2002). Specifically for UNICEF’s “Back to School” 
campaign, funds from most of the donor countries came right on time. 
 
To review the efficiency and the financial condition and preparedness of government to implement 
its EVT programme under the question whether Afghanistan can achieve universal primary 
education or not, one has to look at the only available key outcome data and service delivery 
indicators from “Investing in Afghanistan’s Future” (published 2005). The only two available 
outcome figures show that:  
 
a) expenditure on inputs other than teachers’ sala ries (as a % of primary education recurrent 
spending) came to 40 %; the indicated target set for 2015 is also 40 %;  
b) the key outcome indicator for educational recurrent spending (as a % of government revenue) is 
24 %; the target set for 2015 is 25 %.  
Other figures on government actual or projected domestic resource mobilisation are not available. 
Impact 
All three aid providers made a valuable contribution to the education sector in the provinces of 
Nangrahar and Laghman from 2001 to 2005. DAARTT provided about 1,300 learning spaces 
through its construction of buildings in the two provinces. SCA supported roughly 24,000 
schoolchildren through its education programme in this area. UNICEF’s rehabilitation and 
construction programme made 54,000 learning spaces for beginners available. Not to be forgotten, 
some thousands of students of 600 CBS schools in the eastern zone also found their way to 
education (exact figures of enrolled students in CBS schools for our two provinces were not 
available at the time). 
 
                                                 
73 Extracted and calculated from Budget sheet: SCA - ADR03 final June 04. 
74 See: E. M. Johannessen et al for UNHCR/GTZ: Evaluation of GTZ/Basic Education for Afghan Refugees 
(BEFARe) in Pakistan, October 2002. 
CMI REPORT AFGHANISTAN: FINDING, SECTORS  ANDTHEMES REPORT R 2005: 15  
 26 
All in all, of the approximately 450,000 students enrolled in both provinces in 2004, the three 
organisations concerned (DAARTT, SCA, UNICEF) made sure that within their programme some 
72,000 school children were supported by donor contributions from the five countries. 
 
At a national level it can be shown that UNICEF and Danida and others have substantially 
supported MOE in developing the national curricula for grades 1 and 4 as well the development of 
related textbooks and their printing; support has also been given to grades 2 and 5, whose textbooks 
are on the way to be printed. The new teacher training curriculum, which was partly supported by 
Danida, should be mentioned as well. Moreover, the “Back to School Campaign” (led by UNCEF) 
enabled millions of students to begin their education. 
4. 4 Findings regarding performance of the main aid channels 
The Government of Afghanistan 
The capacity and performance of the implementation of education is weak. This is not only the case 
at a national level, but also a problem at provincial and district level. The management and 
implementation capacity is low and needs to be improved. As a foreign advisor in this sector said, 
there is very weak management at all levels within MOE to handle the whole educational system 
from top to bottom. It is evident that this situation affects the educational system overall in 
Afghanistan. A shortage of funds for investment in educational infrastructure etc. seemed to be 
evident, as is shown in the EVT programme of 2005, which was confirmed by the director of the 
national planning department of MOE. The lack of sufficient funds for investment at school level 
was evident from visits and from interviews with officials at the regional level. The last point can 
also be attributed to the poorly managed alignment of disbursement of the government’s operational 
and development funds and disbursements from ARTF.  
 
As described earlier, Denmark is the only one of the five countries to support the ministry directly 
in its EVT programme. It seems that Danida’s direct budget support showed no delays in the 
disbursement of funds. The component of its management support for managing and effective 
utilisation of external aid funds is seen as a very positive initiative, as were the contributions to 
curriculum development, the teacher training curriculum, textbook development and so on. 
UN 
Without UNICEF’s initiative in the “Back to School” campaign and its immediate and sound 
reaction after the fall of the Taliban regime, millions of students would not have had the chance or 
any opportunity to start a school career. Its contribution to MOE on the new curriculum, textbook 
development, teacher training curriculum, and management courses for MOE staff should be 
mentioned here again. Its performance is rated as very positive. As was mentioned on various 
occasions during the fieldwork, UNICEF could play a more active role in training PEO/DEO 
personal and principals, as well as their normal training of teachers in the use of modern 
monitoring, the use of the new EMIS system. Another issue could have been a discussion on 
decreasing the high security cost of the UN apparatus and instead using some of these funds to 
support more schools. Recent violence in Afghanistan weakened this proposition, unfortunately. 
NGOs 
DAARTT performs professionally in its construction programme, its construction management, its 
cost calculations are sound and professional and the costs of schools construction did not exceed the 
EfA indicator of US$ 8,000 for each schoolroom.  
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INGO 
Since the early 1990s, SCA has practised and implemented its educational programme with great 
success under difficult and volatile conditions. It is very active in raising funds for investment in its 
educational activities. Its capacity for implementing educational programmes gives room for 
expansion, which would, however, require more financial support from their home country. Their 
policy of selection criteria for establishing new schools is seen very positively. The main aim is to 
support and assist former war-affected zones in particular, which is generally applied. Their costing 
parameters for new buildings are similar to those of DAARTT and do not exceed the EFA indicator 
of US$ 8,000 per classroom; the cost of one student per year, including the proportional cost for 
overheads, is almost identical to the cost of € 21 per student per year in the GTZ-BEFARe project in 
Peshawar/Pakistan in 2002. 
5. Overall conclusions 
A general conclusion is that the emphasis placed on education has been correct and timely. There is, 
however, considerable concern about the quality of education. This ensure the quality there is a 
need to engage more with MoE on their capacity development in the planning and implementation 
(covering all levels from centre to school), setting up strategies with time frames and measuring 
achievements accomplished. 
 
Given Afghanistan’s ranking in the education sector among comparable developing countries it can 
perhaps still achieve the MDGs by 2015 if quite intensive improvements and finely tuned measures 
within the whole system can be applied. Therefore, Afghanistan will not be in a position to achieve 
these ambitious goals without more donor assistance for intervention in the education sector over 
the coming 5 to 10 years. 
 
The international donor community, the World Bank and others should start a debate in general, as 
to whether the existing funding process mechanism for implementing the EVT-PIP programmes is 
the most suitable within the existing set-up, given: a) the contribution of timely disbursements of 
ARTF to the government’s core budget (operation and partly development budget) and external 
budget (purely for development expenses), and b) the matching of or between these, and finally c) 
the whole funding alignment between ARTF, MOF and MOE. This would require a far deeper and 
more focused analysis than this evaluation was in a position to do. The potential of community self-
help initiatives is one great advantage that should be further utilised, not only by educational 
authorities but also by donors, by including this concept in the definition of new programmes for 
educational support. 
6. Recommendations 
6.1 Short-term recommendations 
To Danida/MOE/MOF/ARTF 
The mechanism of the disbursement of funds should be improved. The alignment of the 
government’s operational and development budgets should be properly adjusted so that additional 
required disbursements from ARTF to MOF reach MOE in a timely manner and funds needed in 
provinces are available for paying salaries on time, for investment in the educational infrastructure, 
teaching/learning materials, office equipment of PEOs/DEOs, and so on. As stated in the 
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conclusions, it seems to be an issue of national interest that WB and donor countries should look 
into. In consequence this recommendation can be attributed as well to medium- and long-term 
recommendations, according to the preparedness of government and the international donor 
community.  
 
To UNICEF/all 5 donors/MOE 
The EMIS system should be used at MOE properly and should be established in all the provinces. 
The E-CG should supervise the process of usage of first EMIS-generated data via their new 
bimonthly scheduled coordination meetings. UNICEF and SCA should utilise their experience and 
capacity in monitoring of the training of educational authorities at provincial and district level. 
 
To UNICEF/Danida/INGOs(SCA)/MOE 
The newly developed teacher training programme should be implemented soon. A programme to 
build up the skills and competency of school supervisors should be developed soon. 
 
To GOA/MOF/MOE 
A teacher’s salary reform is overdue. UNICEF and others could advise government. Furthermore: 
a) Donors could consider providing partly additional contributions to increase teachers’ salaries 
with additional earmarked financial support to ARTF. As a pre-condition, GoA must find out a way 
to improve its local revenue base plus make a commitment to budgetary improvements in the 
education sector; it has to establish it as a priority in its budgetary policies to make it sustainable. It 
would necessarily lead government to review its payment structure, its tax policy and further 
financial management policies to improve local revenues.  
b) SIDA and SCA and other donors should reconsider their existing policy of topping up teacher 
salaries. 
 
To the MOE:  Printing and delivery of textbooks should be accelerated by government. 
 
To the Donor community/MOE 
Information channels should be designed and implemented to make regional structures (provinces 
and districts) aware of new EVT programmes, sub-programmes and projects. Donors may visit 
provincial education authorities on a regular schedule. It helps PEOs to be seen as partners, which 
are integrated in the overall process of strengthening the education sector. 
 
After TORs have been revised by mid 2005, CG and TWG minutes should include clear 
instructions on attributed tasks and delivery time frames.  
 
To UNICEF/donor community/MOE 
The UNICEF launched and ongoing management courses for MOE staff could also be supported by 
the five countries with short courses in Europe. 
6.2 Medium-term recommendations 
To UNICEF/Danida/MOE 
An overarching national sector/sub-sector strategic plan for EVT programme implementation and 
coordination should be developed soon. Clear and distinct roles and responsibilities for the 
implementation of prioritised grouped projects should be defined. It should include all sub-
programmes and projects with their interlinkages. It should include all educational structures down 
to school level and all other education actors concerned: UNs (UNESCO), IOs, INGOs, NGOs and 
the private sector.  
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To the MOE  
More flexibility should be given to provinces and districts through a more decentralised education 
management.  
PEOs should be advised to establish provincial coordination meetings to address all education-
related partners for one common implementation task. 
 
To UNICEF/Danida/UNESCO/MOE 
Indicators of learning achievements of students should be developed and implemented soon; 
training courses for school supervisors should be developed and the usage of output indicators be 
taught. 
 
UNICEF/WB/MOE/MRRD 
Following the first EMIS school base survey of 2004, a new nationwide education needs assessment 
should be launched to collect reliable data for future strategies to equalise regional disparities in 
education and to adjust the existing implementation pattern where needed. In general, needs 
assessments, including measuring impacts, should be mandatory for aid providers. UNICEF, SCA 
and DAARTT and others could share their experiences in carrying out surveys with PEOs and 
DEOs and also with other providers. 
 
MOE 
A policy to encourage private sector investment in the education sector should be developed 
and deployed (including incentive/ tax models etc.). 
 
All five donors/MOE 
The general negative image of NGOs in Afghanistan requires a quick response in order to sustain 
their present momentum in education. As an example, SCA, as the biggest educator in the country, 
faces uncertainties of future educational involvement, not only in education, but also as far as their 
other activities are concerned. SIDA could play a supportive role on this aspect at the bilateral level. 
6.3 Long-term recommendations 
To the DCI, MOFA Netherlands/DFID/Sida 
Donor countries could consider earmarking their funds for determined implementation periods and 
geographical regions, which would help to overcome regional disparities. Available funds at ARTF 
should be channelled according to set time schedules and according to set benchmarks. 
 
To the five Donors/MOE 
The potential of community self-help initiatives should be intensively utilised, not only by the 
educational authorities, but also by donors in short- and long-term planning processes and should be 
considered by all aid providers within their educational implementation processes. 
 
To Danida/MOE 
To overcome the lack of an educational physical infrastructure, more schools should be constructed 
through the NSP programme. The MoE and MRRD should intensify their awareness campaigns and 
should furthermore extend the programme to all districts.  
 
MOE 
A long-term strategy should be developed and implemented to increase the number of teacher-
parent associations and to revitalise existing ones in helping to reduce drop-out rates and increase 
retention rates etc. (The aim should be one association at each school). 
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All five donors, except Danida 
It is strongly recommended that donors should consider a longer planning frame for their 
engagement in education; 5 to 10 years’ engagement of committed funding would be necessary. 
7. Lessons learned 
- Experiences over recent years have questioned if donors do prefer long-term commitments. 
This is perhaps primarily influenced by the fact that aid had to flow into Afghanistan to reduce 
deprivation, as in other post-conflict countries. Nonetheless, as already stated not only 
emergency and rehabilitation funds but also development funds have already been utilised. But 
donor countries still need perhaps to reorientate towards more long-term committed 
development funding in order to prevent the country from falling back into chaos. 
 
- Proper coordination and implementation in education is needed in order to reach a high 
educational standard so that people/parents realise that their “government is really doing 
something for us, for our children”. Otherwise frustration arises and their belief in good 
governance and the credit which people have attributed to their new government will be lost. 
This is very important in post-conflict countries. 
 
- The assistance of donor countries is necessary, expected and highly appreciated by the recipient 
government as well. But it is also best not to state repeatedly that the management system is 
weak, as one high ranked ministerial complained: his people know about existing management 
weaknesses.  
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Securing Afghanistan’s Future: Technical Annex on Education; 1/2004, p.19. 
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1. Background 
This report is intended to assist the Evaluation of Humanitarian and Reconstruction Assistance to 
Afghanistan (Re. No. 104.A.1.e.39-2) provided by Denmark, Ireland, the Netherlands, Sweden and 
the UK, October 2001 to early 2004, with a special focus on the environmental sector. 
2. Introduction 
Afghanistan faces critical environmental problems. The unprecedented environmental problems in 
Afghanistan,1 further deepen the immense environmental scarcity2 in this country, which in turn 
affects the livelihoods of millions of people and endanger the continuity of a very ancient 
civilisation. It is very important to understand that environmental damage not only threatens the 
Afghanistan land’s carrying capacity, but also the people’s coping capacity. Studies on quantitative 
impact of environmental degradation on GDP growth indicate the substantial adverse consequences 
of air and water pollution on public health and the adverse impact of deforestation and soil 
degradation on productivity in the agriculture sector.3 
 
It is attempted here to provide a snapshot of the status of environment by illustrating how the 
activities of people in this country have affected their environment and how environmental decline 
and degradation is affecting their livelihoods and the overall economy of the country. It is attempted 
to find out if the humanitarian and reconstruction assistance provided by the five concerned donors 
during the period from 2001 to 2004 had been directed to ease these problems and if it had any 
positive or negative effects and impacts, particularly on IDPs. In this framework, standing 
environmental issues are debated to assist the decision-makers in charting meaningful future 
strategy in allocating fund for donors’ programs in the environment sector, based on the 
environmental needs of Afghanistan.  
 
It is known that the assistance provided by the five concerned donors to Afghanistan so far did not 
consider environmental sector independently of other related sectors in a systematic and efficient 
manner. This makes it difficult to provide a complete and holistic picture of the underlying 
environmental factors that impeded the process of development in the country in the past three 
years, and quantify the role of these donors assistance in this picture. It is also noticeable that, in 
Afghanistan, baseline data that could reflect particular circumstances of the state of environment are 
not available to assist in measuring the impact of donors’ assistance on the pertaining issues in 
environmental sector.  
3. Methodology 
This study relied on both the available data, and also on “common sense” based on reasoning 
supported by anecdotal evidence and author’s direct observations and interviews in the field, review 
                                                 
1 Saba, S. Daud, (2001): Afghanistan: Environmental Degradation in a Fragile Ecological Setting. 
International Journal of Sustainable Development and World Ecology. Volume 8, pp.279-289. 
2 Thomas F. Homer-Dixon, (1999). Environment, Scarcity, and Violence, Princeton University Press, pp.253. 
3 Pakistan NHDR, (2003): Pakistan National Human Development Report: Poverty, Growth and Governance. 
Oxford Univ. Press, UNDP, New York.  
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of media reports, and professional discretion. For this evaluation no case study has been conducted, 
thus the sources of information on the assessment of the interventions were limited, as the 
interventions in environmental sector were either non-existent or scant and always tied to other 
related sectors that have been evaluated independently of this author. Wherever needed, a reference 
has been given of these evaluations.  
4. The role of donors in environment sector 
Although, most of the five concerned donors are vanguards of environmental sectors in their own 
countries, they did not have a clear policy on their interventions in the environment sector in 
Afghanistan. However, they have indirectly provided some assistance for environment-related 
projects through UN, ICRC, ECHI, and EU, which has been involved in humanitarian assistance 
and development projects that may have positive impacts on the environment, e.g., reference to 
water and sanitation sector, or the UN Green Afghanistan Initiative (GAIN), as well as the UNEP 
environmental capacity building assistance to National Environmental Protection Agency (NEPA) 
or Ministry of Agriculture, Food and Animal Husbandry (MoAFAH). Apparently there weren’t any 
fund during the evaluated period earmarked for environment sector, thus, it is not possible to 
measure the amount of assistant from these donors that might have directly spent for environment 
sector specific.  
 
As far as the aid is provided for environment-related projects, it has certain relevance  to local 
environmental needs, but indeed with extremely limited and insufficient coverage. The coherence 
between GoA policies and local aid provisions for environmental sector is extremely weak, and 
there is no coherence  between international aid provisions and environmental sector’s needs at the 
national and the local levels. To some degree, there is connectedness with the societal structures 
where the aid is provided, particularly when it comes to NSP projects in rural Afghanistan.  
 
The sustainability of the interventions is questionable, since there is neither adequate coherence, 
nor proper coordination in the environment sector. As far as the efficiency of aid for environmental 
sector is concerned, such assistance has not been efficient at all, since no environmental outputs 
could be measured for aid towards environment-related projects to justify efficiency of the aid in 
this particular sector. It would have been much more efficient if aid for environmental sector has 
been earmarked for specific environmental programs in the sector in coordination with NEPA of 
GoA.  
 
The effectiveness and timeliness of the aid for environmental sector is almost negligible, with no 
sector-specific aid provided so far, and the sector-specific coordination in assistance towards 
environment-related projects among the donors and the implementing partners at national or local 
levels been extremely weak. However, during this time, advisory group (AG) meetings in this sector 
has been convened sporadically, but the natural resources consultative group (CG) that suppose to 
coordinate the recommendations of the AG in this sector has not been convened at least in a year. 
Thus, the impact of the concerned donors’ aid provided for environment sector in the past three 
years has been almost non-existent or extremely negligible. 
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5. Observations 
5.1 The issue of sustainability 
In the framework of development assistance for Afghanistan, environmental considerations must 
help in bringing equity into the community, i.e., distributive justice for choices and opportunities 
among the participants of environmental projects to help in creating a sustainable environment, 
which in turn increases the possibilities of choosing, i.e., the freedom of participation. Donors must 
make sure that their assistance promotes development in Afghanistan in a way that “choices” of 
future generations will not be unfairly reduced by the urgent needs of the current generation, and 
human development is promoted in the country. Thus, a balance between the compulsions of 
today’s needs that could be tackled by humanitarian and emergency assistance and the needs of 
tomorrow that could be tackled by development assistance in Afghanistan must be given a priority 
in designing assistance provisions and strategies.  
 
At this time, Afghanistan does not have the capacity to formulate, plan, implement and manage 
environmental policy, and to incorporate these programs into its overall efforts in post-war 
development. Only recently, on May 10th, 2005, the National Environmental Protection Agency 
(NEPA) of Afghanistan has been established. It is required that the national capacity of this newly  
established institution in designing and implementation of environmental policy must be 
strengthened. This means training people and setting up appropriate institutional capacity based on 
the active participation of communities and project beneficiaries in the process of design and 
implementation of strategies and programs. Donors should make every effort to understand and 
incorporate the requirements of these challenges into their assistance programs, which previously 
have been either neglected or very poor. 
5.2 The nexus of environmental degradation and poverty 
Much of the interface between poverty and environment in Afghanistan revolves around the effects 
of the environment on the poor. These occur in the form of environmental hazards, i.e., biological 
pathogens and chemical pollutants in the air, water, soil or food, as well as physical hazards and 
environmental degradation, i.e., inadequate use or waste of renewable and non-renewable resources, 
high levels of biodegradable and non-biodegradable wastes generation.4  
 
Environmental degradation in Afghanistan hits those living in poverty the hardest, a number that 
encompasses more than 50% of the population.5 The majority of those who suffer from water and 
air pollution, inadequate sanitation, and poor solid waste management are the poor. Poor people are 
also the group of citizens that are most affected by desertification, floods, storms, earthquake 
disasters, and harvest failures. In certain circumstances, the poor Afghans and environmental 
damage are caught in a downward spiral. The past resource degradation of the country deepens 
today’s poverty, while today’s abject poverty in the country makes it very hard to care for or restore 
the vitality and the carrying capacity of the fragile ecosystems of this land. 6  
 
                                                 
4 Satterthwaite, David, (1999): The links between poverty and the environment in urban areas of Africa, Asia 
and Latin America. Paper presented at the UNDP-EC Expert Workshop on Poverty and the Environment, 
Brussels, Belgium, 20-21 January 1999. 
5 ANHDR 2004: Afghanistan National Human Development Report 2004: Security with a Human Face, 
UNDP, Kabul. 
6 Daud Saba, 2004: Afghanistan NHDR background paper on Environment, UNDP Kabul, Afghanistan. 
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Afghans in poverty are forced to deplete resources to survive. This is a process that further 
impoverishes them7. When this self-reinforcing downward spiral peaks, poor people were forced to 
move in increasing numbers to other ecologically fragile lands of the country. Such was the case of 
displacements of tens of thousands of poor IDPs from the provinces of Badghis and Ghor during the 
recent years of drought to the barren lands of Herat; or the displacements of tens of thousands of 
people from Nimruz and Farah provinces, which are ecologically extremely poor and fragile parts 
of Afghanistan, in the aftermath of the sandstorms of 2002 and 2003, respectively. 8 
 
Poverty in Afghanistan, though a very complex and multifaceted phenomenon, in most cases is the 
result of environmental degradation that if not intervened could potentially reach to a point of no 
return, after which poverty and social instability are inevitable. This is the case in many parts of 
south and southwestern Afghanistan, where stability is a major concern. There are ample evidence 
that re-enforce the notion that poverty and inequity are driving factors in creating environmental 
degradation, particularly noticeable in rural areas of Afghanistan, where poverty in combination 
with a lack of economic and social justice and opportunities forces farmers to exploit land resources 
in unsustainable manners, resulting in further land degradation, deforestation, biodiversity loss, and 
water shortages that further enhances the poverty.9  
5.3 The nexus of environment and gender 
Men and women are exposed to different environmental stresses in different ways. In Afghanistan, 
women are more exposed to high levels of indoor air pollution due to the fact that they spend more 
time at home, working in the kitchen. These women are doubly affected by environmental 
deterioration, first because of poverty, and second because of their role and status in their traditional 
patriarchal society. In such a setting, environmental degradation has placed a disproportionate 
burden on women, largely because of their social and economic role, which expose them to a 
greater number of environmental hazards.10  
 
Traditionally the Afghan women have primary responsibility for household chores, activities that 
keep them inside the house for most of the time. As they prepare food for the household, they are 
often exposed to high levels of smoke and dust for long periods of time, reducing their life 
expectancy more than that of the Afghan men. Afghan women also bear the responsibility of  
washing the family’s clothes. As far as the inadequate washing mechanism and facilities, poor 
sanitation, and contaminated water supplies in the country are concerned, this activity could pose 
serious health hazards to the women. Furthermore, the women are usually responsible for caring for 
the sick children and elderly, which in turn increases their exposure to disease-causing pathogens.  
 
These activities significantly reduce women’s time for other activities that they inspire, as well as 
exposing them to health risks that the men does not get exposed to, or not being exposed in this 
frequency. Moreover, girls often help their mother in house chores, depriving them of valuable time 
for education. Physiological factors also play a part in making the Afghan women’s health more 
vulnerable to environmental elements, i.e., the women are particularly at risk during pregnancy and 
after childbirth that make them more vulnerable to such diseases as malaria.11  
                                                 
7 Fukuda-Parr, Sakiko, and Shiva Kumar, A.K., (2003): Unequal Human Impacts Of Environmental Damage. 
In: Readings in Human Development, Sakiko Fukuda-Parr & A.K. Shiva Kumar (eds.). Oxford University 
Press, New Delhi, pp.308-335. 
8 IRIN, (2003): The Iranian International News Agency quoting the UN Office for the Coordination of 
Humanitarian Affairs, 24 Jul 2003. 
9 Daud Saba, 2004: NHDR background paper on Environment, UNDP Kabul, Afghanistan. 
10 WRI, (1996): World Resources 1996-97. World Resources Institute, Oxford University Press, New York.  
11 Ibid. 
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Right from the beginning of post-Taliban involvement of international community with 
Afghanistan, donors have been emphasizing the gender issues, while, ironically ignoring the 
environmental problems that affect the women the most. It is suggested here that gender issues in 
Afghanistan could not be addressed by donors adequately without an emphasis on environmental 
factors that affect the lives of Afghan women. 
6. Environmental awareness 
Functioning illiteracy and educational poverty in Afghanistan has been an important factor in 
contributing to environmental degradation and further impoverishment of the people. For example, 
farmers who out of ignorance inappropriately use pesticides and fertilizers can inadvertently harm 
themselves, their families, and the soils and water on which they depend. Once their ecological 
balance is disturbed, it takes lots of resources to restore that balance again, which they do not have 
at their disposal. This process may consequently drives them further into poverty and inequity. 
 
In Afghanistan, the public understanding of the links between environmental degradation, health 
and human livelihoods is very low. To tackle this problem, adequate policy measures and awareness 
campaigns have to be implemented at national and provincial levels and in the communities. 
Afghanistan does not have the resources for this, and the donors largely ignored this need in their 
assistance programs. In this framework, the newly established NEPA, in the capacity of the national 
environmental agency of the country, bears the foremost responsibility in designing and 
implementing campaigns. But NEPA without an appropriate and targeted assistance from donors 
cannot function efficiently to fill the present gap of the environmental awareness and ingenuity that 
exist in Afghanistan.  
7. Degraded land resources 
Afghanistan is a traditional agrarian society, with rural Afghans constituting some 79.9 percent of 
the population. 12 The Afghan farmers, almost all of them poor, depend directly on what they can 
grow, and are particularly vulnerable to degradation of the land resources. Agricultural sector in this 
country is and will remain a critical component of economic growth and human development. 
However, in its current structure and capacity, this sector is inefficient, and creates more 
environmental problems than it pays for.  
 
In Afghanistan, there are several provinces and regions especially to the west and south-west of the 
country that are influenced by the gradual desiccation of the environment, loss of vegetation and 
consequently humus in the soil, resulting in a looser, sandier soil structure, and ever more arid 
conditions. Here, in some cases, desertification is caused either by abandoning the fragile lands that 
need to be frequently cared for, and ironically in other cases through reclamation, overgrazing and 
the destruction of vegetation for use as fuel wood, a trend that is getting ever stronger.  
 
In southwestern regions of Afghanistan, the notorious ‘wind of 120 days’, which blows from the 
northwest between May and September, scours the landscape, driving banks of mobile sand and 
adding to instability in the drainage network. Without a stable source of water, much of the natural 
vegetation of these regions has died or been collected for fuel wood, further contributing to soil 
                                                 
12 CSO, (2003): Central Statistics Office of Afghanistan. Official data presented during the Workshop on 
National Human Development Report of Afghanistan, 8-9 December 2003, Kabul. 
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erosion and significant movement of sand onto the irrigated areas. Majority of IDPs are in fact 
environmental refugees from these regions. In 2002, up to 100 villages in this region have been 
submerged by windblown dust and sand,13 to be followed by sandstorms of 2003 that buried 57 
villages in the province of Farah, affecting more than 12000 people, and forced thousands of people 
into IDPs camps or left them homeless, destroyed crops and contaminated water supplies.14  
 
In major urban centres such as Kabul, Herat, Kandahar and Mazare-Sharif, the expansion of urban 
developments are constantly eating up the most fertile lands that once were feeding these cities. It is 
ironic that historically, these cities have been established here because of the fertile land itself. 
Now, green fields are disappearing from the view by the passage of each day, a process that if not 
stopped, will irreversibly degrade and destroy the fragile and limited agricultural lands of 
Afghanistan. The greatest damage has been done to the agricultural lands in the suburbs of Kabul.  
 
Wetlands all over the country are degraded or threatened by severe degradation. Particularly, in the 
Kabul region, most of these sensitive ecosystems have been drained for development purposes.  
 
Helping Afghanistan to modernize the production processes of its agro-industry and social relations 
in rural areas by incorporating the farmers to the market through reorientation of production from 
subsistence models to market-oriented approaches will help in overcoming some of the critical 
environmenta l problems pertaining to degradation of land resources. This requires donors’ 
assistance in helping the community to receive and adopt new technologies and innovations to their 
needs.  
8. Deforestation 
Assessing the incomplete evidence available to them in the late 1970s, FAO concluded that most of 
north, central and eastern Afghanistan was wooded until early in the 19th century.15 Estimates at 
that time suggested that there were almost 1 million hectares of oak forest, and about 2 million 
hectares of coniferous forests, mainly pine and cedar. In total these forests amounted to some 4.5 
per cent of the land area. Various types of open woodland, with pistachio, juniper and other species, 
covered about 32 million hectares, or 48 per cent of the land area.16 A 1993 estimate17 suggested that 
forest cover in the east had decreased by 16 per cent to about 12000 km2 since the 1970s, a loss of 
some 2300 km2. 
 
Analysis of landsat satellite images covering the provinces of Nuristan, Kunar and Nangarhar for 
1977 and 2002 revealed that forest cover has decreased by a total of 52 per cent when the provinces 
are taken together. Nengarhar province has been the hardest hit, with a 71 per cent decrease in forest 
cover. Meanwhile, forest cover in Nuristan has decreased by 53 per cent, and Kunar by 29 per cent. 
                                                 
13 Partow, H., (2003): Sistan Oasis Parched by Drought. In Atlas of Global Change. United Nations 
Environment Programme. Oxford University Press, Oxford. 
14 IRIN, (2003): The Iranian International News Agency quoting the UN Office for the Coordination of 
Humanitarian Affairs, 24 Jul 2003. 
15 FAO, (1981): National Parks and Wildlife Management, Afghanistan. A contribution to a conservation 
strategy. Based on the work of J.A. Sayer and A.P.M. van der Zon. Vol. 1, text. Food and Agricultural 
Organization.FO:DP/AFG/78/007. Rome. 
16 Ibid 
17 FAO, (1993): Land Cover Map of the Islamic State of Afghanistan. 1:250,000 scale. Food and Agricultural 
Organization, Rome. 
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Residents predict similar losses for the forested regions in the provinces of Paktya, Khost and 
Paktika.18  
 
In the 1970s, dried fruits, raisins and nuts contributed more than 40 per cent of the country’s foreign 
exchange earnings, although the years of conflict have meant that the country has lost some of its 
former market niches. Prior to the outbreak of war in 1978, wild pistachio nut was one of the major 
export items in the Afghan economy, covering 4700 hectares of harvest area with production of 
3800 metric ton, which is reduced to a harvest area of 2700 hectares with production of 1600 metric 
ton in 1999. 19 A rapid expansion of orchard plantations and the adoption of modern systems and 
varieties occurred between 1989 and 1999,20 but is slowing down, which requires some intervention 
by economic and development policy makers and continuous support from donors in this sector. 
 
Given that a strong relationship between poverty and forests is already established,21 deforestation 
had significant human costs for Afghanistan. It is suggested that participatory policy in the 
management of forest resources of Afghanistan, and intensive reforestation efforts must be adopted 
at community levels all over the country. Research shows that adequate incentives and the 
recognition of community basic tenure rights can increase productivity, while at the same time 
improve protection of forest resources.22 Donors support in the implementation of such a strategy is 
a key. 
9. Biodiversity loss 
Loss of biodiversity in Afghanistan is a consequence endemic poverty and of severely degraded 
environment. The dominating causes of biodiversity losses are biotope destruction, overexploitation 
of wildlife resources, and wildlife trade, deforestation, soil erosion, desertification, air pollution, 
dust storms, agricultural degradation, primitive local industry, and steady drainage of sensitive 
montane wetlands in the quest for more fertile arable land, have severely disturbed the natural 
environment of the wild animals and plants, including many endemic species that are not recorded 
yet.  
 
The freshwater fishes of Afghanistan have been little studied, but many are believed to be endemic. 
Using explosive for fishing or so-called dynamite fishing, and electrifying fish colonies are popular 
fishing methods. Some wild plants that have commercial value are over exploited and disappearing 
in a fast rate, and if not protected, may become extinct. This not only threatens the natural wildlife 
heritage of the country, but is severely damaging the coping capacity of the Afghans, who mostly 
rely on natural resources for their livelihood.  
 
As Afghanistan opens up to the world, there is a need to adopt policies to protect the intrinsic worth 
of diversified species of its biological heritage. It is suggested that adequate policies and 
implementation procedures to protect the threatened or endangered species have to be immediately 
put in place through a participatory mechanism and community efforts, with support from donor 
                                                 
18 UNEP, (2003): Afghanistan: Post-Conflict Environmental Assessment, UNEP, Geneva, 175pp. 
19 FAOSTAT, (2000). Statistical Database 1990-1999 of the Food and Agriculture Organisation of the United 
Nations, Geneva. 
20 UNEP, (2003): Afghanistan: Post-Conflict Environmental Assessment, UNEP, Geneva, 175pp. 
21 PEI, (1999): The UNDP-EC Poverty and Environmental Initiative; Attacking Poverty While Improving the 
Environment: Towards Win-Win Policy Options, UNDP, New York, pp.78. 
22 CNHDR, (2002): China Human Development Report: Making Green Development A Choice, Oxford Univ. 
Press, UNDP, New York. 
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countries. Communal rights and innovations of the people and their traditional or indigenous 
technical knowledge (ITK) of their ecological wealth also merit protection.  
10. Water resources 
Surface as well as groundwater resources of Afghanistan have been severely affected by the 
continuous years of drought, as well as the uncontrolled and mismanaged extraction procedures. As 
dependence on groundwater resources increased, deep wells have been drilled without considering 
the long-term impacts on regional groundwater resources, including traditional Kareez systems. 
Many of the country’s wetlands are completely dry and no longer support wildlife populations or 
provide agricultural inputs. For example, over 99 per cent of the Sistan wetland found to be 
completely dry in the winter of 2002. 23  
 
Water-use efficiency is very low in all sectors, particularly in irrigation that causes losses through 
evaporation of over half of the precious water supply. There are also significant water losses due to 
outdated water supply infrastructure, lack of maintenance, and poor water supply management 
practices in urban areas.  
 
Generally, treatment and recycling of wastewater is almost non-existent. Wastewater collection 
barely exists in cities, often spewing into open gutters and canals, pos ing an extra risk to the poor 
children who gather in these places to play. Perhaps worst of all, urban drinking water supplies are 
being cross-contaminated with coliform bacteria posing a considerable risk to public health. Water 
resources across the country are also threatened by contamination from waste dumps, chemicals and 
open sewers. Foe example, water samples taken in Kabul clearly indicate that the city’s drinking 
water quality is cross-contaminated by sewage.24 Water pollution as measured by organic pollutants 
and suspended solids is a very serious issue in today’s Afghanistan, and requires immediate 
attention from policy makers and support from donors. For further evaluation information on this 
issue, please refer to the water and sanitation sector in this annex.  
11. Air quality 
Of all environmental challenges, the levels of air pollution are the most obvious in major urban 
centers of Afghanistan. However, due to the prevailing public ignorance, the average residents of 
these centers are so used to this ever-worsening situation that it does not bother them at all. Public 
media and state authorities are as ignorant of the situation as the ordinary citizens. Although no 
systematic study have been carried out to find the amount of suspended particulates, it is quite safe 
to assume that Afghanistan’s urban dwellers are exposed to many of the worst toxic and 
carcinogenic air pollutants known. A combination of dust and smoke particulates are common air 
pollution in rural Afghanistan.  
 
Results of air sampling in major urban centers of Afghanistan indicate high amounts of dust and 
concentrations of poly aromatic hydrocarbons (PAHs), most likely originating from vehicle exhaust 
emissions.25 Benzo-a-pyrene is also one of the pollutants detected and is believed to increase risk of 
lung cancer. The highest concentrations were detected in Mazar-e-Sharif, where analyses show 13.6 
Ng/m3. Topography in Kabul is such that it leads to frequent thermal inversions in cold seasons, an 
                                                 
23 UNEP, (2003): Afghanistan: Post-Conflict Environmental Assessment, UNEP, Geneva, 175pp. 
24 Ibid. 
25 Ibid. 
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atmospheric condition that can cover the city for days, resulting in air pollution to the extreme 
concentrations, which in some cases, brings the visibility to only a few meters.  
 
More than two-thirds of the mortalities emanating from air pollution are found to happen in rural 
areas.26 In Afghanistan, the rural population and nomads are at the bottom of the energy ladder, and 
must burn dung, wood and crop residues for cooking and heating indoors or inside their tents 
(ghejdis). This results in filling their poorly ventilated houses and tents with smoke, exposing them 
to very high levels of dangerous toxic substances that cause severe health problems and even death. 
Both indoor air pollution and poor nutrition increase susceptibility to respiratory infections among 
these groups of people. Among them, the women and children, who spend most of their time 
indoors, are disproportionately affected.  
 
As the demand for cooked bricks are rising in urban areas, township and village enterprises are 
responsible for a growing part of CO2 emissions by typically running exceedingly polluting brick 
cooking operations. Seasonally, burning of straw covers some countryside areas in thick smoke, a 
double loss, since this potentially substantial source of energy is transformed to smoke and dust for 
no purpose at all.  
 
Air pollution is considered as one of the leading risk factors for respiratory diseases, such as chronic 
obstructive pulmonary disease (COPD), lung cancer, pulmonary heart disease and bronchitis 
(CHDR, 2003). The scale of health impacts from air pollution in Afghanistan would be depending 
on such aspects as improved air quality and inspection regimes, better traffic flow management, 
reduction of dependency on small motor vehicles, improvement of the efficiency in household 
energy use, and above all, an adequate policy for a sustainable urban development. A design and 
implementation of a national air quality standard and policy could be a prerequisite to the 
achievement of these goals that requires adequate support from the donors.  
12. Solid waste management 
Despite low levels of consumption and production, solid waste management is already one of the 
country’s major environmental problems. Poorly managed domestic solid waste seriously threatens 
the health of the people. The proper management of solid waste is clearly an urgent priority in urban 
Afghanistan, which requires extensive donors support.  
 
In most areas of urban Afghanistan sanitation is lacking, resulting in waste heaps to become mixed 
with excreta, contributing to the spread of infectious diseases. For example, in the city of Kabul, the 
smelly dumps litter roadsides, back streets and empty lots, and the vicinity of public hospitals, 
restaurants, as well as local industry. In most of these cases, piles of industrial and hospital waste 
leach toxic substances into surface and ground waters. Again the poor suffer most. They live near 
waste disposal sites, and their children are the waste -pickers. In most of urban centres, the 
uncollected domestic waste is also the most common cause of blocked drainage channels, 
increasing the risk of flooding and water-borne diseases.  
 
Toxic effluents from chemical and mechanical shops in urban centres of Afghanistan also play an 
increasing role in environmental pollution. The typical contaminants from these sources are mainly 
grease, used automotive oil, acids, heavy metals such as cadmium and lead, and to a lesser amount 
                                                 
26 Fukuda-Parr, Sakiko, and Shiva Kumar, A.K., (2003): Unequal Human Impacts Of Environmental Damage. 
In: Readings in Human Development, Sakiko Fukuda-Parr & A.K. Shiva Kumar (eds.). Oxford University 
Press, New Delhi, pp.308-335. 
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pesticides. Workers in facilities that handle toxic materials and people living close to waste disposal 
areas are the main victims of the effects of these contaminants. Dumping and improper disposal of 
such materials are common, allowing waste to leach into and contaminate the scarce underground 
water supplies. Again it is the poor who suffer the most acute effects from these toxins.  
 
In rural Afghanistan, farmers, who apply pesticides or insecticides to their fields, neither have 
adequate training, nor protective clothing. With lack of functioning literacy in rural Afghanistan, 
peasantry are often unable to read even simple instructions, thus are exposed to serious health 
hazards from the unsafe use of these chemicals.  
13. Overall conclusions 
Concerns over environmental crisis in Afghanistan are real. The facts of environmental degradation 
are far more than exaggerations. Shockingly, they speak for themselves:  
· With poor sanitation and lack of solid waste management, most of the 16000 streets of 
Kabul stink. Hundreds of tons of garbage mixed with human excreta are littered all over 
the city to turn it into the dirtiest places on earth.  
· On average, only 23% people have access to safe drinking water;27 and the groundwater 
levels are uncertain; 
· Air quality in major cities, particularly in Kabul, most of the time becoming intolerable;  
· The poorest Afghans live in the most ecologically vulnerable areas; 
· Persistence of drought in the past few years forced hundreds of thousands of people to 
abandon their self-sustaining life styles and become environmental refugees called IDPs; 
· Only in 2002-2003, the dust storms destroyed the livelihoods of tens of thousand of people, 
and buried more than 100 villages in the provinces of Farah and Nimruz; 
· Wetlands of southwest Afghanistan have shrunk, and if not intervened could turn into 
deserts; 
· The fragile mountain forests are disappearing at a phenomenal pace;  
· In the past 30 years, almost 70% of the natural forest cover of the country has been lost, 
and the remaining is severely degraded. 
· The biodiversity is in decline and many species of flora and fauna are in the brink of 
endangerment or extinction here.  
 
Environmental pr iorities of the country are peculiar. At this point, Afghans are concerned with 
much more basic elements of human survival, i.e., safe water and healthy land resources. Polluted 
water is a threat to life. Each year thousands of our children suffer from acute diarrhoeal diseases, 
malaria, tuberculosis, and trachoma, and 85% of child mortality is due to preventable diseases 
related to environmental degradation. 28 The provision of safe drinking water and sanitation and 
some education in hygiene can dramatically help alleviate these environmental problems and relieve 
much human suffering.  
 
Eroded land is a treat to the livelihoods of almost 80 per cent of the Afghan population. Poverty is 
one of the greatest threats to the environment. If development policies are not adopted to overcome 
this, the poor will continue to overuse their natural habitat merely to survive. The consequent 
environmental depletion will affect generations to come. Lack of national environmental 
management capacity, and poor air and water quality in cities as well as rural areas is appalling, 
                                                 
27 UNICEF, 2003: UNICEF best estimate, Kabul. 
28 ANHDR 2004: Afghanistan National Human Development Report 2004: Security with a Human Face, 
UNDP, Kabul. 
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leading to health problems and substantial economic losses. Likewise, natural capital in the form of 
land, forest and biodiversity is under a long-term decline. 
 
These factors combine synergistically to negatively affect human health and welfare and hinder 
development. They increasingly constrain economic prospects and growth, and so pose a serious 
threat to Afghanistan’s mid and long-term stability, and sustainable human development. Yet, there 
are alternatives. Air and water resources can slowly be restored, forest and land degradation can be 
interrupted and even reversed, and biodiversity losses can be halted if adequate and timely 
interventions are to be made. Thus, in the short-term, efforts in environmental remedy should be 
focused on more localized phenomenon, such as air pollution, water pollution, soil degradation, and 
deforestation. National as well as donors priorities for spending should be immediately redirected to 
the most basic environmental needs and capabilities of Afghans. 
 
It is obvious from the above discussions that the issue of environmental security merits being one of 
the main concerns in the overall national strategy for sustainable development in Afghanistan, 
which needs serious long-term donors’ support and commitment in environmental sector. A model 
of sustainable development must incorporate environmentally safe technologies into all investment 
planning and seek ways to reflect the scarcity value of environmental resources in decision-making 
to ensure sustainability of development.29 In view of the fact that the five concerned donors are 
vanguards in environmental protection in their own rights, their assistance in this sector should be 
considerable. 
 
In the past three years, only a drop of the donors’ assistance has been indirectly allocated to 
environment–related projects in Afghanistan. The scale of action in environmental sector has been 
almost negligible, both on the part of the Afghanistan central and provincial governments, as well as 
the international donors. However, the stage for successful reconstruction of Afghanistan based on a 
sustainable development and environmentally aware agenda is ready. It is a matter of making the 
right choices to help make this happen. To achieve these goals, the establishment of frameworks 
only is insufficient. Action is needed, and this requires a major effort and commitment by all actors, 
including the concerned donors.  
14. Recommendations 
Short-term: Although apparently environmental concerns were getting an increase priority in the 
context of the National Development Framework for Afghanistan30, but in practice, so far neither 
the government of Afghanistan, nor the donors have taken the cross-cutting issues of this sector 
seriously. The NEPA is established only in May 2005. With this institutional framework in place, it 
is suggested that national goals and policies have to be established in par with the MDGs, to include 
environmental quality objectives, technical targets, and implementation measures. Without further 
delay, the donor community must focus on supporting these goals through specific capacity 
building programs aimed at NEPA. Gender-sensitive environmental awareness programs need to be 
supported by the five donors. 
 
Medium-term: Protecting the natural resource base will contribute to economic growth, social 
stability, and sustainable human development. It is obvious that economical growth and 
development in Afghanistan will be largely dependent on technical assistance of the donor 
                                                 
29 Johnson, et al., (1997): World Bank. as quoted in: China Human Development Report 2002, UNDP, Oxford 
University Press. New York. 
30 NDF, (2002): The Draft of the National Development Framework (NDF), April, 2002, Kabul, Afghanistan. 
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community. Thus, strengthening the local capacity in environmental management must be the focus 
of donors’ policy in environmental capacity development, and this requires firm commitment and 
supporting specific environmental management projects in Afghanistan mainly through NEPA and 
other Afghan counterpart.  
 
Equal and efficient access to natural resources, and the rights and entitlements of citizens to 
communal property are other issues that merit to be raised when projects are designed and 
implemented. Strengthening the environmental management is the very important element in this 
regard, which requires the provision of a strong role for communities in implementation of the 
policy, and a leadership role for the state in designing and promoting the policy with strong support 
from donors. This should be viewed as a short-term to medium-term policy of the donors. A 
stronger alliance between local communities, institutions of civil society, government and 
international community will facilitate such roles.  
 
Long-term: The coverage of interventions in the areas such as water and air pollution management, 
solid waste management, reforestation projects, fighting desertification and losses of biodiversity 
should be expanded and systematized. Although some of the ecosystem and biodiversity losses 
from the previous decades are irreversible, development and implementation of integrated economic 
and environmental policies through long-term projects are efficient tools in reducing the human 
impacts on the environment, and vice versa.  
 
Lessons Learnt: The current trend of environmental degradation in Afghanistan is leading the 
country deeper into poverty and dependency on donors, and if not reversed, the people of this 
country will be pushed further into the abyss of human insecurity, social conflict and misery, that 
will consequently be a threat not only to the stability of the region, but the world. Although 
indirectly some assistance has been provided by donors in environment-related sectors such as 
water and sanitation, but direct funding to the government of Afghanistan earmarked for 
environmental sector has been scant or non-existent, and the impact negligible. Donors did not 
have coordination in their activities in this sector, neither among themselves, nor with the 
government of Afghanistan, making the whole activities inefficient in providing direct support to 
the GoA to develop its environmental sector capacity.  
 
It is the time for donors to change their attitude in this regard, and understand the environmental 
sector requirements of this country and respond to it more efficiently and adequately. 
Environmental needs in Afghanistan are dire, and donors should not neglect this sector, as they did 
in the past three years. 
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1. Definition and understanding of gender1 
This study is based on a combination of a deskstudy, interviews with organisations and individuals 
in Kabul, field interviews in Paghman and Bamyan provinces and supplemented with findings from 
other team members having visited other Afghan provinces. 
 
An understanding of the concept of gender is essential to the integration of gender into development 
work. Whilst sexual identity is biologically determined, gender identity is not. It is constructed by 
society and therefore can change and is changed. Gender roles and relations are constantly 
changing, at variable rates and in diverse ways in different cultures and social groups. 
 
As in much of the world, the concept of gender is not well understood.  In Afghanistan, the term 
does not easily translate into the local languages and some interest groups regard the concept with 
considerable suspicion. At the same time, gender continues to be seen as a ‘women’s issue’ and the 
voices of eminent experts such as Nancy Hatch Dupree; cautioning that in Afghan society it is 
essential to include men in any gender development work, frequently go unheard. It is therefore 
essential that those programmes containing a focus on gender are well thought through and 
discussed with the community at large. Progress cannot be achieved without the cooperation and 
understanding of men and women, while at the same time acknowledge the specific need of women 
and to allow them to come forward and be ‘positively discriminated against’. 
2. Background information 
Under the Bonn Agreement “the participation of women and attention to their rights and status are 
both a requirement and a vision of the national peace and reconstruction process.” This agreement 
also established the Ministry of Women’s Affairs (MoWA) and the Afghan Independent Human 
Rights Commission (AIHRC). These two bodies both work to ensure the equal participation of men 
and women in the nation building and peace processes. The AIHRC has been increasingly involved 
in judicial matters, and advocacy and information initiatives that involve the rights of women. 
 
The Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Discrimination Against Women2 (CEDAW) was 
signed and ratified in March 2003 by the Afghan Government. It obliges signatories to eliminate all 
forms of discrimination against women in all aspects of life. The Afghan Government is required, 
within four years of this ratification, to report on the measures it has taken to comply with CEDAW.  
 
The new Afghan Constitution focuses on respecting religious beliefs and enforcing equality of 
treatment before the law. The constitution denies discrimination on the basis of gender and provides 
for equal rights and duties before the law. It also guarantees women’s participation in governance, 
education, health, and other sectors. An average of two female parliamentarians will be elected in 
each province at the forthcoming elections, ensuring at least 68 women in the Lower House, and in 
the Upper House one half of the representatives to be selected by the President must be women. 
These are significant achievements and represent a very constructive step forward.  
 
The targets, for example, those for female representation in the 2003 Loya Jirga were ambitious, but 
since all targets have been exceeded to date, so the above targets should be achievable.  
                                                 
1 The Oxfam Handbook of Development and Relief. Volume I. Oxford 1995. 
2 See http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/cedaw/cedaw.htm  
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3. Gender policy  
Most donor countries have ratified CEDAW and the Conventions on Human Rights along 
with the Beijing Platform3; which resulted from the UN-sponsored international dialogue on 
promoting gender equality. These commitments demonstrate a rich policy environment, but 
translating this into an agreed strategy for moving towards gender equality is a considerable 
challenge in Afghanistan4. Activists, however, do now have a unique opportunity to use these 
international agreements to press for gender mainstreaming.  
 
Since the beginning of the transitional government in early 2002 many strategy documents have been written 
which include references to gender. However, international consultants have prepared most of these and they are 
not usually translated into either of the National languages. Some of the ambitions of these documents reflect a 
Western perspective on gender equality, which may clash with Afghan values, particularly those prescribed by 
Islam. 
4. Sector observations 
4.1 Policy and implementation strategy 
The Ministry of Finance has introduced a very simplified form of gender budgeting into the 
National Development Budget (NDB) process. All ministries are required to indicate which of their 
programmes relate to gender and this information is collated by the Ministry of Finance to assist 
with programme prioritisation. This represents an initial step towards promoting what is good and to 
be encouraged, and, is regarded as a positive beginning. The process requires each ministry to 
undertake an exercise that identifies gender activities in their programmes, and this, of itself, 
represents a form of gender training, even though at present the lack of understanding within some 
ministries makes it difficult to monitor. This level of gender budgeting benefits from being 
relatively easy to explain and at present it focuses upon welfare aspects of gender, such as equal 
access to health and educational services. (Another positive factor is that this tool can potentially be 
applied to all marginalized groups, such as, the disabled and khuchis.)  
  
The National Development Framework (NDF) and the work-plan of the Afghan Government both 
insist that all programmes must pay special attention to gender. The NDF also refers to the need for 
communal dialogue to enhance the opportunities for women and to improve cooperation between 
men and women. At the community level, it is hoped that this ‘special attention’ will translate into a 
main focus on health and education, which must be the immediate priorities.  
 
The most recent GoA statement, Securing Afghanistan’s Future5 published in March 2004, was 
disappointing in gender terms. Again, written by foreigners, with only intellectual inputs from 
Afghans, it was intended as a twelve year forward looking document, but it shows very little 
foresight concerning the role of women. There is little beyond target setting for enrolment in 
                                                 
3 Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action adopted by the Fourth World Conference on Women: Action 
for Equality, Development and Peace, Beijing, 15 September 1995 see 
 http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/beijing/platform/plat1.htm 
4 The Norwegian Embassy and CIDA have provided capacity building to MoWA for operationalising 
CEDAW    
5 http://www.af/resources/mof/recosting/SECURING%20AFGHNAISTANS%20FUTURE.pdf  
CMI REPORT AFGHANISTAN: FINDING, SECTORS  ANDTHEMES REPORT R 2005: 15  
 
 49 
primary and secondary education and no commitment to priorities, such as, training female health 
workers to reduce maternal mortality. The document states that: “In both health and education, the 
gender element is critical, given we are moving from gender apartheid to gender integration, 
addressing the capabilities of women in the culturally appropriate way requires special attention”. 
But this special attention is not provided elsewhere in the document. Whilst some aspects of gender 
integration may indeed need considerable further study, other aspects are very obvious and more 
ambitious commitments could be made immediately on health and education.  The Government also 
needs to make allowance for the lost generation of young men and women who are too old to rejoin 
education.  Without education now for that generation there will be a big gap that is not being 
addressed. Education for the age group between 15 and 24 is one of the MDGs, and these youths 
will be major contributors to Afghanistan’s future over the next 20 plus years. 
 
The Berlin meeting held in March 2004 came up with two very concrete commitments in its work 
plan, these being, the integration of women in political, economic and social life and increasing the 
number of women at a higher grade throughout public administration; which is one of the MGD 
indicators.  
 
On education the document Securing Afghanistan’s Futures states “Gender disparities are prevalent 
across both regions and levels of education. In Kabul 81% of school age girls attend primary school, 
but in many provinces the rate is well below 15%. Likewise, female attendance in schools and 
higher learning facilities drops dramatically as gir ls progress towards higher grades. Closing the 
gender gap in education will require concerted efforts to strengthen “cultural” demand for girls’ 
education in the provinces and at advanced levels, while ensuring that opportunities to attend 
(supply of learning spaces, female teachers) are well in place.” 
 
The majority of women in Afghanistan have never seen a doctor6. In rural areas 40% of health 
facilities do not have any female staff, and when present they are primarily TBAs (traditional birth 
attenders) or CHW (community health workers). There is a tendency to focus on reproductive 
health only, when planning health services for women. Women have less access to treatment of any 
diseases with 87 % of women in a survey in Herat7 (the most educated area in Afghanistan) having 
to obtain permission from their husband or male relative before seeking health care. Male doctors 
may not even listen to a female patient’s chest when making a clinical diagnosis, leaving female 
patients with poor diagnosis and possibly inappropriate treatments. Tuberculosis is an example of a 
disease effecting women at a disproportionate rate, due to their gender based roles of cooking and 
cleaning in enclosed ill ventilated areas, for example, 70% of detected tuberculosis cases occur 
among women8. 
 
Greater awareness of need to train professional birth workers is now apparent, but insufficient 
facilities are available to support this. With an the annual population rate growth estimated at 3.9%, 
there is an urgent need to bring family planning down to the community level and to introduce sex 
education for young people. BRAC has done some excellent work in this area and the MoPH is 
beginning to talk about this sensitive issue.  
 
Gender imbalances in health are revealed at an early age. In areas with difficult access to health 
services, like Badakshan or Nimroz, carers are less likely to take girl children to clinics for 
                                                 
6 Samar, Sima (2004). Dispite the Odds: Providing Reproductive Health Care to Afghan Women. New 
England Medical Journal 351; 11 September. 
7 Amowitz LL, Reis C, Icapino V: Maternal Mortality in Herat Province, Afghanistan, in 2002: An Indicator 
of Women’s Human Rights. JAMA. 2002 September 11 288(10):1284-91. 
8 Ministry of Health (2003): Project Document for National Tuberculosis Control Programme 1.3 Health and 
Nutrition AFG/03446. 
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treatment than boys9. Lack of education combined with a tradition of early marriage lead very 
young women into high-risk pregnancies which contributes to making maternal mortality the 
leading cause of death among Afghan women of reproductive age10.  
 
Some agencies have reported that they lost many of their health staff in the first quarter of 2002, 
especially female staff, which were suddenly in huge demand by other organisations. This happened 
with the influx of foreign contractors and the scaling up of UN operations with significantly higher 
salary rates. Many of these employees moved from rural work places into the cities, primarily 
Kabul, and some even moved out of the health sector.  
 
Little consideration has been demonstrated of the potential role of women in advancing family 
livelihoods in Afghanistan. This requires education for women at all levels and could have a 
significant impact if other livelihood promotion activities are successful. For example, to resurrect 
fruit and other industries requires workers with a great range of skills, which should include women, 
for example, in sorting, packing, marketing and administration. Women’s contribution to the 
economy through agricultural also needs to be pushed harder for better recognition as currently 
there is a big gap in national planning. The Ministry of Agriculture is highly patriarchal in outlook 
and has not given much concern to further women’s role in the sector. 
4.2 Coverage and actors involved 
Understanding of gender issues is weak, not only at the national and provincial levels, but also 
internationally. The Afghan Government ministries and their departments in the provinces have no 
real strategy, and it is clear from meetings held with some donor agencies that they also have little 
sense of direction. 
 
The MoWA was established as a ministry in 2002. At the political level MoWA now has a 
structure, but like all ministries it is weak and yet it has few consultants to support its work. Having 
initially attempted to implement projects at the provincial level, MoWA is now attempting to focus 
upon four areas for policy development, these being: female education, health, law and political 
rights (including constitutional issues and economic empowerment). It does not have any 
development projects to supervise and its key strategy is gender mainstreaming, though several 
provincial DOWAs does not seem to buy into this view The lack of any flagship programme has 
constrained the influence of the Minister but its key role should be advocacy, monitoring and 
technical support and reporting. MoWA has received little support from GoA and other ministries 
tend to think that MOWA will solve all women’s problems. 
 
The former minister was sucessful in raising awareness within Cabinet of problems facing women, 
such as, human trafficking, the age of marriage and violence against women. Developing a 
National Action Plan for Women (DNAPW) is focusing on mainstreaming gender within the 
ministries to ensure women’s equal participation in nation building and state building, but MoWA’s 
role here, in cooperation with The Afghan Women’s Network (AWN), has been less successful and it 
needs to look at how it can reach beyond the current low level of comprehension.  
 
The advisory group on gender, whilst considered to have be perhaps the best AG, is not a consistent 
or coherent body with a fixed representation, but an open forum, and therefore no consistency in 
policy or strategy is possible.  The new Minister has, however, been reluctant to call the meetings. 
 
                                                 
9 Afghanistan: Progress of Provinces. Multiple Indicator Cluster Survey 2003. TISA and UNICEF. 
10 WRI, (1996). World Resources 1996-7. World Resource Institutute, Oxford University Press. New York. 
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In the provinces, the most notable activity of MoWA has been the provision of women’s literacy 
training as a manifestation of their project focus. Here we find training offered only to women, 
despite the fact that many men and youths are also illiterate. Whilst the quality of this training may 
be high, the strategic gain from this training is not clear, since the recipients may not be women 
who are likely to benefit from using reading and writing skills in any livelihood or other function. 
Whilst literacy can raise individual’s status, it is not apparent that the literacy training resources 
have been targeted to best advantage, for example, towards young men and women who lost the 
opportunity to complete their schooling due to instability and social restrictions. 
 
AIHRC has fallen into the same trap as MoWA; of trying to do things and solve problems rather 
than disseminating understanding. However, it is now well respected and is often resorted to by 
women seeking redress for family or social problems. 
 
No need assessments have been done on gender by any agency. Amongst the NGOs there is perhaps 
the most concerted attempt to deal constructively with gender issues at their organisational level. 
Oxfam have conducted a gender mapping exercise and DACAAR and SCA are both working to 
develop internal staffing guidelines on gender. There are case studies focusing on the gender 
situation in different parts of the country produced by AREU.  
 
UNIFEM has established a legal program and provide support to MOWA and other ministries to 
formulate the National Action Plan for Women in Afghanistan. They appear, however, to have 
lacked a strategic vision in the period under review and has tended to operate more like an NGO, 
implementing small projects here and there across the country, often with little effective 
coordination with other donors. These projects have included skills training courses and support to 
women’s centres. UNIFEM/UNDP are working closely with MoWA to provide capacity building 
on strategic planning and in advocacy and convening workshops and seminars. JICA has also 
provided administrative support to MoWA.  
4.3 Relevance of the interventions 
At the national le vel there is a discernable impact from gender related interventions, particularly in 
regard to the drafting of a new constitution, as well as the attempts to raise awareness of gender 
issues within the GoA and the work of the Ministry of Finance in establishing a gender budgeting 
process. The challenge at this level will be to maintain the momentum of this work, as attention is 
drawn away by other priorities. 
 
The efforts made to ensure female participation in the Presidential election was also a good starting 
point for further awareness raising work and again it will be a considerable challenge to maintain 
the same level of female participation when election funding becomes a lower level donor priority. 
The number of women voters could have been increased if gender consideration had been 
emphasised in the selection of polling stations; some were too far away for women to access or 
were located in places unsuitable for women to visit.  
 
The National Solidarity Programme (NSP) is providing women’s representation at community 
level; this is a very big step forward which needs to be built upon. NSP is now looking at how best 
to do this, whilst also trying to maintain its momentum. It is a good starting point for integration, 
but, it faces challenges and in most villages separate male and female CDCs have been established. 
Some of the facilitating NGOs are providing additional capacity building training on management, 
human rights, community mobilisation and peace building in their respective NSP communities. If 
these supporting trainings continue in both male and female CDCs, then women could be promoted 
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and empowered in decision-making, otherwise the ideas and decisions of men will not be 
influenced. 
 
Microfinance Investment Service Facility for Afghanistan (MISFA): The microfinance 
institutions supported by MISFA have considerable potential in providing cost-efficient access to 
loan finance to large numbers of female clients. This could bring positive changes to the living 
situation and status of clients.  But women’s access to local markets needs to be developed and their 
products improved. Most women could make a significant contribution to their families’ financial 
well being if they had access to markets. Many families in Parwan, for instance, have livestock and 
the women make products from livestock that their male family members sell in local markets. The 
income is never returned to the women and they are excluded from decision-making on how to 
develop the products or invest the profits. 
 
Women’s Shelters and Centres.  The women shelters work under extremely difficult security 
circumstances in order to accommodate and help women who have often left their families due to 
violence, forced marriages etc. The women centres, mainly provide vocational trainings for women. 
In general the construction and upkeep of centres and shelters is uncoordinated between the various 
donor agencies. For example, in Herat, several donors have provided funds for construction and the 
shelters have been built in close proximity and serve the same catchment area. Also, USAID have 
provided funding for the construction of very high quality women’s centres, but they did not plan 
for the effective utilisation of the space provided or for ongoing repairs and maintenance of the 
structure or the equipment that they also donated. In other parts of the country no funding has been 
made available for women’s groups, and since NGOs in isolated places do not have good 
connections with Kabul the donors have limited knowledge of their work.   
 
There remains a lack of effective community participation in much project designs. In some areas, 
where clinics and schools were absent, funds were spent on women’s public bathrooms without 
community consultation, with the result that the facilities were never used as they were considered 
inappropriate for women. In Nangahar, women’s public baths have been constructed when there is 
no safe place for women at risk from domestic violence, and these vulnerable women have had to 
look for shelter inside the prison (women and children confined in prison is a major problem in 
itself, many kept there without legal verdict  – or because they have been abandoned by their 
families)  In Bamyan, new settlements were made for returnees and IDPs, whilst overlooking 
gender aspects, for example, the bathrooms and latrines were constructed too far away from the 
houses; this makes women’s and girl’s access to them difficult or impossible after dark. 
 
Projects such as food and cash for work have found little opportunity to involve women, since the 
work provided was mainly manual construction, which is considered inappropriate for women. 
Also, income generating projects such as Ghelum (rug) weaving, and craft production have 
continued to be funded, but little market planning was undertaken and quality considerations were 
not effectively applied. To date, there is very few  evidence of any innovation in income generation 
for women except some examples of media trainings for women, driving and car maintenance. 
Women are still primarily busy doing tailoring, embroidery, carpet weaving and knitting, whereas, 
other training, such as computer skills, English language, and data entry could be provided for 
women in urban areas where the demand for office skills is now very high. 
4.4 The role of the donor organisations in gender programming 
One of the developments in aid delivery that counters against the allocation of resources to gender 
and other cross-cutting issues is the procurement of pre-designed projects through a process of 
competitive bidding, where price is one of the primary criteria for the award of contracts. Under 
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such a process, making resources available for gender inputs will only happen if the requirement is 
specifically stipulated in the tender documentation and clearly flagged as a factor in the bid 
evaluation process. It was striking that recent programme documents produced by DFID under its 
livelihood’s sector for capacity building in the Ministry of Agriculture, made no reference to 
gender, despite assurances that this issue has been mainstreamed throughout the organisation. 
Donor organisations that wish to promote gender awareness need to be more proactive in this area 
and must be prepared to make the additional funding available to ensure that the issue is 
mainstreamed, rather than allowing it become sidelined.  
 
Donors such as Sida and Danida have been prepared to support some gender awareness but this is 
primarily limited to the work of their own national NGOs, such as, SCA and DACAAR. The 
Donors have, however, provided support to education which is regarded as an important women 
empowering intervention, and support to the AIHRC and MOWA (through UNIFEM) and NSP – 
for their gender-related work. 
4.5 Coherence and connectedness 
The main priorities found during the field trips are education, health, legal assistance and security. 
At the project level women also expressed priority for access to clean drinking water, which should 
be close to (or preferably within) their home compounds, additional culverts across water channels 
were required in order to increase their access to health facilities, etc. 
 
The life of woman in rural areas has not changed as that of women in urban areas has. Women in 
rural areas are disconnected and do not have access to information. The social and cultural norms, 
which influence a woman’s ability to exercise her rights, present major constraints across the 
country, albeit to different degrees. Women in urban areas have many more possibilities by 
comparison. There does appear to have been an imbalance in funding in favour of urban areas, 
which is compounded by a lack of local expertise beyond the urban centres. One exemption has 
been the programme for widows, supported by WFP, which although much criticised for 
management failings, was effective in creating job opportunities for these women, both in rural and 
urban areas.  
 
For more effective promotion of gender and gender equality, there should be educational and 
literacy programs for both men and women in addition to the emphasis on primary education.. Due 
to misinterpretations of the Holy Quran by poorly educated religious leaders, women do not know 
that they have the right to work, right to education and the right to live as men do. 
 
Most health programmes focusing upon women do not include awareness for men. For example, 
concerning contraception and child-spacing, it is essential that men understand how to use 
contraception and why it is so important that their wives do not have pregnancies in rapid 
succession. In some places women are aware of contraception, but they use it rarely due to this gap 
in understanding within their families. Doctors also may have very little information and are not 
trained in the necessity for passing awareness on to husbands. Especially, where social and family 
networks have broken down, sources of reliable information are essential. The World Bank is 
looking at how experience from other countries can be used to assist the GoA. The Government 
needs access to information and advice on how to approach this sensitive issue, and the donor 
community is not good at providing information on best practices, which needs to be delivered at 
Cabinet level in the first instance. The health sector is beginning to recognize some critical gender 
dimensions here. Saving women’s lives should be a major priority as women’s life expectancy is 
amongst the lowest in the world, at around 43 years. Much greater priority is also required since the 
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current rate of population increase will hamper economic development, as the resources are not 
available to effectively educate so many children.  
 
There is no legal assistance available for women other than that provided by the AIHRC, 
Norwegian Refugee Council and Medica Mondiale. Women are suffering in jails for no reason 
other than perhaps an internal family dispute or being victims of violence, including rape and other 
sexual abuses, and then charged with adultery. The family court exists to solve these problems but 
its judgements are not reliable or consistent throughout the country and most women have little 
chance of receiving true justice. Levels of domestic violence against women also impact on their 
psychological health and their potential to contribute to the economy. A range of cultural and 
religious constraints needs to be overcome to allow for a wider empowerment of women. 
 
Some of the gender and human rights awareness programmes conducted have been criticised for 
increasing tensions within families; the expectations of women participants have been raised 
without any commensurate increase in awareness amongst other family members, especially the 
men folk. For example, the Evaluation was informed that the levels of domestic violence and 
divorce had increased in Yakawlang, Bamyan. The DoWA representative in Bamyan emphasised 
the need for professional trainers with a more rounded understanding of all the issues.  
4.6 Coordination 
There is a lack of effective coordination on gender issues. This is particularly apparent at the 
provincial level where there appears to be no common strategy amongst the various 
implementing organisations. The development of a National Action Plan by MoWA offers 
some prospect for improvement, as this could help to ensure men and women’s equal 
participation in decision making and planning in each ministry.  
5. Cross-cutting issues 
5.1 Security  
Security from attack by armed militias has improved in most part of the country, although random 
attacks remain a threat. However, the rate of common criminality in Kabul city and other urban 
centres has increased significantly and many interviewees voiced extreme fears concerning human 
trafficking. If women and girls do not feel safe moving around their neighbourhood they cannot 
contribute meaningfully to the economy. If girls cannot go to school because of fear of abduction, 
and women cannot travel to health clinics or hospitals, then improvements in service delivery will 
not benefit them. Failings in enforcing the rule of law impact upon both men and women and 
undermine their quality of life, while domestic violence is of particular threat to women. The high 
level of self immolation in Herat is contributed to such violence, and women being forced into 
marriage against their will. 
 
Individual security includes issues pertaining to inheritance and property rights and this is a national 
issue that needs to be addressed through the judicial process.  
5.2 Societal norms influencing respect for women 
Afghanistan is a fractured and transitional society with many young people coming to their mother 
country for the first time. Local communities have yet to be re-established and there is confusion 
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over social values, especially with so much western influence entering the country through 
electronic media (violent films and the proliferation of pornography being prime examples). The 
disconnects between tradit ional values and modern influences need to be addressed, as the resultant 
confusion threatens social norms and values, which can further undermine gender relationships. 
Here donors could play a strong supportive role to the Government. 
5.3 Monitoring and evaluation  
Some ad hoc monitoring and evaluation systems have been developed by individual NGOs, such as 
Oxfam, but beyond that there is no national baseline information upon which to establish future 
monitoring and evaluation surveys. 
6. Findings and conclusions 
Before, and immediately following, the fall of the Taliban regime much emphasis was placed on the 
need to improve the lives of women in Afghanistan. In fact, the issue of women’s rights was cited 
as one element in the justification for the international coalition entering the country. But since then, 
other priorities have taken centre stage, so that the issue of gender mainstreaming has been 
increasingly marginalized. Donor organisations, human rights and all advocacy groups must ensure 
that pressure is placed on the Government to continue to build on the momentum established to far.  
 
In addition, the need to improve coordination of activities, particularly those in the provinces is 
clear and long term programmes which are better researched should be established, along with 
effective monitoring systems and means for communicating lesson’s learnt.  
 
More resources are required for education and training, particularly for the current lost generation of 
young men and women who could contribute so much to Afghanistan’s immediate future if they are 
given the skills and resources to achieve their potential. 
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1. Introduction 
Afghanistan’s population suffered from very high mortality and morbidity even before the Soviet 
invasion of 1979. Throughout the 1960s, Afghanistan’s health system was extremely limited, 
predominantly hospital and doctor based, and concentrated in urban areas where less than 20% of 
the population lived1. Twenty three years of war left the health sector critically damaged, and meant 
that little progress was made in improving health service delivery. The large majority of health 
services have for the last decades been financed by international assistance without coordinated 
planning, partly through cross-border operations by NGOs and UN agencies. The health system is 
too small, fragmented, grossly gender and urban biased, used only by a minority of the population 
and unevenly distributed across the country2. The gravity of the situation is reflected in some of the 
worst health indicators found anywhere in the world. The under-five and infant mortality rates are 
the highest in Asia and very high compared to other developing countries and three to fivefold 
higher than in neighbor ing countries3. The maternal mortality ratio, estimated at 1,600 per 100,000 
live births is the highest in the world and reflects the low status of women4. The rate of chronic 
malnutrition (moderate and severe stunting) remains around 50% reflecting a combination of poor 
caring practices, micronutrient deficiency, and chronic food insecurity5. Most of the burden of 
disease results from infectious causes, particularly among children where diarrhea, acute respiratory 
infections, and vaccine preventable illnesses likely account for 60% of deaths. Among adults, 
tuberculosis accounts for an estimated 15,000 deaths per year with 70% of detected cases being 
among women.  
 
The fall of the Taliban regime in 2001 and the subsequent influx of international assistance have 
resulted in heightened development activities. The Commission on Macroeconomics and Health, 
which presented its report to WHO in December 20016, concluded that populations enjoying good 
health also have the capacity to reduce poverty levels and achieve sustainable economic and social 
development. This idea seems to have had fundamental implications for the development of policies 
of the GoA and for the donor community supporting it. Simultaneously, improved health of the 
Afghans can serve as a bridge to sustainable security, peace and development7. However, 
determinants for health in a population are mainly found outside the health system. A multi-sector 
approach ensuring poverty reduction, secure livelihoods, access to clean water and sanitation 
facilit ies, access to education (especially for females) and respect for human rights, is needed for 
improvement of the situation.  
 
The living conditions and human security vary considerably internally in Afghanistan, both between 
provinces and in districts inside provinces. While Herat ranks second after Kabul when it comes to 
selected indicators in health8, Badghis (neighboring Herat) ranks 29th out of 32 provinces.  
                                                 
1 Securing Afghanistan’s Future: Accomplishments and the Strategic Path Forward. Health and Nutrition 
Technical Annex January 2004. 
2 Ministry of Health, project document for Integrated Primary Health Care Programme AFG/00831. 
3 WHO Afghanistan country brief. November 2004 
4 Ahmed A, Edward A, Burnham G, (2004): Health indicators for mothers and children in rural Herat 
province, Afghanistan. Prehospital and Disaster Medicine; 19(3):221–225. 
5 Ministry of Health, Public Nutrition Policy, November 2003. 
6 Macroeconomics and health. Investing in health for economic development. WHO Geneva 2001. 
7 WHO (2002): Reconstruction of the Afghanistan Health Sector:  A preliminary assessment of needs and 
opportunities. WHO-EM/EHA/003/E/G. 
8 UNICEF: Afghanistan – progress of provinces. Multiple Indicator Cluster Survey 2003 ranking a calculation 
of aspects of the following indicators: Measles Immunisation, Vitamin-A supplementation, disability for 1-4 
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2. Observations  
2.1 Policies and implementation strategies of the GOA/the 
international community  
There is great inequity in the distribution of facilities and services throughout the country, between 
provinces, and between districts in the same province9. Even where health facilities exist, they often 
lack basic utilities. All facilities should have access to safe water sources, which is not the case 
today. In order to address the challenges of health service delivery, the Transitional Islamic 
Government started a process aiming at, over time, making essential health services available to all 
Afghans through the introduction of a BPHS (Basic Package of Health Services). The health service 
delivery in this system is contracted to NGOs and private actors through a bidding process to the 
donors (USAID, EC, WB), and a time limited performance based partnership agreement (PPA) is 
signed between the partners. This policy was decided following a process driven by the World 
Bank, addressing it the first WB/ADB/UNDP preliminary assessment December 2001/January 
200210. This was seen as an opportunity for harmonizing resources represented by numerous NGOs 
de facto responsible for most of the health service provision in the country, as well as recognizing 
the lack of capacity of the MOPH. 
 
The BPHS has four levels and consists of: One Health Post per 1,000-1,500 Afghans. One Basic 
Health Centre per 15,000-30,000 population. One Comprehensive Health Centre per 30,000-60,000 
population. One 50-bed District Hospital per 100,000-300,000 population.  
 
Although the MOPH still in some provinces is responsible for health service delivery, its primary 
roles are developing strategies, goals and objectives, setting indicators, monitoring, supervision and 
control of performances of the implementing partners11. A third party evaluator monitors providers’ 
performance on the basis of agreed upon national indicators. User fees may be levied at the point of 
delivery. This is a significant change in policy in Afghanistan, although unofficial payments for 
services in public clinics have been and still are pervasive. The Constitution of Afghanistan states 
that: “The state is obliged to provide free means of preventive health care and medical treatment, 
and proper health facilities to all citizens of Afghanistan in accordance with the law”12. The next 
paragraph reads: “The state encourages and protects the establishment and expansion of private 
medical services and health centers in accordance with law”. According to the MOPH there is 
currently no active legal regulation of the private sector in health, but traditionally doctors need to 
be employed in the Government sector in order to operate private services after working hours. 
With the under funded Government system, most doctors operate private clinics. A MOPH 
representative described the situation in their province: “The doctors come la te and leave early in 
their government jobs. When they earn a few dollars a month, of course they have to work private 
                                                                                                                                                     
years and 7-17 years, salt iodization, school enrolment, child labour, drinking water, sanitation and access to 
radio. (Lowest rank indicates the best situation). 
9 Transitional Islamic Government of Afghanistan, Ministry of Health (2002): Afghanistan National Health 
Resources Assessment. Prepared for the Ministry of Health by MSH, HANDS, and MSH/Europe. 
10 Daly E (2003) Discussion Paper. Performance Based Partnership Agreements in the Transitional Context of 
Afghanistan. 
11 Transitional Government of Afghanistan, Ministry of Health, March 2003 / 1382: A Basic Package of 
Health Services for Afghanistan. 
12 The Constitution of Afghanistan Year 1382 Chapter two – Fundamental Rights and Duties of Citizens. 
Article Fifty-Two. First part. Unofficial Translation. Taken from The A to Z Guide to Afghanistan Assistance, 
AREU, 3rd Edition 2004. 
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to pay the rents and feed their families. They need at least 3-400 USD per month to live an ordinary 
life. If you go even to the teaching hospital after lunch, you will not find a single doctor” 
 
The National level health priorities set by 2002 were:  
1) Reduction of under five mortality.  
2) Reduction of maternal mortality.  
3) Addressing malnutrition.  
4) Prevention and control of communicable diseases.  
5) Addressing inequitable distribution of health services.  
6) Capacity building.  
 
The important fields of disability and mental health were not placed as priority programs in the first 
stage of the BPHS, due to careful prioritization of programs reducing the excess preventable 
mortality. However, in the mid term and long term plans, these aspects are being phased in, as well 
as the development of new policies on the “essential hospital package”. 
 
There seem to be consensus from the international community to supporting the efforts of the GoA 
in establishing a coherent health system in the country, although concerns are raised about the short 
funding commitment for such a massive expansion. Initial caution towards PPAs was summed up as 
“too fast, too soon, on too large scale, with limited experience to draw from”13. The beneficiary 
perspective is not taken sufficiently into consideration. In some of the provinces the operation of 
clinics and implementation of services have been transferred from one NGO to another, not 
necessarily improving quality or access. The expansion plans may also be unrealistic due to the lack 
of qualified medical staff. The effects of having free market competition for scarce human resources 
led to major turnover of staff between agencies in 200214. 
2.2 Main actors and coverage 
There are around 30 NGOs involved in delivering services of the BPHS in the country. 
Approximately 70% of the districts are currently covered by the BPHS providing primary health 
care to 50% of the population15. The MOPH considers this development as a substantial and 
important achievement. The BPHS is enforced by vertical programs (EPI16, malaria, TB17). Some of 
the implementers like Ibn Sina and SCA describe the progress as substantial when it comes to the 
goals of expansion, with a more equitable health service, high quality and good access. At the same 
time recognizing huge unmet needs and slow progress in some areas, and that the ultimate goal of 
improving the health status of the people takes a long time. The health statistics do not yet permit a 
proper coverage analysis towards the goals of reduction of mortality and morbidity. The results can 
be measured on the basis of number of clinics, numbers of patients treated in the clinics, number of 
children vaccinated and similar quantitative data, or assessments from smaller clusters or house 
hold surveys. Still there is huge uncertainty related to the projections of data from individual 
patients to percentages of the population.  
                                                 
13 Daly, E (2003) Discussion Paper. Performance Based Partnership Agreements in the Transitional Context 
of Afghanistan. 
14 SCA annual donor report 2002. 
15 WHO November 2004 Afghanistan Health System Update 
16 EPI – Expanded Programme of Immunization 
17 Tuberculosis control – through national standards including DOTS (Directly Observed Treatment 
Swallowing) 
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2.3 Efficiency and timeliness 
From the political transition in 2001, the influx of aid agencies and funding has increased 
enormously. However, everything did not need to be started at a zero point, several health programs 
were ongoing in the country. Primary health care, train ing of local staff, supply of medicines and 
vaccines, outreach activities and water / sanitation programs are not new to Afghanistan. The 
activities that took place from 2001-2004 are targeting many of the previously defined basic needs. 
The control of communicable diseases, for example eradication of polio, progressed steadily in 
Afghanistan from 199618 when 30% of infants aged under 1 year had received three doses of OPV 
(oral polio vaccine). In 2004 UNICEF reported the achievement of vaccination 6.7 million children 
against polio, making it realistic to achieve the MDG of polio eradication within 2010. The main 
change since 2001 has been the establishment of comprehensive national plans within the health 
sector, a framework of optimism and stability, allowing all involved actors working towards 
expressed overall objectives. The aid has been distributed according to aid agency access to a 
greater extent than according to needs19.  
2.4 Transition from emergency to rehabilitation and development 
interventions 
Within the health care it is difficult to see a clear distinction between the different phases of 
emergency, rehabilitation and development, they are all interlinked. The human development 
indicators20 within health (and other sectors) are still so poor that they in “normal context” of 
current Afghanistan do not meet the minimum standards for disaster response outlined in The 
Sphere Project21. Key indicators used for evaluation of effectiveness of interventions in controlling 
disease and preserving health22 in Sphere include: The under-5 mortality rate is reduced to no more 
than 2/10000/day (equals 73/1000/year)23. Measles vaccination coverage reaches more than 95%24. 
There is access to adequate nutrition25. There is access to adequate water26. Several of the people 
met during this assessment point out the fact that the situation related to health still is an emergency, 
but that the situation varies geographically and between the urban – rural divide in Afghanistan. 
When it comes to infrastructure within health (excluding city-based hospitals), this is clearly not re-
habilitation or re-construction, but new construction and expansion as well. For example, the 
number of clinics in Helmand has increased from 2 to 42.27. 
 
There is a focus still directing a lot of resources into emergency situations. Examples are responses 
to outbreaks of cholera or other types of watery diarrhea, measles epidemics, or health responses to 
natural disasters like floods or land slides. Events like these seem to trigger funding easily 
compared to dealing with the same human suffering of the same extent in ordinary, poor areas. This 
is a common phenomenon in many conflict / post-conflict situations. 
                                                 
18 CDC (2001): Progress Toward Poliomyelitis Eradication – Afghanistan, 1999-2000. MMWR weekly 
March 02, 2001. 
19 Several of the stakeholders say this in interviews, recognising that areas considered too unsafe for 
Government or INGOs have the poorest health indicators. 
20 UNDP (2004): Afghanistan National Human Development Report 2004. Security with a Human Face: 
Challenges and Responsibilities + UNICEF MICS 2003. 
21 The Sphere Project (2000): Humanitarian Charter and Minimum Standards in Disaster. 
22 Analysing standard 4, part 2:5 in minimum standards in health services, Sphere Project. 
23 Afghanistan national summary 172 (urban 142, rural 183), MICS 2003, UNICEF. 
24 76% in Afghanistan national summary, MICS 2003, UNICEF. 
25 50% of chronic malnutrition, Ministry of Health (2003) Public Nutrition Programme. 
26 68.8% of rural households do not have access to safe drinking water, MICS 2003, UNICEF. 
27 Information from Ibn Sina. 
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The MOPH expects the technical assistance to move from the immediate post-conflict phase to 
longer-term development, and that donors and technical agencies will increasingly harmonize their 
inputs28. They, however, see their planning towards development in a perspective up to 2015 in 
reaching important Millennium Development Goals, a commitment the donors need to have in 
mind. If the external funding stops or is significantly reduced, the fragile system will collapse, the 
expansion stop, and the health provision will concentrate in the cities. In that scenario, the health 
service provision in the districts will again be defined as an emergency. 
2.5 The role of the five donor countries 
The five donors have contributed to paying salaries of employees in the Government health sector 
through the ARTF. They have funded UN agencies involved in health, like UNICEF, WHO and 
UNFPA. They have supported the Red Cross and Red Crescent movement and their health 
programs through ICRC and IFRC, and direct contributions to NGOs involved in health programs, 
especially SCA and DAC, (DACAAR through the rural development programme), and CA. 
However, the main donors to the health system as outlined in the BPHS are WB, USAID and EC, 
and separate grants from JICA. 
2.6 Quantity and quality of the aid as perceived by beneficiaries 
In spite of rural expansion of health services, most Afghans do not receive aid to the extent of their 
needs or expectations 29. They do not receive significant and appropriate assistance in health, and in 
some cases appreciate the end of the draught or newly constructed roads30 as more important in their 
daily lives than the change of the Government. However, mainly through mass media they are 
aware of the increased international support, and feel disadvantaged as long as they do not see 
tangible results. The NSP programme is an exception, but health programmes are only available 
through the NSP when in accordance with other National health plans. Especially females in rural 
villages and IDP camps mentioned health assistance and access to clinics as high priority needs that 
were not being met, and that the male CDCs are deciding what assistance the village is to prioritize. 
In all the villages visited, reported cases of recent deaths and untreated diseases were prevalent. The 
only notable exception seemed to be outreach vaccination teams visiting the villages for polio 
vaccination during the National Immunization Days.  
 
Most facilities are located close to roads31, which may enhance referral and access for population-
dense areas. Rural clinics are often understaffed, lack medicine, have no experienced doctor, or are 
unable to provide a proper diagnosis. A woman in Rabat Sangi, Herat said: “We have lots of 
problems in reaching the clinic. We have one doctor for more than 30 villages. When we reach, 
there may be 100 people waiting, and only 50 get help. We are told to come back another time and 
then it is the same. Emergency cases can not be helped. We have to go to the city, and this is more 
difficult and too expensive”. To access clinic based services, patients will often travel long 
distances and at great cost to themselves and their families. The establishment of basic level 
services may in this perspective be insufficient, and not solve the needs of the patients when they 
arrive. 
                                                 
28 Securing Afghanistan’s Future (2004): Accomplishments and the Strategic Path Forward. Health and 
Nutrition. Technical Annex. 
29 Numerous responses from beneficiaries in the field study areas. 
30 Especially mentioned in Southern Zabul, due to the new Kabul-Kandahar highway improving access to 
hospitals in Kandahar rather than to the provincial capital of Zabul, Qalat. 
31 AREU, MOPH, ANHRA. 
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2.7 Coherence between national policies and the reality on the 
ground 
The MOPH plans and policies are outlined in a time-frame of phasing in new elements and services 
according to availability of human resources and funding, and of expansion of other services like 
education. The implementation of the BPHS, although progressing, is still far behind targets. There 
are many clinics established just by the name or in terms of constructed buildings. The expansion 
has also taken place in the most “attractive” provinces for the contractual partners; provinces with 
stability, not too difficult geography or climate, and relatively high population density get more 
bidders. The future expansion will be more costly and more challenging, not the least because of 
lack of staff and lack of interest by medical personnel in going to remote areas. In a paradoxical 
way, the new health system has led to the reduction of established clinics for agencies not included 
in the PPA. One example is the Afghan Red Crescent (ARCS). ARCS was established in 192932, 
and is an important national organization involved in disaster preparedness and response. In 2003 
they were represented with branches in all the 31 provinces. The ARCS’ policy has been to provide 
community services in all the provinces, as well as primary health clinics, and it would be against 
its mandate to concentrate in one cluster or province in the BPHS. Now their future funding for 
health activities is uncertain, and they have had to reduce staff and downgrade some of their 
established services, which included female doctors and health services directed towards women 
and children. Their Community Based First Aid programme has also been significantly reduced, 
although local-based health initiatives in rural Afghanistan could be vital as a first-line of services 
compensating for limitations in access and appropriateness of the facility-based health care. 
 
It is also a question whether the services for the population in areas where well established NGOs 
have handed over their clinics to new actors have benefited the catchment population or not. Some 
respondents in the interviews have mentioned a problem with reduction in quality by new actors in 
areas where SCA was previously running the clinics. 
The capacity of MOPH in the district is very limited when it comes to monitoring of activities, and 
the danger is that the Government does not manage to be in control of what is going on in many 
provinces. 
 
In some emergency operations, for example in the health emergency related to whooping cough 
outbreak in Ghor Province during the winter, the coalition forces provided helicopters. While the 
MOPH found this unproblematic, some of their usual partners in emergency vaccination and relief 
had to abstain from participation due to their humanitarian principles and ideas of making a 
distinction between military and humanitarian actions. 
2.8 Coordination at the local level  
The provincial health coordination committees (PCCs) are established in all provinces, encouraging 
participation between all actors within health in the province, whether military or civilian. The 
meetings take place on a monthly basis and in case of health emergencies.  
 
The provincial health authorities seem to have none or small input to the selection of the 
implementing agency of the PPA, causing some communication problems from the involved 
parties. If the provincial MOPH wants to correct a contractor in its province, they have no influence 
on delay of payments or other sanctions, and ultimately the complaint has to be directed to the 
donor in Kabul if the agency does not agree.  
 
                                                 
32 IFRC and ARCS documentation and interviews. 
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Traditional civil society is represented through district health committees. The private sector outside 
the BPHS is not represented in local coordination mechanisms. The perception from many actors 
seems to be that the real decisions are not taken at coordination meetings, it is more a forum for 
information sharing. The involved parties can do what they want with their own available funding. 
The provincial MOPH does not have any decision making power when it comes to contract 
distribution in the PPA. For example in Herat, DAC did not get a PPA contract for the cluster it has 
operated in full coordination with the MOPH in Herat for years, and the area has been given to 
another NGO without proper consultation. 
3. Cross-cutting issues relevant to the health sector 
3.1 The perception of the aid providers 
The health service provision in rural Afghanistan has been depending on NGO support for decades, 
and the assistance is highly appreciated. The change in perception lately is caused by the 
expectation of rapid improvement, an expectation not met. “People are aware of a lot of money 
coming to the Government. But what they see physically are the NGOs. It is hard for the villagers to 
know if the car is needed or not. 5-10 years ago people felt that NGOs served them and relieved 
their pain. Now they believe they are here to fill their pockets. This jeopardizes the work of our 
staff”. This was said in a bit of frustration by a representative of an Afghan NGO. His opinion was 
that the Government wanted to hide its own incompetence and corruption by blaming other actors. 
The Government criticizes the NGOs and simultaneously subcontracts the health service provision 
to the NGO actors. This is difficult to understand: “Why is the Government contracting NGOs if 
they do not trust them? It is their own money and they do not have to do that!” But he agreed that 
the implementation seem expensive with international staff. The money belonging to the poor in 
Afghanistan goes out of the country with foreigners’ salaries and travels, or in the pockets of the  
already rich Afghans through house and office. An Afghan doctor who had worked for years in an 
international, medical NGO had experienced new expats coming and going, but the Afghan staff 
staying without recognition for their true skills. “Foreigners say: I only stay long enough to buy a 
house in my country!” or “After six months I go home and pay back my loan”. She felt underrated 
and frustrated, and although the payment in the Government sector was lower, she was now 
working in the provincial hospital and felt that she was doing a patriotic duty towards her country. 
 
The people in some of the areas visited have depended on health support by INGOs, services later 
withdrawn, reduced or suspended due to security risks. MSF (Médecins sans Frontières) pulled out 
of Afghanistan on July 28, 2004, following the murder of five of their staff in Badghis province33. 
At the time they provided assistance in 13 provinces with 80 international and 1400 Afghan staff 
members. Clinics were rapidly handed over to other NGOs and the MOPH, but not with sufficient 
budgets, for some resulting in rapid decline of quality of services. Comments from some local 
actors have been that NGOs come in with sophisticated plans and high cost interventions with huge 
budgets for a short time. When the money is gone, so is the NGO, and the local system is left with 
useless equipment and no maintenance. 
3.2 The return of refugees and IDPs 
People returning from living for years in neighboring countries are used to higher living standards 
and better health services than the population in Afghanistan. Returnees from Iran may have left 
                                                 
33 Katz I, Wright A (2004): Collateral Damage – Médecins sans Frontières Leaves Afghanistan and Iraq. New 
England Medical Journal 351;25 December 16. 
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behind refrigerators and other electric appliances, coming back to settle in mud houses without tap 
water, electricity or latrines. Several of the aid providers interviewed have mentioned the attitudes 
and knowledge among the returnees as a positive change in creating an environment for health 
promotional activities. “Returnees from Iran are more interested in health and education. It was not 
like this four or five years ago”, a UNICEF representative in Herat observed. One example is 
attitudes towards the usage of contraceptives, which is accepted in Iran, and clerics have issued 
progressive edicts indicating that poor families could practice family planning. Studies indicate that 
Afghan refugees exposed to Iranian life, have changed attitudes34. Preventive health services, like 
usage of bed nets in against malaria transmission, has gained support through social marketing in 
refugee camps35. 
 
However, returnees both from Iran and Pakistan are used to higher standards of health service 
provision than what is currently available in Afghanistan, and may contribute to the general 
dissatisfaction with the situation. Returnees with chronic medical conditions find no treatment, and 
complicated medical cases in general remain unattended. As a doctor bluntly said: “The people with 
money go directly to Iran. The others are dying”. The complete lack of modern, medical treatment 
has raised concern about the ethics of sending refugees back to Afghanistan from Iran when they 
depend on life saving treatment like dialysis 36.  “Repatriation of dialysis patients and transplant 
recipients may be tantamount to their deaths”. Although Iran as the host country may expect 
UNHCR to take care of these individuals, advanced tertiary, curative services are not on the current 
priority list of the GoA.  
 
UNICEF is cooperating with UNHCR in order to identify professionals among the returnees in 
order to utilize the human resources they represent. Although statistical data were not presented to 
the evaluation team, the impact on the health service does not seem to be profound, compared to the 
burden on the same services the high number of returnees represents. Medical professionals have 
fled the country at a disproportionate rate, and seem to be reluctant to leave jobs in other countries. 
“There are about a thousand Afghan doctors and a few thousand nurses in Pakistan alone. 
Thousands also are in Europe  and North America”, Dr. Nayeem Azim, chairman of Afghan Medical 
Association states37. The challenge lies in attracting them back to Afghanistan. The donor countries 
may be able to contribute by not withdrawing the status of asylum in the host country for health 
professionals willing to go back to Aghanistan, as suggested by the British Medical Association.38 
Very few of the doctors in Afghanistan have any information on updated diagnostic and treatment 
practices. 
 
Health services in the IDP camps have been reduced (Zalmay Dasht) or closed (Mashlak) as a push 
for the IDPs to return to their home places. The rationale for this decision is questionable from a 
humanitarian point of view. A widow in Mashlak camp (originally from Faryab) said that: “We are 
lacking basic health facilities. People with simple illnesses have to go to the city and pay a lot of 
money”. In Zalmay Dasht, a woman complained: “I am sick, and I got some tablets. I am still sick. 
                                                 
34 Piran P. (2004): Effects of social interaction between Afghan refugees and Iranians on reproductive health 
attitudes. Disasters. 2004 Sep;28(3):283-93. 
35 Kolaczinski JH, Muhammad N, Khan QS, Jan Z, Rehman N, Leslie TJ, Rowland M (2004): Subsidized 
sales of insecticide-treated nets in Afghan refugee camps demonstrate the feasibility of a transition from 
humanitarian aid towards sustainability. Malaria Journal. 2004 Jun 10;3(1):15. 
36 Ghods AJ, Nasrollahzadeh D, Kazemeini M (2005): Afghan refugees in Iran model renal transplantation 
program: ethical considerations Transplant Proc. 2005 Mar;37(2):565-7. 
37 British Medical Journal 2002;324:319 ( 9 February ) Nayeem Azim, chairman of the Afghan Medical 
Association, explains to Alex Vass the difficulties of reconstructing the Afghan healthcare service. 
38 Roger Dobson (2002): Afghan health workers should be allowed home to treat people. BMJ 2002;325:674 
( 28 September ). 
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My children are also sick, and they are sick after getting the medicine too. We have different 
problems, but they give all of us the same medicine”.  
3.3 Nation and state-building 
MOPH clinics contracted to NGOs are from the beneficiaries’ side seen as NGO activities, not 
services provided by the Government. People usually referred to the NGO operating the services if 
there was a clinic in the area, and did not know whether that was a result of the BPHS or other 
policies. 
 
PRTs in the areas visited are not seen as significant contributors to the health care system, but 
offering practical assistance in concrete cases. They are observed when carrying out clinic 
construction in some districts and support the referral hospital in Herat upon request with fuel and 
technical assistance. It has, however, been noted that PRT representatives enter clinics on field 
visits, and coordination meetings in the MOPH fully armed, contrary to the habit of keeping health 
facilities as a no-weapon-zone. Some surveys carried out by PRTs result in local expectations, not 
necessarily followed by actions. This is, however, also the case with visiting NGOs or UN agencies.  
3.4 Gender 
The gender imbalance in Afghanistan is one of the factors contributing to ill health and early death 
among women. The majority of women in Afghanistan have never seen a doctor.39 In rural areas 
40% of health facilities do not have female staff at all40, and when present, they are primarily TBAs 
(traditional birth attenders) or CHW (community health workers). It is a tendency to focus on 
reproductive health only when planning health services for women. However, women have less 
access to treatment of any diseases. 87 % of women in a survey in Herat41 (the most educated area 
in Afghanistan) had to obtain permission from their husband or male relative to seek health care. 
Male doctors may not even listen to a female patient’s chest when making a clinical diagnosis in the 
more traditional areas, leaving female patients with poor diagnosis and possibly inappropriate 
treatments. Tuberculosis is an example of a disease affecting women at a disproportionate rate, for 
example 70% of detected TB cases occur among women42. 
 
The gender imbalance in health is shown at early ages. In areas with difficult access to health 
services, like Badakshan or Nimroz, caretakers are less likely to bring girl children to clinics for 
treatment than boys43. Lack of education and traditional early marriages lead very young women 
into high risk pregnancies, contributing to making maternal death the leading cause of death among 
women of reproductive age44.  
 
Some agencies have reported that they lost a lot of health staff in the first quarter of 2002, especially 
female staff suddenly in huge demand. This happened with the influx of hundreds of NGOs and 
                                                 
39 Samar Sima (2004): Despite the Odds – Providing Reproductive Health Care to Afghan Women. New 
England Medical Journal 351;11 September 9. 
40 MOPH, ANHRA. 
41 Amowitz LL, Reis C, Iacopino V: Maternal mortality in Herat Province, Afghanistan, in 2002: an indicator 
of women's human rights. JAMA. 2002 Sep 11;288(10):1284-91. 
42 Ministry of Health (2003): Project Document for National Tuberculosis Control Programme 1.3Health & 
Nutrition AFG/03446. 
43 Afghanistan – progress of provinces. Multiple Indicator Cluster Survey 2003. TISA and UNICEF. 
44 UNICEF/CDC (2002): Maternal mortality in Afghanistan: magnitude, causes, risk factors and 
preventability. 
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scaling up of UN agencies paying significantly higher salaries. Many ended up in the cities, 
primarily Kabul, and even working in other sectors than health. 
3.5 Environment 
Environmental factors represent important determinants for health. There is strong concern 
regarding health effects of rapid uncontrolled urbanization, poor sewage, lack of wastage disposal 
and lack of access to potable water. Malaria is an example of a disease spreading because of 
changes of climate and migratory patterns. 
 
 
BOX 2.2.5.1-MALARIA 
Malaria is endemic in large areas of Afghanistan, estimated by WHO to be 3 million cases per year in 2002, 
compared to 40-80 000 detected cases annually in the 1970s. The National Institute of Malaria and 
Parasitology in Kabul operated 240 laboratories for epidemiological surveillance and diagnosis in 1979. From 
1980s the war caused a progressive breakdown of all malaria control activities, which in addition to diagnosis 
and treatment of patients included household indoor spraying, and various measurement of reducing the 
breeding of the larvae. Environmental deterioration, breakdown of irrigation systems, population 
displacement, insecurity and inaccessibility, emigration of health staff, and health service decline all 
contributed to the progressive rise in malaria burden. In addition, incecticide- and drug resistance has 
complicated the situation. Over 60% of the national population is now at risk from the disease – principally 
focused in 14 provinces. 
 
The numbers of mosquito breeding sites are affected by environmental factors. The end of the draught has 
increased agricultural activities and irrigation, which empirically is known to increase the areas of stagnant 
water, and thus the mosquito burden. Lack of sewage and proper wastage disposal are also having a negative 
impact. The WHO “Roll Back Malaria” strategy for the prevention and control of malaria focuses on delivery of 
three key interventions: prompt diagnosis and early treatment; prevention of infection, primarily through the 
use of insecticide treated bednets; and, intermittent preventive therapy for pregnant women. The Ministry of 
health has approved and disseminated to all healthcare providers some basic national documents (strategies 
and guidelines) developed during 2003 through cooperation with UNICEF and WHO. The Malaria Treatment 
Protocol for Afghanistan, Guidelines on Malaria Outbreak Preparedness and Response. National Insecticide-
Treated Nets (ITNs) Strategy for Afghanistan and a social Mobilization Strategy based on Communication-
for-Behavioural-Impact (COMBI) approach. Laboratory confirmation of malaria infection is rarely available, 
and the treatment of the large majority of cases will be based on clinical criteria. A lot of training remains 
before health workers in Afghanistan accurately differentiate between malaria and non-malaria causes of 
fever. 
 
However, malaria control is clearly not just a health intervention issue, and participation in efforts of 
controlling the problem need to be broadened and should incorporate agricultural and private sectors. 
 
Sources: Malaria control in Afghanistan: progress and challenges, the Lancet February 2005. 
Carroll D., Whalen C., Arnow P. (2003): A Strategic Framework for Action against TB and Malaria in 
Afghanistan: Guidance to USAID/Afghanistan. 
Ministry of health: Project Document for Malariaand Leishmaniasis Control, AFG/03449. 
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4. Findings 
4.1 The relevance of the interventions 
Stakeholders agree that rapidly improving access to basic health services to the population is highly 
relevant and very important. Due to the magnitude of needs, the MOPH assisted by external 
advisors prioritized the key elements of services which they anticipated would have the greatest 
impact on the major health problems, services that were cost-effective in addressing the problems 
faced by many people and services which could be delivered to give equal access to both rural and 
urban populations. Adopting a public health approach is challenging in an environment of strong 
focus towards institution-based curative services, and few doctors are trained in population health. 
 
None of the interventions can be said to be irrelevant or unnecessary, the problem is rather the 
magnitude of needs making it difficult too stick to strict priorities. The problems are so pervasive 
that it is difficult to allow sufficient patience in building capable systems instead of overloading 
them. Donors may be too eager in rapidly infusing huge amounts of money in an immature system, 
expecting short term and unrealistic results, a concern UNICEF raised in a meeting. The MoF took 
over the management of the MOPH budgets at an early stage, as there was no absorption capacity 
for implementing all the plans being funded initially. 
 
Some experienced Afghan doctors complained that later revisions of the plans might have been 
unnecessary if Afghan voices had been heard properly initially. For example doctors should have 
been in the BHC (Basic Health Centre) from the beginning, and not just following a later revision. 
There are relatively many doctors in Afghanistan compared to nurses or other health workers45. The 
concept of community health workers as VHV (village health volunteers) may also be challenging 
as long as these VHVs are not supposed to be paid. This may enforce the habit of paying for 
services without any quality control, and it may not be realistic that they will stick to the limited 
number of tasks they are allowed to do. 
5. The framework of the interventions 
5.1 Coordination 
According to the MOPH on central level, and its own policy documents, the development of the 
BPHS was a participatory process with involvement of the major stakeholders. However, from the 
periphery it seems like a Kabul centered exercise, with project documents initially developed in 
English by external consultants, and some of the priorities based on experiences from other 
developing countries rather than reflecting realities in an Afghanistan. Seemingly most actors 
(whether PPA partners or not) gradually adapt their own protocols and standards towards the 
national standards and facilitate for collection of National data through the HMIS (Health 
Management Information Systems). The health sector is mentioned as a positive example when it 
comes to coordination in several of the provinces, in comparison with other sector coordination 
mechanisms. 
 
The provincial MOPH departments have less knowledge and hardly any resources financially or in 
hardware (transportation, computers) to fulfill their monitoring roles, but are assisted on an ad hoq 
                                                 
45 MOPH, ANHRA. 
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basis by NGOs in the sectors. MOPH facilitate for coordination through PCCs (provincial 
coordination committees) where all actors including PRT and coalition forces are invited.  
 
The UNICEF priorities within health are fully compatible and supportive of the MOPH priorities. 
Some of the NGO actors are actively participating in MOPH consultative groups; especially SCA 
has played a key role in representing the NGO community in professional health task forces. To 
ensure the effective and efficient coordination between the central and sub-national levels, MOPH 
established the Grant and Contracts Management Unit (GCMU) under the General Directorate of 
Policy and Planning. 
5.2 Coherence 
The national health strategy and the national policy on health and nutrition are parts of the first 
pillar in the NDF (National Development Framework). On a “Government document level” it is 
clearly seen that many developmental issues are relevant for progress on the health sector and that 
coordination between line ministries required. The CGHN (Consultative Group on Health and 
Nutrition) is held on a monthly basis, and other line ministries consulted are Ministry of Women’s 
Affairs, Min istry of Finance, Ministry of Higher Education, Ministry of Rehabilitation and Rural 
Development, Ministry of Planning, Ministry of Martyrs and Disabled, and Ministry of Education. 
The focus on human development, reducing poverty and improving living standards and educational 
levels especially among women, are among the determinants for health. But a lot remains before 
these ministerial connections in Kabul mean anything on a district level.  
5.3 Connectedness and sustainability 
The health service delivery planning at the moment takes place on a central level, with increasing 
expectations from the central level that the provinces should contribute to making provincial plans. 
The ability of the provincial health authorities in assuming that role varies within the country. Some 
of the NGO implementing partners have a long history with health sector service provision in 
Afghanistan, and are used to interacting with local shuras and provincial authorities. Others have 
been given PPA contracts without any previous health experience (e.g. NGOs traditionally working 
with engineering or education), or without previous experience from working in Afghanistan. They 
may see themselves as the sole service provider, and do not want “interference” from what they see 
as a slow working or incompetent MOPH. Some contracts have been given to new NGOs in areas 
already well covered by others in agreement with the MOPH, but without having a PPA.  
 
Sustainability financially is at the moment out of the discussion, it is very clear that the health 
system in Afghanistan will need external financing for a long time. The MOPH calculates: 
“However, to assess the financial sustainability of the Development Program, the overall costs by 
2015/1394 are put into perspective by comparing these with the expected Public Health Budget 
originating from the Government’s domestic resources. For this assessment, it is assumed that: 
 
1. The 2015/1394 GDP will have reached $450 per capita per year46; 
2. That the Government’s own contribution to the health sector will amount to 1-1.5% of the 
GDP; 
3. That 50% of the overall health budget by 2015/1394 will be funded by international donors 
(a situation not unlike that in other very poor countries). 
 
                                                 
46 Budget calculations based on CSO data 2003 with a baseline of 22.2 million people, and an annual growth 
rate of 1,92%. 
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Using the lower (1%) share of the GDP accruing to the Health Sector, the total budget available to 
Health would be 238.5 M $. Using the higher share (1.5%) would lead to a total budget of 375.75 M 
$. The proposed health sector program, by year 12 (2015/1394), will cost an estimated 269.5 M $. 
This forecast indicates that, even when given the lower share (1%) of the expected GDP, the Health 
and Nutrition Sector program is financially sustainable with a 50% donor contribution” 47. However, 
these calculations are based on very modest population- and population growth figures (22, 2 
million / 1, 92% growth in 2003 CSO), as compared to MICS (24, 5 million / 2, 5% growth in 
2003), or USAID48 (28, 5 mill / 4, 9% growth in 2004). Discrepancies in population projections for 
2010 vary with nearly 10 million from these sources, making the budget projections at best 
guesstimates. 
 
Although payment for services and cost recovery increasingly is on the agenda, the patient 
payments can not cover the expenses of implementation of services. The health reform is not 
introduced as a privatization project. Some NGOs have introduced 40% cost recovery of drugs, and 
use a standard admittance fee, but very few reports that it has a significant contribution to the 
budget except in a few urban clinics with high population density. If payment for services becomes 
the official norm, the question is how the poor are to be able to get the services they need. 
Preventive services of huge public health importance, for example vaccination, would be impossible 
to implement if based on payment for services. Even with free immunization, the coverage is still 
very low, and it takes a lot of social marketing for promoting vaccination. The MOPH they have 
contracted an external agency49 for assessing a cost recovery/privatization system within health.  
6. The interventions 
6.1 Effectiveness 
Expanding health services to rural areas is effective combined with community based services. 
However, reasonable access to the most basic health services cannot be ensured through facility-
based care only. The traditional healing system in most cases the first-line of treatment. Improving 
the institution-based services will not impact the situation for those who can not reach these 
services, or for those who need referral when that is impossible. The focus on improved obstetric 
care in health facilities will probably have a slow or minor effect on the maternal mortality, unless 
the link with those assisting with most home deliveries is made50. Focusing on health education is 
important, but its impact on altered behavior is not sufficiently investigated. Preventive services 
may gain less attention in a system evaluated on performance indicators measuring effectiveness in 
terms of costs per patient treatment.  
 
Within the BPHS, there is no possibility to treat all conditions or provide medicines for all common 
problems within the specified standards. The doctor sometimes provides two sets of prescriptions, 
one for the hospital pharmacy (inside the BPHS), and one for the local shop for drugs not covered in 
the system. In reality the referral system may not function, and the treatment must be given by local 
level health workers instead of the intended level of the BPHS. Some health workers in basic health 
centers complain that they are not allowed to use injectables, while the alternative for the patient is 
to get it from an untrained person in a shop probably unfamiliar with hygienic practices. Impact 
                                                 
47 Securing Afghanistan’s Future (2004): Accomplishments and the Strategic Path Forward. Health and 
Nutrition. Technical Annex. January 2004. 
48 USAID Country Health Statistical Report Afghanistan Sept 2004. 
49 John Hopkins University. 
50 93.1% of rural women deliver assisted by unskilled birth attendent (in last two years) UNICEF MICS 2003. 
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within vaccination coverage of polio with monitoring of reduction of registered polio cases has 
proven positive results, making it realistic to believe that polio can be eradicated from Afghanistan 
by the end of 2005. Some NGOs measure impact and cost effectiveness of targeted interventions 
like provision of clean water and health education linked to reduction of incidence of diarrhea. 
6.2 Needs assessment and monitoring 
Population morbidity and mortality indicators in the country create the basis for the choice of 
national health priorities. Description of needs in project documents by NGOs and UN are, with 
some exceptions, based on general knowledge about the situation in the country, rather than specific 
and local needs. But as an NGO worker observed: “A good proposal with a poor needs assessment 
does not mean there is no need!” The lack of reliable population data is a significant problem. 
Dupree noted in 1980 that statistics in Afghanistan are “wild guesses based on inadequate data”51. 
As an example, UN figures for the four provinces in the western zone are officially 2, 7 million, 
while results from the NIDs (National Immunization Days) indicate a population between 4-5 
million. The provincial MOPH believes that the population in Herat province alone amounts to 3 
million. UNICEF promotes the usage of birth registration cards in order to gain better knowledge 
about birth rates.  
6.3 Efficiency 
In the PPA coordination meetings evaluation data are presented ranking the financial performance 
of different contractors. The cost per capita of the BPHS is estimated at 4,4USD, while some 
providers are down to 3, 5-3,7USD, and others substantially higher. There is efficiency / equity 
dilemma, however, as the MOPH expresses an ambition towards equity of health services. In 
pursuing fairness in access, geographical and demographical differences between provinces have to 
be taken sufficiently into consideration in the evaluation of performance. Per capita allocations will 
not solve access or equity constraints.  
 
Case-studies indicate that preventive health initiatives like vaccination52, latrine introduction53 or 
deworming campaigns for children54 are cost effective. The basis for the estimates of averted deaths 
as a result of targeted preventive interventions may be adopted from other countries, for example 
child malaria deaths averted per 1,000 children protected by bed nets55. Some of the estimates may 
have limited relevance in Afghanistan, and a lot of field studies are needed before a real comparison 
between different service providers will be possible. 
6.4 Performances of the main implementation channels 
UNICEFs health and nutrition programme aims at decreasing infant, under five and maternal 
mortality through the use of proven and cost-effective interventions, by supporting MOPH efforts in 
cooperation with implementing partners through better delivery of a basic package of services56. 
                                                 
51 Colombo, Sandro and Pavignani, Enrico: Afghanistan health sector profile 2002. 
52 Fox-Rushby J.A, Kaddar M, Levine R, Brenzel L (2004): The economics of vaccination in low- and 
middle-income countries. Bulletin of World Health org. Sept 2004, 82 (9). 
53 Meddings D.R, Ronald L.A, Marion S, Pinera J.F, Oppliger A (2004): Cost effectiveness of a latrine 
revision programme in Kabul, Afghanistan. Bulletin of World Health Organisation April 2004, 82 (4). 
54 Government of Afghanistan / WFP / UNICEF: Deworming Campaign Documentation CD 2004. 
55 Child malaria deaths averted are based on 6 deaths averted per 1,000 children protected. Lengeler C 
Insecticide treated bednets and curtains for malaria control (Cochrane Review). In: The Cochrane Library 
1998; 3. 
56 UNICEF consolidated donor report 2004. 
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The main programs include EPI, establishment of EmOC (Emergency Obstetric Care) centers in the 
provinces, and improving nutrition. UNICEF is using baseline data from the first national 
micronutrient survey conducted in June 2004, in order to strengthen monitoring of impact. UNICEF 
is planning the next country programme for 2006-08 incorporating recommendations from the Mid-
term programme review. 
 
ICRC has been working in Afghanistan since 1987 after assisting Afghan refugees in Pakistan for 
six years. Within health, ICRC supports medical services, improves water supply systems, is 
engaged in disability programs and prevention of mine injuries, and strengthens the work of Afghan 
Red Crescent. The ICRC limb-fitting centers remained principle providers of physical rehabilitation 
services in Afghanistan. ICRC has continued supporting the hospitals acknowledging that the BPHS 
has left gaps for high demand hospital services. Among other activities, ICRC has played an 
important role in maintaining surgical activities and operating blood banks. ICRC has pulled out of 
provincial hospitals adopted by NGO implementers under the BPHS. In Kabul, ICRC handed over 
the newly renovated national orthopedic referral hospital, Wazir Akhbar Khan, to the MOPH, who 
in turn agreed with an American private pay hospital to take over57, illustrating the state’s low 
ability to run the hospitals. ICRC has not seen overall reduced needs for its support to humanitarian 
work in Afghanistan following the fall of the Taliban. 
 
SCA (Swedish Committee for Afghanistan) started providing humanitarian aid to Afghanistan in 
198258 with support for medicines and health care, later expanding into other education and 
agriculture. SCA became a huge health care provider in Afghanistan on unprecedented scale, 
operating both curative and preventive health services. SCA still is one of the largest organizations 
in Afghanistan. The historical importance of SCA in contributing to keeping competent medical 
staff inside the country by providing employment and training can not be over estimated in the 
current situation. SCA has monitored and evaluated their health interventions closely against 
measurable output targets. Due to a long term strategy of capacity building, the health programme is 
not overly dependent on expatriate staff59. The change of health policies has, since 2002, led to a 
huge transformation in the health work of SCA. For the first time SCA is working with a ministry 
and follow other guidelines than their own. SCA is operating PPAs in Kunduz and Wardak, and 
handed over clinics in 18 provinces to other NGO actors in the country. They use regional funds 
from SIDA in improving quality. SCA does not bid for projects funded by USAID.  
 
SCA also manages a comprehensive disability programme called RAD (Rehabilitation of Afghans 
with Disability). From a joint operation between UNOPS and SCA called CDAP (Comprehensive 
Disabled Afghans Programme), in 2004 this became a separate SCA programme directly funded by 
SIDA. Originally it was established as a medical rehabilitation programme for mine victims and war 
wounded, but expanded in -94/95 to include mentally retarded and employment support. The RAD 
is now one of the biggest programs operating independently of the UN in Afghanistan. The work 
should be performed in accordance with the forthcoming National Strategy for Disability in 
cooperation with the MMD (Ministry of Martyrs and Disabled), and the cooperation between major 
actors in this sector is reportedly good. The National Disability programme is added to the 
Afghanistan financial budget “from1385 (2006), $0.25 per capita will be added to pay for 
community based disability and mental health care”60. 
 
                                                 
57 Reported in Kabul Weekly 300305. 
58 SCA Annual donor reports 2001 and 2002. 
59 SCA Annual donor report 2001. 
60 Securing Afghanistan’s Future. Accomplishments and the Strategic Way Forward. Technical Annex 
January 2004. 
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DAC (Danish Afghanistan Committee) based in Herat province is providing health services on four 
levels in three districts. There is a strong focus on reproductive health and high quality obstetric 
services. DAC has always worked in cooperation and coordination with the provincial health 
authorities, and still supports the MOPH in Herat through payments of salaries and running costs for 
the primary health care unit, provision of transportation and professional capacity building. DAC 
also supported the education of nurses in Herat. The funding comes from DANIDA, a grant 
expiring in August 2005, but expected to be continued for the next 3 years. DAC applied for a PPA 
for its cluster of the BPHS, but that was granted to an American NGO without consultation with the 
local authorities. When DAC eventually phases out, their clinics will be handed over to MOPH.  
 
Christian Aid  is working through a partnership  approach, and opened the field office in Herat in 
1997. The ideology of working through local partners is supposed to have long-term impact, and 
makes implementation less vulnerable to security constraints affecting the expats. CA supports 6 
core partners, training them in making base line surveys, impact assessments and capacity building 
in the field. Some partner NGOs are involved in health service provision through clinics in Western 
Afghanistan, and implement PPA through USAID/REACH. 
 
DACAAR 3-day workshop on SAFE MOTHERHOOD April 2005 
 
Participants to the workshop were 18 female social community workers for DACAAR in Herat province. The 
women are already living in the communities where they are working, and know the areas, the women and their 
needs well. DACAAR is operating both NSP and their own community development programme, focusing on 
reaching the women. They employ a son or a husband as a”mahram” for the female community worker in order 
to make movements between villages possible.  
 
During the training the women first learned how to make a baseline survey for the villages they are working in, 
and methods on measuring impact. Every month they carry out three meetings with the female shuras with a 
pre-planned agenda. There should be one clear message at a time. They have faced many problems in the 
villages through the community work.  
 
The main messages for the community women regarding safe motherhood are:  
- Get TBAs to attend the births.  
- Use clinics for referral.  
- If possible attend ante natal check-up.  
- Provide knowledge about immunizations and supplements. 
 
The course subjects for the villagers are:  
- Normal pregnancies and minor health problems. 
- Danger signs in pregnancy and risk factors. 
- Breast feeding. 
- Birth spacing. 
 
Increasing breast feeding is a high priority issue for child survival in Afghanistan. There are local practices 
preventing the usage of early breast feeding. The community workers are aware of the obstacles and use a lot 
of time with the women groups and discuss in a friendly way. The messages in the training focuses on positive 
sides for the child like: The milk is always available, it is clean, has the right temperature; it contains 
antibodies and balanced needs for the first four months. For the mother it reduces the risk of bleeding, 
reduces the fertility for a few months, and helps her regain shape more quickly. The community workers have 
key messages for all the different topics of priority.  
 
Previously rural women only met during weddings or funerals, but now they meet on a regular basis in the 
group. The experience so far is that personal hygiene and home cleanliness have improved, there are less flies 
and other insects around the households. The women have learned about what to do when children have 
diarrhea, and the awareness regarding danger signs in health is improved. They expect the same progress 
when introducing these new topics. 
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7. Overall conclusions 
- The health status of the population in Afghanistan remains among the worst in the world. 
- The GoA’s ambition towards expanding the essential health system in rural areas through 
PPAs has shown considerable progress from 2001-2004. There is agreement between all 
major donors as well as the health sector’s major NGOs towards supporting the strategy of the 
MOPH. 
- The traditional role of the MOPH is hugely transformed, requiring internal training and 
capacity building at all levels. So far the central and provincial health authorities have limited 
capacity (technically, financially, managerial) and ability of properly assuming their 
stewardship roles.  
- The NGOs in the BPHS are transformed from being independent developmental agents, to 
being contractors for service delivery.  
- Private actors (e.g. private doctors, midwives, laboratory services, pharmacies) play an 
increasingly important role in the health service delivery, but are not subjected to regulations 
or Government control. 
- There are still huge unmet needs for preventive and curative services both in urban and rural 
areas. Important sectors of mental health, disability and referral hospital services need to be 
phased in and financed. The stakeholders, including the Government, are aware of these 
shortcomings. NGOs, UN and the Red Cross / Red Crescent Movement continue supporting 
projects and vertical programs outside the BPHS in their traditional sectors of engagement in 
order to address some of the unmet needs, more or less as a continuum of their involvement 
during previous governments in Afghanistan. 
- Measurement of performance criteria of PPAs are lacking or unreliable due to scarcity of 
baselines and projectable population data, and influence on population morbidity and 
mortality can not be measured at this stage. Quantitative output indicators are emphasized.  
- The lack of health professionals willing to work in rural areas is a constraint for the 
implementation of the BPHS. Unhealthy competition by implementing agencies for 
competent staff has lead to massive turn over of employees, and loss of competence. Salary 
discrepancies between the Government and NGO/UN sector are also leading to staff turn over 
and instability. 
- A new basic health centre built in an area does not necessarily mean that the catchment 
population has better access to health care. Cultural factors, gender roles, lack of education, 
seasonal variations, poverty and lack of transportation limit access for people in rural areas, 
necessitating service at referral hospital level when they finally manage to seek help. 
- Introduction of “cost recovery” and other payment for services arrangements may adversely 
affect the access for the poor. 
- Linkages between traditional healers and local community health workers to the health 
system are poorly developed, limiting expected effects of the institution-based services like 
Emergency Obstetric Centers.  
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8. Recommendations 
- Donors supporting health care provision in Afghanistan on the basis of a keen interest in 
improving the population health need to plan for long-term commitment. The initial 
investments in construction, equipment upgrades and staff training are wasted unless 
maintained and resupplied. The new system needs consolidation, but also further expansion in 
order to keep up with the population growth. 
- Stakeholders need to acknowledge that the health indicators of the population will improve 
slowly only, not pushing for unrealistic achievements.  
- Effective coordination is required among donors and partners to achieve MDG targets. The 
tendency of urbanization and concentrating on Kabul is a hindrance towards reaching 
important goals, and one limitation is the lack of female health workers in the districts. Proper 
coordination where the actors look at overall goals and not just goals for their own time lines 
and projects, could contribute to better distribution of key personnel. 
- The impact of the BPHS for the beneficiaries should be comprehensively assessed as soon as 
possible. The reform is massive and short-term, and the importance of properly analyzed 
(intended and unintended) impacts must be clarified. The potential need for the government to 
be involved in  service delivery in the future can not be excluded at this point. Experiences 
from other countries having applied a similar reform must be taken into consideration. 
- Donors should support health research, as there are too many assumptions and too little 
knowledge about health seeking behavior in Afghanistan. 
- All actors involved in capacity building need to focus on the transfer of authority to Afghans, 
supporting the targets of the MOPH of managing without external consultants in a 10-year 
time frame. 
- An improved link between the NSP and the health programs should be established. Test 
provinces could be selected, for example a province where the same agency is responsible for 
the NSP and the BPHS, to evaluate whether synergies of the two programs may be achieved.  
9. Lessons learned 
Health services delivery is dependent on an ideology of whether health care is a commodity 
governed by market forces or a public good61. The commodity position means denial of access to 
those who cannot afford health care. Thus health services are located where the most profits can be 
generated rather than community need. Some health planners consider health care a public good and 
propose a progressive approach to health policy in developing countries - engine leading the general 
economy to improved health care. Political will is needed to cause major changes in the health 
system in a reasonable length of time. Health policies need to expand and integrate services and 
stop corruption. Most poor countries have poor health statistics, but a few poor countries have 
achieved remarkably good health statistics at relatively low cost62. The experience from these 
countries suggest that the following conditions are required: i) political consensus on the high 
priority of education and health services ii) female autonomy iii) readily available education, 
especially for women iv) adequate nutrition, and v) available health services including preventive 
services. Lao PDR has promoted health care partnerships with the private sector, and cost recovery 
                                                 
61 Goldsteen RL, Pereira JC, Goldsteen K (1990). The engine or the caboose: health policy in developing 
countries. Rev Saude Publica. 1990 Dec;24(6):523-7. 
62 Beaglehole and Bonita (1997): Public health at the crossroads. Achievements and prospects. 
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in public hospitals, to increase resources in the public sector, while at the same time attempting to 
ensure appropriate access to health care for those without means to pay63. The social goals of this 
reform have not been achieved, and equity in health care remains theoretical rather than practical. 
People meet their health care needs in the private sector where what they receive is strictly limited 
to what they can pay for. For the poor, in most cases, this means drugs alone, i.e. no examination, 
no diagnosis and only limited advice.  
 
Afghanistan has an opportunity in showing that the political commitment towards improving health 
statistics is followed by financing and human resources. In this process difficult dilemmas will arise 
concerning domestic budgetary priorities, for example public health spending versus military 
spending.  
                                                 
63 Paphassarang C, Philavong K, Boupha B, Blas E: (2002):Equity, privatization and cost recovery in urban 
health care: the case of Lao PDR. Health Policy and Planning Dec;17 Suppl:72-84. 
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1. Introduction 
This livelihood’s study has focused primarily on rural livelihoods with the added dimension of the 
drive to find alternatives to opium poppy cultivation. The rural livelihoods sector should not be seen 
in isolation to that of urban livelihoods, but the latter dimension was circumscribed by a relative 
lack of information or donor activities focused on urban areas during the period under review. 
 
Livelihoods cannot be seen within a narrow focus on physical production processes, but rather as a 
complex chain of activities, resources and assets. This chain includes economic drivers, such as, 
access to inputs, access to investment capital and skills development, access to markets and 
information, and the physical infrastructure of transport and irrigation networks. These should be 
assessed along with the intricate strategies for diversification of incomes practiced by all poor 
households as a traditional coping mechanism in an exceptionally high-risk environment. This is 
particularly the case in the period under review due to the impact of over two decades of warfare, 
which caused extensive migration leading to the total abandonment of some villages, along with 
three years of drought up to 2002. It has often been stated that 80% of Afghans depend on 
agriculture, but this statement may have little foundation in reality. Clearly, whilst a large 
percentage of Afghans engage in agriculture and/or livestock production, it is likely that far fewer 
entirely depend upon these activities. Very little information is available on these coping strategies, 
although some recent research has been undertaken by the AREU1. 
1.1 A short of history of livelihood interventions 
Most NGOs working in Afghanistan from the 1980’s onwards engaged in a variety of livelihood 
interventions. These were funded both bilaterally and multilaterally. Their activities included a 
number of district-based integrated rural development programmes, which supported improved 
crops, income generating through craft production and infrastructure projects, such as the cleaning 
and repair of karezes and building of irrigation and road structures, as well as, support to education 
and health care facilities. Most interventions were initially planned in a top down manner often 
from offices based in Peshawar, and to ensure community involvement they were heavily 
subsidised. Virtually all such interventions provided initial success followed by ultimate failure due 
to their lack of both a genuine community buy-in, as well as, any underlying commercial rational.  
Issues such as the communities’ responsibility for on-going repair and maintenance of irrigation 
networks and roads were often addressed in a cursory manner by the NGOs’ staff. By the mid to 
late 1990’s responses to these shortcomings resulted in moves towards a more sophisticated 
delivery mechanism, focusing upon the direct engagement of traditional community structures, such 
as village or district shuras. These councils were, for example, invited to discuss and select their 
own priorities for assistance, conditional upon their willingness to contribute to implementation and 
subsequent maintenance using their own resources. 
 
In addition to these integrated approaches, there were many discrete programmes, particularly 
popular with some UN agencies, working on reconstruction and rehabilitation of infrastructure, seed 
multiplication, locust control, primary health care, and much more. 
 
In some ways these activities have changed little till today, and the NSP in particular has benefited 
from the improved delivery system piloted in the latter 1990’s. The most evident change has been 
the dramatically increased level of funding now available, at least for the creation of infrastructure.  
                                                 
1 Addressing Livelihoods in Afghanistan. Adam Pain and Sue Lautze. Afghanistan Research and Evaluation 
Unit. September 2002 
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There is also an increasing realisation that market forces are paramount in determining the final 
outcomes of all livelihood interventions.  
 
However, the shift towards genuine community participation is not apparent throughout the sector 
and donors remain willing to fund activities that bear a striking resemblance to the earlier failures. 
This is perhaps due to the haste in which most interventions have been planned and the lack of 
immediately obvious alternatives. The absence of institutional memory due to very high staff 
turnover and the employment of younger, less experienced staff, are also factors in this slow 
learning process. 
 
History Repeating Itself 
Examples of failed projects repeating themselves are the numerous small projects funded by a very wide 
spectrum of donors aimed at training carpet weavers or raising incomes from craft production. In at least 
one such case the carpet weavers are also to be given computer training! The question; as to why anyone able 
to effectively use a computer would wish to spend endless exhaustive and minimally paid hours crouched by 
a carpet loom, appeared to be left unanswered. An Afghan NGO employee working in central Afghanistan in 
1990 made a startling observation. He compared a carpet training programme for young adolescent boys to 
the work of Frederick Engels in his 1842 publication The Condition of the Working Class in England, which, 
being so terrible, he said, “I never thought it could really be true until I saw this project”.  
 
Rural livelihoods in the period immediately prior to and at the beginning of the period in question 
had been severely affected by at least three successive years of drought. Alongside this, over two 
decades of instability and considerable population migration had already resulted in the loss of all 
Afghanistan’s export markets. These had been developed from the 1950’s to 1970’s for products 
such as dried fruit, almonds, sheepskins, etc. With contemporary developments in product 
standards, it will not be possible for Afghanistan to return to these export markets without an 
extensive programme of product enhancement.  
 
Today, it is hard to buy even fresh fruit and vegetables in Kabul that have not been imported from 
neighbouring countries. There is therefore a considerable and immediate potential for import 
substitution, particularly when considering the increasing trend towards urbanisation. A rapidly 
increasing population (currently estimated at 3.9% increase per annum) is another factor that will 
exacerbate Afghanistan’s food deficit.  
2. Sector observations – livelihoods2 
Throughout the period of drought in Afghanistan and immediately following the fall of the Taliban, 
WFP and ECHO averted the feared onset of famine by providing considerable food resources. Food 
was brought in and distributed as widely as possible to communities considered to be most at risk. 
In urban areas WFP established women’s bakery projects, both as a source of income for female 
bakers and to ensure that bread was available to the most needy. Following the Bonn Agreement, 
emergency food supplies began to be converted into food/cash for work programmes. These 
programmes were aimed at ensuring that the most vulnerable groups throughout the country would 
have access to paid employment, with payment provided at the equivalent of $2 per day, which was 
considered to be just below the minimum wage, and therefore self-targeted at the most vulnerable 3. 
The work undertaken often involved gravelling rural roads but with the absence of compaction 
machinery that would make this work more durable. The dual aim was to increase accessibility to 
remoter rural and some urban areas, as well as, to provide an income safety net for the vulnerable. 
                                                 
2 Unless otherwise stated all figures are taken from internal documents produced by the agencies described. 
3 Inevitably, food/cash for work programmes do not reach all the vulnerable, such as, the physically disabled 
or the very old or the very young.  Due to the prevailing culture, women are often also excluded. 
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There was little or no design work involved as by their nature these programmes were undertaken as 
an emergency response. 
 
The massive expansion of opium production, both under the Taliban (with the exception of 2001 
when it was effectively prohibited in much of the country) and under the subsequent Interim 
Government, has distorted livelihoods to a considerable degree. Conventional cropping of wheat 
declined until 2003 when the rains came and a record harvest was produced (this coincided with a 
record opium harvest also.) A possible indicator of the impact of opium on the rural economy is that 
the cost of labour has increased to where unskilled rural labour is now at a minimum of around $3 
per day. NEEP has had to change its casual labour strategy as contractors were unable to attract 
sufficient workers, or the workers were unmotivated to keep working according to schedule. 
Contractors now sub-contract groups of workers and pay according to the amount of work 
performed per group; this provides an incentive to finish the work ahead of schedule. 
 
Today, Afghanistan imports wheat purchased on the commercial market in Pakistan, along with 
wheat imported by WFP (400,000 MT in 2004) as emergency food to vulnerable groups and as food 
for work. This indicates a potential for import substitution if the costs of production are favourable.  
 
Campaigns to substitute for opium production through research into alternative livelihoods and to 
enforce sanctions against producers will be major activities in the coming years. Already, there are 
clear signs in Badakhshan that the donor community lacks the ability to coordinate its approach in 
this area, as will be discussed further below. 
2.1 Policies and implementation strategies at sector level 
With such a wide variety of livelihood activities being undertaken, it was necessary to focus 
specifically on the major funding channels through the ARTF, along with a small number of 
individual activities funded bilaterally.  
 
NEEP, WFP and ECHO have all combined social protection; targeting income deficient 
(vulnerable) communities, with a drive to provide productive infrastructure in the form of roads, 
irrigation networks, etc. In the context of a complex emergency moving rapidly through to recovery 
and into the development phase, it is unsurprising to find that clear policies and implementation 
strategies were lacking, particularly in the period 2001/03. 
 
To assist their targeting, agencie s can access data collated by the National Surveillance System 
(under MRRD and funded by the EC), which aims to enable programmers to design and review 
policies leading to equitable targeting strategies. It also has an early warning system for the 
potentia l impact of natural and economic shocks. Other data is available from, the Central Statistics 
Office; the Opium Surveys conducted by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, and the 
Government’s Counter Narcotics Directorate. However, in 2002/03 the quality and quantity of data 
available was very limited. To address this, staff of the National Surveillance System are now being 
trained to carry out timely and regular poverty/livelihood data collection and analysis.  
NEEP 
NEEP has been criticized for operating within a policy vacuum during its first 2/3 years of 
implementation. Its programme was not part of any national rural development strategy and there 
was no overall transport policy or rural transport policy. NEEP did however attempt to dialogue 
with local communities in order to prioritise its investments. 
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It is clear that for NEEP, the dual objectives of social protection and provision of rural infrastructure 
could not be sustained in a political climate that demanded nationwide delivery, irrespective of 
levels of vulnerability, prior to the Presidential elections in the latter part of 2004. As a result, 
attention to the provision of a social safety net for very low-income families took second place. In 
the event, the improved harvests of 2003 and 2004, of themselves, provided a safety net. (The 
Afghan economy is estimated by the World Bank to have grown by 7% in 2004, which provides an 
indicator of casual employment opportunities, especially for workers able to migrate to where the 
best opportunities existed.) 
WFP 
Discussions with WFP’s staff confirmed that in 2001/02 WFP saw its role as assisting in the 
prevention of large-scale migration. By 2002/03 WFP was criticised for continuing to work 
independent of the GoA and for failing to coordinating with other agencies. This was explained to 
be due to its staffing which was still emergency orientated, as it took time to alter the staffing 
profile by recruiting development orientated professionals. WFP has now put in place a new 
working arrangement that engages with the GoA and with the Livelihoods and Social Protection 
Consultative Group. But this is time consuming, where previously they had discussed with village 
elders and local commanders on an ad hoc basis.  
 
On the controversy concerning their continued reliance of food4 rather than cash for work, WFP’s 
Country Director for Afghanistan stated that donors are reluctant to provide cash, since they regard 
food as less fungible and believe that food is more likely to reach those in real need. Also, food 
distributions are more visible and therefore may be preferred for political reasons. All food is 
purchased by WFP on the open market and therefore it does not directly benefit US farmers; 
although they are the main producers. Studies show that cash or food may be preferred at different 
times of the year; immediately post harvest cash is preferred, but in winter months when vehicular 
access is poor, food may be more appropriate.  
 
WFP’s Evaluation Report5 states that “Impressive progress was made in risk and vulnerability 
assessment with the evolution of National Risk and Vulnerability Assessments [under the National 
Surveillance Programme], but the linkage between vulnerability assessment and programming 
remains weak. In spite of solid assessment work, the resources allocated to acutely and highly food-
insecure districts are well below assessed requirements. The duration and timing of assistance is 
often inadequate to address the food gap, partly because of remoteness, insecurity, shortage of 
implementing partners and inadequate coordination with cash-based programmes”. 
ECHO 
ECHO’s strategy was to ensure a continuum of aid moving from humanitarian relief through to 
rehabilitation as the initial emergency conditions of 2001 improved through 2002, with some areas 
                                                 
4 Extract from an internal WFP report prepared by Daniel Molla, Head of Programmes for WFP, dated 2004:  
“Since 1996, WFP has been collecting weekly price data on selected commodities and unskilled labor in 6 
cities of Afghanistan: Kabul, Jalalabad, Kandahar, Herat, Mazar and Faizabad. Analysis of wheat price trends 
in these markets over the past two years (2003/04) indicates that prices have remained generally stable despite 
the enormous increase in wheat harvest this year and substantial commercial imports of wheat and wheat flour 
from neighboring countries. The bumper harvest has resulted in an increase of about 1.7 million metric tons of 
wheat this year compared to last year. While some of this additional supply will substitute commercial 
imports, the rest will enter domestic markets with a potential to lead to declines in wheat prices in the coming 
months. There has been little evidence of this happening since the end of the major wheat harvest season in 
July (2004).“ 
5 Summary Evaluation Report of PRRO 10233.0 in Afghanistan. WFP/EB.1/2005/6-A 16th December 2004 
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moving forward at a faster rate than others. This strategy required excellent communication 
between the different agencies, such that free distribution would not coincide with food/cash for 
work programmes, but, as such, this was not always guaranteed.  ECHO recognised a need to move 
away from food-for-work to cash-for-work as soon as possible to avoid suppressing the farm-gate 
price of wheat. This is contrary to the view of WFP.  
MISFA 
MISFA set out to be the national conduit for wholesale (micro) financial intermediation (i.e. to 
provide funds for on-lending) through NGOs and as such it received international loan finance for 
on-lending. In addition, grant funds were provided through the ARTF for capacity building to those 
same NGOs. MISFA also aims to act as an advocate and a vehicle through which policy/legislative 
and institutional developments can take place. It is owned and controlled by the GoA and aims to 
take financial services to the people and in so doing to promote enhanced and sustainable 
livelihoods. MISFA is described as having a particular focus on the poor and most vulnerable  and 
on enabling them to better manage risk. This latter aim suggests some confusion since it is most 
unlikely, given the experience of micro-finance in other developing countries, that MISFA will be 
able to make financial services available to the poor and most vulnerable6. International experience 
indicates that it is the ‘marginal poor’ that benefit disproportionately from micro-credit provision.   
But the ‘marginal poor’ can be effective drivers of economic development and they might also 
provide employment opportunities to those in greater poverty.  
 
MISFA intends that successful NGOs will separate off their micro-finance activities to create 
independent Micro-Finance Institutions (MFIs) in the future.  
NSP 
The National Solidarity Programme (NSP) is a primary vehicle for the GoA, s social capital 
building, with an objective “… to lay the foundations for a strengthening of community level 
governance, and to support community-managed sub-projects comprising reconstruction and 
development that improve access of rural communities to social and productive infrastructure and 
services”. 
  
Built on the WB’s Community Driven Development concept it is an innovative programme that 
combine rehabilitation and development aims with those of nation building. All villages will receive 
uniformed support from the government, size of assistance depending on number of inhabitants, and 
there is a cohered effort to establish a common communal structure through the establishment of 
female and male Community Development Councils (CDC). 
 
The programme initially targeted 8,000 villages in priority districts throughout the country, based 
on vulnerability criteria. Due to the extensive nature of the work involved and some delays in 
implementation the target was reduced to 4.000 for the first phase, reaching 6,985 CDCs by April 
2005, though the plan is to expand to all Afghan villages, estimated to be 20 000. A total of 120 mill 
US dollar had been granted for the programme, while only 76 mill US dollar have so far been 
disbursed. 
 
The programme is lead by MRRD, implemented by 21 Facilitating Partners (FPs), primarily NGOs, 
and supervised by the Oversight Consultant (OC). Through a facilitation process the CDCs develop 
                                                 
6 The very poor have a preferance for access to secure savings facilities, which is not a service prioritised by 
MISFA at this stage. 
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a Community Development Plan, prioritising 3 projects for subsequent funding and committing 
themselves to contribute at least 10 % of the project value. The CDC’s decide on project 
implementer, while the FP and OC oversee project implementation. The block grants are handed 
directly to the CDC, though the Da Afghanistan Bank. The aim is thus to ensure communal 
involvement and reduce corruption through larger degree of transparency at the village level and 
extensive control mechanisms. 
 
At the Ministerial level the MRRD heads a Steering Committee, though this is neither well attended 
nor well functioning and thus a point of strong concern, The NSP has been selected for implement 
of a major school building projects, and in many villages the main priority is for projects demanding 
the approval of and interaction with other Ministries, as MoE for building of schools and MoH if 
communities wish to prioritise a health clinic. And while the MoF’s recently has raised concerns 
about what is perceived as high initial implementation costs, while adoption of a strict NGO 
legislation will have severe implications for the project. And, moreover, other actors’ interests in the 
NSP as a vehicle for disbursement of assistance, as in a drug eradication strategy, might lead 
Afghans to see it more as a political tool than a humanitarian and nation-building programme. Thus, 
intra-ministerial information exchange and dialogue with donors is of outmost importance.  
 
The CDC election and project identification process is elaborate and well regulated, to the extent 
that villagers and FP complains about the extent of paperwork, causing a problem in the villages 
with a low education level. The demand for separate female and male CDCs in all villages is 
laudable, but the degree of women’s influence over the final decision making varies largely. 
However, just ensuring the possibility for women to meet regularly within a village must be 
regarded as a major step forward. With the establishment of CDCs all humanitarian and 
development actors, including GoA ministries, have got a common village reference point to work 
with and through. And one that is perceived as more representative of these communities than those 
individuals or the range of shuras and committees they previously interacted with. 
 
The programme is complex in terms of delivery at the national level, but at the village level its 
working methodology can be easily assimilated with the aid of community development workers 
and its apparent equality in distribution of development assistance is very appealing. A major 
concern is noted on the long time it takes the OC to process the applications and get the block grants 
delivered to the CDCs. 
 
All communities and local authorities interviewed expressed a strong support for the NSP. Many 
underlined that it was the first time they had benefited from any governmental support, and they 
regarded this programme as fair as all villagers were informed and based on the number of families 
they knew exactly their financial allocation.  
 
There are still reports of misuse and corruption, certainly where the CDC’s are dominated by 
commanders and /or influential individuals. However, if the NSP is regarded as a developmental 
and nation building process the best way to address such challenges would be for the CDCs 
members to replace such individuals though new elections. Their disempowerment will then be 
through empowerment of the common villagers.7 
 
While the general assessment of the NSP is positive there are some concerns that need to be 
addressed urgently to ensure best possible utilisation of its potential. The first relate to the nation-
building process, where, given its initial success, many villagers are waiting for the NSP to be 
expanded to their villages. To avoid increased criticism on both the GoA and the FP, there is an 
urgent need to ‘roll out’ NSP to new districts. The speed of the next steps is less important than 
                                                 
7 MRRD is reportedly considering ways to establish a regulatory framework for the CDC. 
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people’s knowledge that they eventually will benefit. However, a reduction of bureaucracy and the 
processing time will greatly enhance the appreciation, where a minimum requirement is for the 
CDCs to be told when they will receive the block grants. 
Alternative livelihoods 
Under the heading alternative (or sustainable) livelihoods a great variety of interventions have taken 
place. In fact, cash or food for work is often referred to as an alternative livelihood, albeit short 
term. During the period under review there was no sector-wide policy for any livelihood 
interventions and many of the small production related projects have exhibited a very wide 
spectrum of approaches, from those that demand full community buy-in and participation to those 
which are very heavily subsidised and lack any business planning. It is not practical to consider all 
these interventions, many of which have been of a pilot nature.  Included within these has been on-
going research into improved wheat and potato cultivation leading to increased yield, and poly 
tunnel cultivation of vegetables for early cropping. The reestablishments of vine and fruit rootstocks 
are also a priority. 
2.2 Coverage and actors involved  
Although originally designed as a safety-net programme that would also provide enhanced 
livelihoods from asset construction, NEEP was diverted to providing nationwide coverage in a total 
of 308 districts in all 34 provinces regardless of levels of vulnerability. To March 2005 NEEP 
reports that 6,000 Km of rural roads have been rehabilitated and/or constructed, including 11,000 
running meters of culverts and bridges, etc. Small scale irrigation schemes amounting to 187 were 
also undertaken as well as 69 schools, 9 clinics, and 105 shelters, 26 government buildings and 29 
nurseries were all constructed using a total of 11.2 million labour-days. 
 
The deliveries of NEEP, WFP and ECHO are impressive during the period, given the many 
logistical obstacles that they faced, and for NEEP in particular where an entire delivery system had 
to be established. However, relatively small amounts of aid reached the South in the first two years 
due to political instability and the targeting of foreign aid programmes by insurgents. Due to 
inconsistencies in reporting formats, from agency to agency and, from year to year within some 
agencies, it is not possible to provide comparative information in this report.  
 
MISFA made a good start but its figures are distorted by the exceptional performance of BRAC, 
which accounts for 60% of its delivery statistics. (See box below.) For a well-balanced market 
MISFA needs to ensure that BRAC has some viable competition in the future. Most of MISFA’s 
other partner NGOs are still developing their working methodologies and training staff, such that 
their delivery and performance remains low. MISFA began with 8 NGO partners and that has now 
risen to 12. The micro-loans provided vary from NGO to NGO and range from $50 to $1000 for 
periods of 3 to 12 months. To March 2005 MISFA reports that a total of 140,000 clients (nearly 
90% women) in 15 provinces had been supported, and an average repayment rate of 98.5% has been 
achieved. Activities financed include: shopkeepers, bakers, hairdressers, electricians, plumbers, 
tailors, embroiderers, carpet makers, animal husbandry, orchard establishment, blacksmiths and 
carpenters.  
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 Women and Micro-finance 
BRAC Bangladesh,  is the foremost NGO of its home country in terms of profile and outreach, and is known 
particularly for micro finance, informal education and village health care. Originally formed in 1971 and still 
led by its founder, a Chartered Accountant, BRAC is known for its commercially orientated style of operation.  
 
BRAC first registered in Afghanistan in June 2002. Since then it has captured more than 60% of MISFA’s 
funds for on-lending to micro-finance clients.  Consistently targeting almost exclusively female clients, 
BRAC has a style of its own amongst NGOs in Afghanistan and it seems to be relatively unhindered by 
internal debate concerning the appropriateness of interventions for Afghan women. Rather, it has imported 
its own tried and tested working methodology from Bangladesh. This has been adapted to suit the 
dramatically differing demographics in Afghanistan, which adversely affect its economies of scale, rather 
than for social/cultural distinctions. In Bamyan, BRAC’s criteria for establishing a micro-finance operation 
have not been met due to low population density within a one hour walk of any proposed Branch Office. At the 
time of our visit they were appraising the possibility of revising their catchment area criteria. It was also 
interesting to note that BRAC maintained a low profile and employed no (visible) 4x4 vehicles despite 
working in the same terrain as all other aid agencies. (They were however involved in at least one project, not 
micro-finance related, which involved the distribution of yet more sewing machines.) 
 
BRAC’s style of delivery is simple to the point of a certain degree of rigidity, but very easy for staff to apply 
and for clients to understand. It has achieved a level of delivery that far exceeds its competitors, and this 
demonstrates that there is a real potential for micro-finance in Afghanistan, whilst also illustrating that 
micro-finance demands highly specialised, focused and strong management to ensure its success.  
 
It is too early to judge to what extent micro-finance will impact on the lives of BRAC’s female clients; to date 
most are financing the businesses of their male relatives, but it is opening a door for relatively poor and 
mostly illiterate Afghan women that has been firmly closed to them in the past. Womens’ ability to access 
funds must be seen in the context of the additional status that this can afford them within their households. 
Group membership also gives women access to other women beyond the confines of their families, which for 
returnee women is an important point of contact for rebuilding social networks in a new community.  
 
 
The coverage of the many alternative (or sustainable) livelihood programmes cannot be assessed 
within the scope of this report. Many did not begin until the latter part of the period in question. 
2.3 Relevance of the interventions 
The major short-term focus on infrastructure investment combined with cash or food for work was 
very relevant to meet the needs of beneficiaries during the period under review. It is regrettable that 
the quality of the work undertaken has failed to meet the expectations of the beneficiaries, but in the 
adverse security and low human resource context of the time, this is considered to have been largely 
unavoidable.  
 
The medium to long term interventions of MISFA, NSP and alternative livelihoods research are not 
necessarily targeting the most vulnerable and therefore have not contributed directly to social 
protection.  However, in terms of providing future economic drivers it is considered that they are 
also very relevant and provide an appropriate linkage along the continuum from emergency to 
development. 
 
A number of ad hoc livelihood interventions, mostly very small scale, have been funded, these 
include, carpet weaving, handicraft/tailoring, livestock production and other income generating 
activities. Many appear to be ill conceived in terms of business planning, market potential, and 
coherence with principles of sustainability. In this regard there has been a failure to learn from past 
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mistakes, with such activities setting a poor example  and possibly detracting from participant’s 
future willingness to engage with more appropriate interventions in the future.  
 
Skills training, and all aspects of human resource development are much needed at all levels and at 
every point in the emergency to development continuum. To date, the record has been patchy and 
several respondents noted that insufficient funds had been made available to provide for training, 
since donors appeared interested in higher profile activities. 
2.4 Efficiency and timing 
Delivery of all aid was inevitably constrained by a lack of Government structures through which to 
channel the aid and the limited human resources of over-burdened NGOs. But despite this the 
reported delivery figures appear good. The release of funding by donor organisations was not 
reported to have been an issue causing delays in delivery. But delays have occurred on the ground, 
often associated with the time required to get approvals from Kabul, as many activities have been 
managed in a highly centralised manner with very little authority delegated to provincial officers, 
even when experienced foreign TA were involved in the delivery process at the provincial level. It 
does appear that ECHO may have been more efficient, or less bureaucratic, in this regard. In at least 
one report8 ECHO is complemented for its flexibility in responding to changing facts on the ground.  
 
Implementation of all the projects discussed above has been through NGOs along with some private 
contractors. The vast majority of these were international NGOs (ECHO was working with 46 
European NGOs in 2004). Such organisations have had many years of experience of working inside 
Afghanistan, but in the absence of an effective or recognised government they had been accustomed 
to having considerable leverage in the design and implementation of their own policies and 
strategies. With the establishment of an Internationally recognised Government they rapidly had to 
adapt to their new role; that of implementing projects that had been largely pre-designed, often 
without their participation, and then awarded to them through a process of competitive bidding. At 
the same time, they have suffered very serious staff losses due to the much higher salaries offered to 
their trained staff by the UN agencies as well as by some bilaterally funded programmes. NGOs 
such as Oxfam and Islamic Relief were well aware of their changed circumstances and were 
grappling with the process of change. 
 
Other general issues on efficiency relate to the lack of attention to the sustainability of 
interventions, particularly asset management and maintenance of infrastructure programmes, and 
other livelihood initiatives that failed to address marketing issues, for example. Clearly corners have 
been cut in the rush to deliver within a very short timeframe and this has impacted on the overall 
quality of many projects. Much of the monitoring undertaken has been quantitative rather than 
addressing qualitative issues. Some of these shortcomings can also be explained by overall human 
resource limitations. 
 
With regard to sustainable livelihood programmes a number of respondents reported that winter 
wheat seed had not been delivered until the spring in some instances, causing the plants to be sterile.  
2.5 Transition from emergency to development 
In most programmes the transition from emergency through reconstruction to development occurred 
in ad hoc steps as knowledge of the situation on the ground was emerging and changing rapidly.  
With the course of time, the pace of change has slowed to a more manageable rate and many 
                                                 
8 Evaluation of ECHO’s Humannitarian Intrvention Plans in Afghanistan. January 2004. 
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agencies are developing clearer strategies towards providing more comprehensive development 
programmes. For both WFP and ECHO this should result in a scaling back of their activities.  
 
ECHO’s long-term strategy looks towards a phasing down or possible phasing out of its activities; 
the ultimate decision will depend upon the will of member states to continue the funding. ECHO 
indicated that they would not be actively involved in counter narcotic activities (alternative 
livelihood programmes often involve cash for work), as they did not perceive this to be within their 
mandate, but that they would be prepared to provide assistance for disaster preparedness. In the 
medium term they will continue to support sustainable livelihood programmes to assist returnees in 
safe areas. 
 
WFP has more ambitious plans and appears to be willing to move into long term development 
activities. The amount of food aid is decreasing and WFP supports this. For the 3 years to 2005 an 
average of 200,000 tonnes of food were delivered into Afghanistan. Over the next 3 years the 
average is planned at 150,000 tonnes per year. The reality, according to WFP, is that a very large 
number of people remain food insecure in Afghanistan. For emergency situations, such as 
earthquakes, WFP will make a separate appeal for food.  
 
WFP’s new strategy, still under review, looks at the following activities. It will decrease the amount 
of free food provided through humanitarian relief and will provide food for work on a reactive basis 
such that those areas in greatness need benefit and that the work does not clash with times when 
seasonal labour is in demand. Concerning alternative livelihoods, WFP notes that donors have 
diametrically opposing views on whether to work or not to work in poppy growing areas. Currently, 
for anti-narcotics they consider that there is no proper coordination and no clear strategy within 
Afghanistan. WFP will be involved but the modalities have yet to be decided.  
 
NEEP has developed a clear forward strategy9 that sees it maturing into a programme focused on 
rural access, and with its management structure being based within the MRRD and MoPW, whilst 
the respective and separate mandates of these two ministries have yet to be agreed.  
 
                                                 
9 National Rural Access Program (Formerly NEEP) Strategic Framework and Workplan SY 1384 (April 2005 
to March 2006) NEEP JPMU March 2005. 
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NEEP’s (NRAP) Future Institutional Framework10 
 
The support of UNOPS and ILO will be systematically phased out as skills are transferred to 
permanent civil servants.  
 
The rational for a single focused programme is that the capacities of other ministries dealing with 
irrigation and other rural infrastructure have increased and specialised national funding programmes 
are now operating. Road infrastructure provides significant scope for employment opportunities, 
particularly when projects are designed for large numbers of unskilled labourers and there is 
flexibility regarding the type, size and timing of construction activities in relation to the social 
safety net objective. Also, the design, management and monitoring of activities will benefit from 
economies of scale and their impact should be significant. 
 
MISFA and the alternative livelihoods programmes originated as development orientated 
programmes. MISFA has been persuaded to extend its work into the provision of loans for the 
                                                 
10 As per note above. 
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repayment of farmer’s indebtedness resulting from advances made for opium production. This is a 
high risk undertaking as poor repayment might undermine the willingness of other borrowers to 
make their repayments. For a micro-finance organisation to advance loans that are not underwritten 
by viable investment proposals, is not normally considered ‘best practice’11. MISFA will, in this 
instance, be committing its money to the refinancing of investments that have already failed, and 
which, since they are illegal, cannot be continued. It may be regrettable  that MISFA is being drawn 
into the alternative livelihoods sector, when its focus should be firmly fixed on establishing a first-
class micro-finance industry based on international best practice.  
2.6 The role of DFID in the Livelihoods Sector  
DFID’s main programme funding has been through the ARTF, with a view to ensuring GoA 
ownership of interventions. It is intended that the GoA will pay recurrent costs. The primary 
investment windows under livelihoods have been NSP, NEEP and MISFA. 
 
DFID’s Rural Livelihoods Programme has three main activities, being:  
 
Þ Institutional capacity building within the ministries of MRRD and the Ministry of 
Agriculture. To this end they are supporting Planning for Rural Development in 
Afghanistan which is set up to define a strategic vision and plan for building capacity 
within the existing ministerial structures and coordination groups. The relevant 
coordination groups being, the Livelihoods and Social Protection group under the MRRD 
and the Sustainable Livelihoods group under the Ministry of Agriculture. 
Þ In 2003 NSP began its activities, after a long gestation period. DFID will support its 
future development and assist in reviewing its strategy and achievements.  
Þ Also in 2003, MISFA began the pilot stage of its work and this is continuing with support 
from DFID. 
 
DFID does not wish to follow the USAID policy of bringing in foreign contractors but prefers to 
work within the framework of Government in order to achieve long-term capacity improvements. 
This strategy was not followed in the early part of the period in question and it is only 
comparatively recently that they have begun to work closely with the Ministry of Agriculture. DFID 
has recognised the need to feedback from the field into policy making and hence it is funding an 
FAO programme on sustainable livelihoods in Bamyan. This has focused on potato seed production 
and winter wheat, but this needs to make better linkages with NGOs and should be more integrated 
within the Ministry of Agriculture. 
 
In 2004 there was increased political pressure on the counter narcotics agenda, which is DFID led, 
but they had no resident expertise on alternative livelihoods until that time. The focus had been on 
poverty reduction and DFID was supporting interventions, such as FAO’s, which were looking for 
alternatives. With the increase in political pressure there was a need to show actual results and 
impact. The DFID funded Research Alternative Livelihood Fund (RALF) has invited bids for 
agricultural action research. But this is not currently considered by independent experts to be in a 
position to provide sustainable outcomes. DFID has also set up a Counter Narcotics Trust Fund that 
is owned by the Government and operates similar to the ARTF. The aims of the fund are the 
promotion of alternative livelihoods, along with eradication and interdiction, through, for example, 
                                                 
11 “MFI’s need to consider debt capacity as opposed to basing credit decisions on a credit need approach that 
risks future trouble for both lenders and borrowers. This is because the need for credit and the ability to repay 
debt cannot be assumed to match. ” From: Sustainable Banking with the Poor. Microfinance Handbook. An 
Institutional and Financial Perspective. Joanna Ledgerwood. The World Bank. Washington D.C. 1999. 
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the apprehension of traffickers. All donor funds could be channelled through this to the Ministry of 
Finance, with oversight provided by UNDP.  
 
The issue of opium in Afghanistan cannot be ignored since it impacts on everything and needs a 
very structured response. It is necessary to break the poppy monopoly to prevent the rise of a 
dominant group that is beyond the law and this requires interdiction but at present law enforcement 
is too weak to achieve this. If results are not forthcoming it is felt that eradication will be imposed 
and DFID is opposed to this, especially aerial spraying, which could impact on other crops and have 
a considerable shock effect on rural incomes. Therefore, DFID strongly advocates investment in 
alternative incomes alongside the strengthening of internal security. But immediate results are not 
expected.  
 
DFID is favourable to the possibility of scaling up NEEP as it is seen as having immediate short-
term impacts without any negative long-term effects. Both MISFA and NSP are intended to have 
positive medium to long-term impacts on rural livelihoods and therefore should be given increased 
support also. In the long term, DFID wishes to support the creation of foundations for economic 
growth. This requires incentives for market penetration such as preferential priority markets in the 
EU and the USA for grains and fruits. It is also possible that export standards could be lowered for a 
period, but this is difficult to negotiate. Rebuilding of the horticulture industry will take some time 
due to the destruction of rootstock. Alternative crops are very limited and they take time to return a 
profit, for example, fruit and nuts need 3-4 years and for horticulture good transport is essential. For 
all crop substitution, including cotton, value chains incorporating marketing and processing need to 
be addressed.  
 
MISFA must be enabled to work with the formal banking system to encourage engagement with 
entrepreneurs who require loans exceeding $1000. For this risk management capacity needs to be 
established. There is a gap for medium and large scale lending which needs to be filled, as the 
production chain must have incentives built in and loan finance is a part of this. MISFA now has a 
three year strategy in place. 
2.7 Coherence 
The livelihoods sector, as explained in section one, covers a broad range of activities. To discuss 
policy and implementation strategy it is therefore necessary to break the sector down into its various 
components.  Coherent policies understood and shared throughout the donor community or at the 
level of the GoA, were not apparent during the period, although individual players did have defined 
strategies12. Consideration must however be given to the emergency/relief nature of most of the 
programmes and therefore the approaches followed often lack the level of coherence that would be 
expected from more mature interventions. As the donor community, in partnership with the 
Government, looks more closely at the long-term issues of livelihood promotion the coherence of 
the different programmes should begin to emerge. 
2.8 Coordination 
The consultative group mechanism incorporating all twelve sectors funded under the ARTF is 
excellent in principle, but all actors admit that it does not work in practice. Even within the MRRD, 
where three major programmes are managed, each programme effectively works in isolation. This 
has resulted in duplication of short-listed projects by NEEP, NSP and the National Area Based 
                                                 
12 Understanding and Monitoring Livelihoods Under Conditions of Chronic Conflict: Lessons from 
Afghanistan. Adam Pain. Overseas Development Inistitute. December 2002 
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Development Programme. There are also internal communication shortcomings within the MRRD; 
between UN contracted local consultants and the permanent civil servants. 
 
Sustainable livelihood coordination is also poor and divergent policies and strategies are very 
evident. Consultants working in the Ministry of Agriculture report that there is a clash between the 
majority of donors, including DFID, and The World Bank. The Ministry is still focused on central 
planning and direct government service-delivery, and this appears to be supported by the World 
Bank’s recent strategy statement. Clearly, the Ministry requires a clearer philosophical 
understanding of the role of the Government in a modern agricultural sector. Whilst some 
coordination exists activities needs to be very well planned, especially with the imminent arrival of 
a large number of consultants working on different donor funded programmes. Their work should 
be focused concerning the development of the private sector in agriculture and on capacity building 
to achieve this.  
2.9 Connectedness 
It was apparent from field visits that communication at all levels is a significant shortcoming.  
Misunderstandings seem to punctuate all aspects of aid delivery. The NSP programme could in the 
future assist in overcoming some of these problems, but, as with all aid delivery, the timeframe for 
NSP appears quite unrealistic. It is perhaps the persistent push for delivery in quantity terms which 
underlies much of this disconnectedness. 
 
 
Bamyan Centre’s market road  constructed under NEEP is a good illustration of people’s expectations being 
very contrary to the organisational mandate of the concerned authority (in this case MRRD with UNOPS 
supervision). UNOPS engineers were able to clearly justify their choice of a cobbled road surface, in light of a 
combination of criteria that were in accordance with NEEP’s mandate. For example, the stones were locally 
available, local labour could be used to dress and place the stones, the surface would be highly durable, it 
could be repaired using only labour and extreme winter temperatures would not damage the it. They also 
stated that, as future funds became available the stones would be an effective subsurface for further 
treatments.  
 
However, local people were unanimously furious concerning what they considered to be the imposition of a 
totally unacceptable, low quality road, which damaged their vehicles and created endless dust. It seems that 
they expected tarmac or concrete surfacing. But this would, according to UNOPS, have required specialised 
equipment from Kabul and the market road was less than half a kilometre in length. Further more, the NEEP 
programme had an insufficient budget for this, whilst its mandate was to undertake labour intensive works 
to provide emergency employment, as well as to upgrade infrastructure to support other livelihood 
activities. They also commented that the local labour had been very reluctant to utilise effective stone 
dressing techniques (hence the uneven surface) despite all their efforts in providing training along with 
arranging a field visit to another project using the same method. 
 
It is difficult to see how such considerations can be effectively communicated in a prevailing environment 
where all communication is poor (see coordination above) and where so many accusations are made 
concerning the misuse of funds, which fuel distrust between the parties. 
 
 
In none of the infrastructure projects visited had the issue of ongoing asset management and 
maintenance been discussed with community members. This applied equally to the NSP funded 
CDC projects. The CDCs involved expressed some willingness to assist with maintenance, but it 
was clear that they considered this to be primarily the Government’s responsibility. 
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Income Generation for Women under NSP 
In one income generating project under NSP, aimed at assisting female community members, it was found 
that some 20 sewing machines had been purchased. The first of two groups of 20 women were being provided 
with some basic training. They were asked questions, such as, why had they selected this project, which 
amongst them would own the sewing machines, and how would they earn income from them? None of the 
women, along with the NGO’s staff, were able to provide answers to any such questions.  
 
At the same time, these same women explained the dire problems faced by pregnant women due to the 
absence of trained birth attendants and the distance of their village from the nearest maternity facility. Had 
more time been allocated for project identification, perhaps this group of women would have chosen to fund 
training for local birth attendants, rather than deciding to participate in an income generating project which 
they did not understand. 
 
2.10 Cross-cutting issues 
Gender issues in livelihoods.  Some issues have been mentioned above and others are included in 
the separate gender section. 
 
Female Involvement in NEEP 
NEEP was mandated to provide an income safety net for vulnerable men and women. However, social 
restrictions prevent women from working alongside men and/or out in the open on road projects. Therefore 
other activities were identified. Amongst these, weaving wire gabion baskets and planting tree saplings, both 
providing some environmental protection, appear to have been the only two to be implemented. NEEP 
undoubtedly lacked the specialist staff to effectively engage in such work and it seems inevitable that the 
good will and hard work expended by the available staff had no result in terms of meaningful impact.  
 
In the case of gabion weaving, it was reported that after extensive planning to get the project off the ground, a 
small group of women struggled to learn how to do the weaving, whilst being watched intensely by a large 
audience of curious men and young boys. The men then complained that the women had been given work to do 
that was too hard for them.  
 
This is one of very many instances where attempts to prioritise projects for women, although laudable in 
theory, can have negative consequences. The depth of research and planning required was not possible within 
the timeframe available. 
 
 
Security. Security concerns played a negative role in preventing work in the Southern provinces. 
The continued appointment of former belligerents to powerful positions at both local and national 
levels counters against the consolidation of state legitimacy. 
3. Findings (assessments) 
The period under review began with a severe drought, which became a complex emergency 
following the Multinational campaign to oust the Taliban. This then moved rapidly to consideration 
of medium-term reconstruction interventions. The primary focus of this evaluation has been on 
shorter-term responses in the livelihoods sector. A few development orientated initiatives are now at 
an early stage of implementation, for example MISFA and NSP. Other longer-term interventions 
remained on the drawing board or were just in the initial start-up phase by early 2005. For instance, 
a number of economic and social protection programmes under ILO, along with promotion of 
inward investment supported by GTZ and USAID, are two areas where considerable funding is 
beginning to be targeted. 
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3.1 Needs of beneficiaries in relation to government policies and 
strategies 
Government policy and strategy in this sector has not been clearly articulated in the period under 
review. Beneficiary needs have been assessed were possible using data collated by the National 
Surveillance Programme, and other information services. The quality of this information was not 
highly regarded in the initial stages but technical assistance is being provided to assist with data 
collection and analysis.  
3.2 The interventions carried out by aid providers 
Effectiveness 
Results delivered in quantitative terms are undoubtedly impressive and the work of the many 
partner NGOs contracted by the implementing agencies must be acknowledged in this regard. 
However, given the very large sums of money involved and the absence of data regarding needs 
assessment, and, the absence of delivery monitoring or the measurement of impacts, it is simply not 
possible to determine the effectiveness of the end result. It must however be the case that the 
livelihoods of Afghan families were supported in a positive way. It is also likely that forced 
migration was prevented at a time when the media spotlight would have made this a very sensitive 
factor to deal with politically.  
 
On the other hand, it appears evident that many male Afghans do migrate on a regular basis for 
seasonal employment to other parts of the country or to neighbouring countries, and that migration 
should not necessarily be regarded as a negative indicator. These workers are benefiting from a 
flexible labour market, which allows them to take advantage of differential wages at various 
locations on a seasonal basis. 
 
The major programmes considered here appear to have been able to respond flexibly to changing 
circumstances, as is demonstrated in ECHO’s move from food for work to cash for work, and 
NEEP’s introduction of contract groups for workers employed on construction sites. It is clear that, 
despite a very rapidly changing situation and the many practical demands of getting delivery onto 
the ground, that they were able to effectively review their delivery mechanisms.  
 
WFP’s response is perhaps less transparent. Both, its continued reliance on food for work and its 
move into areas that are clearly development orientated, and therefore outside its normal mandate, 
must be questioned. They have responded with the justification that other agencies do not currently 
have sufficient capacity to cover all the areas that need to be addressed, and this view must have 
some validity given WFP’s very well established and lengthy engagement with Afghanistan. The 
justification for such strategies these should be given further consideration by donor organisations 
as real needs become more apparent. 
 
Its is clear however, that the shear volume of funds available following the Bonn Agreement could 
not all be effectively managed and that this resulted in the short-cutting of procedures such that not 
all contracts have been effectively monitored and much of the underlying quality of infrastructure is 
below standard. The issue of the sustainability of impacts (long term asset management and 
maintenance issues in the case of infrastructure work) has been consistently overlooked. This is 
widely acknowledged by NEEP and ECHO and is now beginning to be addressed, but it is a factor 
that will be compounded by the poor quality of the original investments. 
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MISFA is still at a pilot stage and cannot be assessed in detail at this time. Strong and very well 
focused management will be very essential to ensuring that this programme is able to reach its full 
potential. An effective, efficient and well resourced micro-finance sector in Afghanistan will be a 
central building block on which to establish other livelihood and social protection programmes.  
Efficiency 
WFP and ECHO worked well through their long established NGO partners (mainly international 
NGOs) to deliver food and cash for work projects in most parts of the country. This seems to have 
been efficiently managed in accordance with their tried and tested working practices.  
 
In the case of NEEP, the challenge was far greater, since this programme was implemented through 
the MRRD and MoPW, with funding channelled via the World Bank through to the Ministry of 
Finance. All internal systems for these procedures had to be established, the paper work had to be 
developed, human resources had to be trained, and contracting procedures had to be introduced and 
understood, both by staff and potential bidders. A great deal of senior management time was 
expended on these issues, which it is easy to overlook in hindsight.  
 
With all the above, it is not possible to overlook the issues of corruption which were raised so 
frequently by informants at all points in the aid delivery chain. 
 
Many efficiency gains from human resource development by NGOs and implementing agencies 
have been negated by the poaching of their staff by better resources programmes; often UN 
agencies or contractors working on bi-laterally funded programmes. This constant drain of 
personnel has inevitably impacted on efficiency, and is again the result of the unrealistically high 
level of funding reaching Afghanistan within a short period of time, which clearly exceeded the 
country’s absorptive capacity. 
 
MISFA appears to have functioned in an efficient manner during its short period of operations. 
 
With all programmes the absence of monitoring data negates any clear assessment of efficiency. 
Impact 
The immediate impact of the roads programme was enthusiastically described by the shuras visited, 
even though the community members had not actually been employed in the construction process. 
They stated that they were now able to bring in consumption goods and other items from the market 
centres. They were also able to trade their own produce that consisted mainly of wheat, potatoes and 
poplar poles for construction. The road now made it possible for children to reach schools further 
down the valley and for other family members, especially women, to obtain medical treatment. 
They also had better contact with the government authorities and neighbouring villages.  
 
The NSP programme was also credited with bringing villages together and enabling old enmities to 
be put aside as they had to work together within a single CDC or they had to cooperate on NSP 
roads projects in order to have sufficient funds to reach a main access road. 
 
The long-term impact of both these programmes will be compromised if the community cannot 
maintain or susta in these impacts. For NSP a supply of project funds should continue in order to 
provide a rationale for continued CDC meetings, and, more importantly, the level of contact with 
facilitating NGOs must be maintained in order for the benefits of the CDCs to be consolidated; this 
will be a very long-term commitment. 
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For longer term impacts to be sustained it will also be necessary of the donor community to invest 
in training programmes that will provide the skills necessary to undertake good quality 
interventions, these might range from artisan skills for the construction industry to all types of 
professional competencies. 
 
In terms of environmental impacts, it was not possible to assess whether this had been negative or 
perhaps even positive. To the extent that a lot of construction work has been undertaken and wells 
drilled for drinking water, etc., without recourse to any environmental assessment, this creates a 
considerable risk that negative impacts will have resulted. The over-felling of trees for timber in the 
burgeoning construction industry, the impact on an already fragile water table and on neighbours of 
deeper wells being sunk, and, the effects of dams created for hydropower production, all create 
potential environmental impacts which cannot be assessed with the information available.  Some 
tree planting has taken place but this is very limited and the survival rate of the saplings is not 
known. 
 
The aid programme at large should have impacted upon the credibility and visibility of the GoA and 
this will therefore have affected the outcome of the Presidential elections. However, as with other 
impacts, this positive ‘feel good’ factor is unlikely to be sustained unless the quality of interventions 
is improved and unless the Government is able to tackle the increasingly negative responses from 
ordinary people who consider that corrupt officials and politicians, along with greedy but well 
connected businessmen, are pocketing an increasingly large percentage of the aid provided. 
4. Overall Conclusions 
The quantity of aid delivered is indeed impressive. However, numerous constraints inhibited the 
quality of what has been delivered. Security was a major issue in some areas, availability of reliable 
information, the time in which to undertake proper assessments and design work and planning, and 
above all, the overwhelming constraint on the availability of skilled and competent human resources 
were all severe obstacles to delivery. The primary motive for this push for delivery in the 
livelihoods sector was undoubtedly political, since presidential elections had been scheduled for 
2004 and it was considered essential for the interim government to make its mark throughout the 
country prior to that time.  As a result, a great deal of aid has been provided whilst many 
beneficiaries feel angry that they have not benefited in any meaningful way. Alongside this, these 
constraints also influenced financial and cost management, with inevitable accusations of corruption 
now becoming rife throughout the country. Due to the absence of reliable vulnerability data it is not 
possible to determine the extent to which the anticipated humanitarian disaster of 2001/2 was either 
overestimated or averted.  
 
The Securing Afghanistan’s Future13 document makes the following statement with regard to the 
livelihoods and social protection sector: “Greater consistency between Government execution 
policy and implementing partners (whether NGOs, UN Agencies, or the private sector) will be 
sought, and coordination within the budget and CG framework will be strengthened. Emerging 
analysis of poverty and vulnerability will be harnessed and key programmes closely monitored. In 
the immediate future the focus will be on ensuring that key programme pillars (NEEP, NSP, MISFA 
and Rural Water and Sanitation) are effective and that any major gaps are identified. Good policy 
will focus mainly on productive programmes rather than more narrowly on direct transfer payments, 
which will be reserved as a last resort.” 
                                                 
13 http://www.af/resources/mof/recosting/SECURING%20AFGHNAISTANS%20FUTURE.pdf  
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5. Recommendations 
5.1 Donors 
Rather than being drawn into the rush for delivery it may have been more advisable for the donors 
to work together on planning the realistic absorptive capacity for aid in Afghanistan during the 
period 2001 to 2005, and prioritising it for the most urgent sectors. In light of this, the financial 
resources necessary could have been released in a planned, controlled and systematic manner. 
Remaining funds should have been placed into a genuine Trust Fund, which could have been 
professionally managed and invested for the future benefit of the Afghan people. This would have 
significantly reduced the widespread corruption which is now undermining the confidence of the 
Afghan people and diminishing the credibility of all those in positions of authority within the 
Government.  
 
Research should be commissioned to determine the best policies for donor agencies to pursue in 
order to support an expansion of wheat production in Afghanistan, whilst at the same time ensuring 
that food deficit communities are protected by subsidised food provision. This research would 
therefore seek to clarify the controversy concerning the import of wheat by WFP for food for work 
programmes as opposed to cash for work which is provided by ECHO and NEEP. 
5.2 Aid providers – The Government, UN Agencies and NGOs 
The government’s apparent campaign to blame the so-called ‘NGO’ community for the soaring 
levels of corruption now emerging, is disingenuous since they appear to seek to absolve themselves 
from responsibility. There is a strong case, however, for NGO legisla tion that can provide an 
unambiguous definition of what is required in order to register as an NGO and which the 
government is able to enforce in a transparent and equitable manner. This should effectively disbar 
many local organisations that registered as NGOs at the behest of the UN during the 1990’s, and 
some even more recently. 
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Technical terms  
WP & Improved 
water source: 
Water point is defined as any source which provides reasonable access to safe 
drinking water like:  
Household connections, public standpipes, boreholes, protected dug wells, 
protected springs and rainwater collection. Reasonable access is defined as the 
availability of at least 20 litres a person per day from a source within one 
kilometre of the user’s dwelling. 
 
AP An aid provider is any humanitarian organisation either NGO, UN-organisation, 
international organisation which provides humanitarian services financed by the 5 
donors. In general it refers to the following type of organization: 
UN 
INGO (e.g. DACAAR, SCA, etc.) 
ICRC, IOM (International Organisations) 
LNGO (FWO) 
Government ministries (mostly subcontracting to LNGOs) 
 
1. Introduction 
1.1 State of the affairs at the beginning of the evaluation period 
Water is one of the most important, if not “the” most important natural resource for Afghanistan. 
The country is literally a “creation” of the big rivers and the snow covered mountains which feed 
the old irrigation systems and replenish the aquifers. Traditionally the population of Afghanistan is 
using mainly surface water either from rivers or canals, and to a lesser extent ground water is 
abstracted through shallow wells, springs and karezes1. Sanitation in rural areas is either through 
traditional latrines, open fields and / or designated places within the family compound. More 
sophisticated sewage treatment has not yet been introduced to Afghanistan. The key figures 
indicating the problems in this sector are almost common knowledge (status 2001): 
 
- Only 19 % and 11 % of urban / rural population had access to an improved water source2 
- Only 25 % and 8 % of urban / rural population used adequate sanitation facilities 
- 25.7 % of children die before the age of 5 (latest surveys in 2003 showed 17.2%) 
- Diarrhoea is one of the major cause of mortality among children3 
 
Since mid of 1980ies the water sector in Afghanistan has been mainly dominated by DACAAR, 
UNICEF and SCA and together with MRRD and UNHCR they are the key-organisations (key aid 
provider) for this evaluation. Especially DACAAR4 and UNICEF became the lead agencies since 
1990, initiating the development of a common hand pump (developed from the Afridev pump in 
cooperation with SKAT-Consulting (Switzerland), setting up a factory in Pakistan), working on 
common standards, driving coordination and preparing a comprehensive data base5. The draught 
                                                 
1 Traditional underground water channels taping into aquifer mainly for drinking water extraction and 
irrigation 
2 Source: http://www.unicef.org/sowc01/tables/table3.htm Unicef, MICS 2001 
3 Source: UNICEF, MICS2 – 2000, Section E, Child health.  
4 The existence of a lead agency is one of the main reasons why well construction and materials are 
standardized. 
5 None of the 12.673 wells of SCA are in the DA CAAR data base. 
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which has started in 1998 had a major impact on the interventions. Especially dug wells have been 
prone to failure6 and according to DACAAR reports app. 21 to 25 % of dug wells are presently dry 
in the country. The community well (for 20 families) is not the conventional7 standard of Afghans 
as traditionally families have shallow wells equipped with reel and buckets in their backyard8. 
However, this does not imply that the construction of communal wells has been a wrong approach. 
To provide drinking water to a rural population through individual wells is not economically 
feasible.  
 
Activities of Aid providers (APs) focused essentially on the rural water supply sector while for 
urban water just emergency rehabilitation was carried out (ICRC, UN-Habitat and WHO). The 
technology used by APs was straightforward, either dug wells lined with concrete rings or tube 
wells drilled with percussion rigs. Both constructed with a concrete apron and channel to drain the 
surplus water. Three types of hand pumps have been installed depending on the ground water level 
(Kabul, Indus and Pamir). Selected wells which have fallen dry were deepened.  
 
Where a cost-benefit analysis has justified it or the terrain necessitated it, gravity schemes were 
constructed but not in great numbers9. Water quality testing was reduced to assure the hand over of 
a hygienically safe well. A water quality monitoring system could not be established.  
In order to underline the numbers of water points (WPs) and sanitation facilities constructed in 
Afghanistan the output of DACAAR is presented in the following table 10. 
 
Taking the figures from the main actors (DACAAR – 25 380, SCA – 9 050) and adding an estimate 
of wells constructed by others (e.g. GAA, MRRD, AKDN, ACF, PMS) then the aid community had 
constructed app. 36 000 WP until the end of 2001 in Afghanistan11. The main focus of interventions 
was more in improving access to water and quantity of water available than improving 
environmental health12. 
 
Activities in terms of sanitation have consisted of latrine construction (single / double vault) mostly 
in connection with implemented water supply project for demonstration purposes. In schools 4 to 6 
compartment latrines have been built (UNICEF, SCA). More refined sanitation technologies have 
not been applied (septic tanks and / or sewage systems). 
 
Aid providers introduced accompanying health and hygiene campaigns at an early stage, but these 
have never been fine-tuned based on assessments on behavioural change and had a rather limited 
effect13. In the same way, the impact of well and latrine construction was never measured against 
base-line surveys using practical indicators. 
 
 
                                                 
6 Because they have been constructed to have between 1.5 and 2.0 m water table available in the well 
7 The impression from the interviews was that it is also not the desired standard 
8 This is the reason common wells are hardly duplicated and repairs are very slow given the importance of 
water. 
9 Around 3,8 % of WP in the DACAAR data base are stand post. 
10 Information on latrines from the data base and received by DACAAR were different, however this table is 
used being the most credible. 
11 DACAAR alone 25.300 and SCA more than 9.000. For calculation see annex. 
12 In order to do this a functioning water quality monitoring system and effective health and hygiene education 
has to be assured. Even so water-borne diseases have certainly been reduced as well. 
13 No person interviewed actually remembered any of the topics taught. Many even not the campaign itself. 
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Table 1.3-1: Water points / latrines installed by DACAAR since 1990, as of December 2004 
Water points installed Latrines installed 
Beneficiaries Beneficiaries 
Province 
Number 
Households  Persons 
Number 
Households  Persons 
Badghis 509 9,480 66,360 1,169 1,169 8,183 
Farah 1,464 21,360 149,520 2,292 2,292 16,044 
Ghazni 3,575 66,280 463,960 7,996 7,996 55,972 
Ghor 1,099 15140 105,980 2,010 2,010 14,070 
Helmand 2,458 46,740 327,180 3,647 3,647 25,529 
Herat 5,975 113,880 797,160 8,102 8,102 56,714 
Kabul 1,133 18,880 132,160 2,160 2,160 15,120 
Kandahar 2,019 39,420 275,940 1,238 1,238 8,666 
Kapisa 186 3,700 25,900 296 296 2,072 
Khost 1,623 31,640 221,480 1,716 1,716 12,012 
Kunar 1,099 14,320 100,240 2,250 2,250 15,750 
Laghman 925 14,940 104,580 1,580 1,580 11,060 
Logar 1,861 24,980 174,860 1,490 1,490 10,430 
Nangarhar 5,091 99,480 696,360 8,215 8,215 57,505 
Nimroz 222 4,440 31,080 280 280 1,960 
Nuristan 12 240 1,680 0 0 0 
Paktia 433 24,900 174,300 3,516 3,516 24,612 
Paktika 1,405 6,700 46,900 1,420 1,420 9,940 
Parwan 162 1,920 13,440 385 385 2,695 
Uruzgan 226 4,520 31,640 1,016 1,016 7,112 
Wardak 1,310 25,420 177,940 2,152 2,152 15,064 
Zabul 657 13,140 91,980 1,420 1,420 9,940 
Total 33,444 601,520 4,210,640 54,350 54,350 380,450 
 
Source: DACAAR ProDoc Annex 5 
 
 
Box: 1.2-1 
The traditional sanitation practice in Afghanistan is through latrines, though not every family would have 
one. The entrance to the latrine is on the first floor, with faeces being collected between the ground and first 
floors and with a manhole at the ground level that can be opened for emptying the latrine. Men stated they 
prefer to urinate and defecate in open fields and that it is mainly women and the smaller children who use 
latrines. As it is taboo for adult women to use open fields, in the absence of a latrine a designated place 
inside the compound is used. Faeces from the latrine or the compound are used as fertilizer and often 
sufficient time until mineralization of faeces is not allowed for. Even so people are to a certain extent aware 
of the health hazard associated with fresh faeces. 
2. Involvement of donors in water and sanitation 
During the funding period the total support from the 5 donors amounted to 1.062 Billion Euro, 791 
Mio. Euro could be traced by the already mentioned aid flow study. Around 65 Mio Euro roughly 
8.2 %, 14 have been spent for activities in the water and sanitation sector.  
 
                                                 
14 Information is taken out of the aid flow data base. For details see annex. 
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Donor App. Amount in Million Euro 
Sida 22,3 
DFID 16,5 
Danida 14,9 
Netherlands 9,8 
DCI 1,5 
Total 65 
 
From 2002 to 2004, approximately 29 00015 wells were constructed throughout the activities of 
humanitarian organisations. The primary focus of interventions during this latter period was on 
improving access to safe drinking water and increasing the volume of available water rather than on 
improving environmental health.  
 
 
Table 1.2-2 
Water points constructed in Afghanistan from 2002 to 2004  
      
Estimates of wells built through the following organizations:  
      
Agency 2002 2003 2004 Total  
           
DACAAR 2.717 2.813 2.462 7.992  
SCA 1.211 812 1.040 3.063  
UNICEF 4.312 1.532 200 6.044  
UNHCR 1.381 2.530 1.633 5.544  
MRRD 200 600 2.400 3.200  
Others 1.000 1.000 1.200 3.200  
           
  10.821 9.287 8.935 29.043  
      
2253 wells have been funded by UNHCR and implemented by DACAAR in 2002 / 2003 
These wells have been put under DACAAR.    
 
      
Source of information      
      
DACAAR DACAAR data base    
SCA SCA data base    
UNICEF submitted documents on achievables  
UNHCR submitted documents on achievables  
MRRD submitted documents on achievables  
Others estimates from documents and exp. of evaluator 
 
 
 
 
 
      
                                                 
15 MRRD estimates that a total of 45.000 wells were constructed until 2004, the evaluation find a figure of 
65.000 as more realistic.  
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Estimates of wells built funded by 5 donors in Afghanistan   
      
DANIDA SCA N-MFA DCI UK   
            
1.000           
  3.063         
400 200 300 200     
400 200 300 200 700   
400           
150 150 150 200 1.100   
2.350 3.613 750 600 1.800 9.113 
      
 
 
The 5 donors have presumably 16 been funding 31 % (around 9,000) of these WP with the majority 
(40%) provided through Sida (SCA). Figures on sanitary installation installed between 1990 and 
2004 were difficult to obtain. Estimates would be around 75,000 latrines and the same number of 
bath. 
 
DFID contributed the majority through funding of the NSP. DANIDA used mainly DACAAR but 
also the UN structure and the MRRD. The Netherlands supported mainly UNHCR and Ireland in 
principle their NGOs (Concern, GOAL, Troicare, etc.). The main recipient of Sida was SCA. ICRC, 
and through them interventions in urban water supply systems, have been funded mainly by Sida, 
DFID and Netherlands. 
 
None of the donors have been actively involved in policy making or had any special initiative to 
boost interventions for water and sanitation although the importance of the sector has been 
recognized by everyone. 
3. Observations 
The following observations in essence refer to the case-study area (Nangarhar and selected 
districts). Wherever it is appropriate it of course includes and considers the “national 
perspective”. 
3.1 Policies and implementation strategies, relevance of the 
interventions 
Policies and strategies did not change after the ousting of the Taliban regime. The intervention 
concepts of APs in the water and sanitation sector have been still based on an emergency 
scenario implementing ad-hoc and demand-driven interventions. 
 
                                                 
16 Precise figures are extremely difficult to establish because of cross-financing and contradicting figures from 
documents received by aid providers. 
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While before 9/11 the policies of UNICEF, SCA and especially DACAAR within the WSG 
have been the common concept, the influx of new AP not only made the tracing of wells and 
latrine construction difficult but also had an impact on standards used17.  
 
 
Box 4.1-1 
Although some new agencies entered the WatSan sector in order to provide emergency drought relief, there 
was an even greater influx after the fall of the Taliban and the establishment of the new government.  
A large number of new actors are now therefore active in the water and sanitation sector, which was once the 
monopoly of a few agencies, such as DACAAR, SCA, ACF, UNHCR and UNICEF.  
Until recently the WatSan sector was, to all intents and purposes, guided and regulated by the Water and 
Sanitation Group (WSG) which was established in 1997 in Pakistan. The WSG was led at this stage, by UNICEF 
and DACAAR. Early in 2002, the WSG moved to Kabul and soon after leadership was transferred to MRRD. 
The transfer has not been entirely successful in that lack of capacity and even commitment within MRRD 
means that the WSG is still led by UNICEF and DACAAR. Despite these problems, however, MRRD is 
gradually playing a stronger role in the sector by developing guidelines, policies, setting targets and 
establishing coordination, monitoring and planning systems. 
Source: DACAAR, ProDoc 2005 
 
At the beginning of 2003 the MRRD started to take over the lead role in the water and sanitation 
sector18 from DACAAR and UNICEF. However, national policies with respect to rural and urban 
water supply and sanitation have only emerged recently 19.  
 
While up to 2003 the MRRD has been sub-contracted by APs to construct WP and latrines, since 
2004 the MRRD sub-contracts LNGOs. The responsibility of the MRRD is quality control, 
monitoring and supervision. Even though it has limited capacities (manpower, know-how and 
logistics) and cannot warrant professional monitoring and supervision20 the MRRD slowly gains 
momentum. UN organisation in principle subcontracted the construction of wells whereas INGOs 
mostly implemented themselves (only in few cases they subcontracted to LNGOs). Technologies 
applied for rural water supply have been simple: 
 
- Dug wells  
- Tube wells 
- Deepening of wells (mostly through percussion rigs) 
 
To a lesser extent: 
o Gravity schemes mostly consisting of a spring catchments with distribution piping and 
stand posts 
o Water supply for refugees and IDP camps (using productive wells including submersible 
pumps driven by a generator) 
o Rehabilitation of Karezes21 (traditional systems for drinking water and irrigation) 
o Spring protection 
 
The physical construction of WP was rather similar for all APs and differences existed mainly 
concerning the degree of community participation and the introduction of an O & M system. This 
however has a significant impact on sustainability. Whereas some APs (e.g. DACAAR) stressed 
                                                 
17 Even different types of hand pump s have been used. Fortunately most of the new AP used the Afridev. 
18 While in 2003 DACAAR constructed 935 wells for UNHCR, only 9 were implemented in 2004. 
19 MRRD 5 year development plan for the rural water supply and sanitation sector. 2005; 100.000 WP, 
1.000.000 latrines. 
20 The brain drain of capable professionals to IOs is quite significant in this respect. 
21 Basically subterranean canals tapping into aquifers and conveying the water through gravity to the users 
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strong community participation (providing material, skilled labour only and expecting, provision of 
sand and aggregates, excavation, etc.) others remunerated the community for all services.  
 
The standard O&M concept for water points is the “hand pump mechanic / care taker system”. The 
HPM is selected for an on-the-job training, implementing wells together with the AP as the future 
person responsible for repair in an area. He is on average responsible for 50 to 100 hand pumps and 
should ideally be an entrepreneur after the AP has finished the wells 22. Payments of the HPM are 
either an amount of wheat and corn each harvest, a monthly cash amount, or cash per repair 
depending on the relative prosperity of an area. The CT is responsible for the maintenance of the 
individual well selected amongst the user group. Spare parts are mostly available in bazaars all over 
the country. Uniformity of the type of pump used (Afridev) has facilitated the setting-up of a spare 
part system.  
 
Gravity schemes have been built under an emergency setting concentrating in essence on the 
construction of the physical elements of the system. Important aspects of sustainability have mostly 
been neglected23 e.g. participatory workshop to discuss technology options, training in operation 
and maintenance, provision of tools, production of a system map, financing of the system and tariffs 
for water, etc. 
 
Except ICRC and WHO all AP financed by the 5 donors have been mainly active in the rural water 
supply sector. ICRC as the only AP funded was and is profoundly involved in urban water supply 
mainly in Kabul, Kandahar, Herat and Jalalabad. The intervention in the urban water sector lacks 
coordination between the actors (WB Consultant, UN-Habitat, ICRC, KfW). 
 
Sanitation was never really given the importance it deserves (in particular if compared with the 
water sector) and activities of APs concentrate on the construction of latrines for demonstration 
purposes, multi-compartment latrines for schools and H&H training. Hygiene education would be 
the key instrument for effectuating behavioural change and for generating demand for improved 
sanitation. APs are somehow still working on the design of an effective health and hygiene 
education campaign24. 
 
In general aid providers did not carry out needs assessments but reacted to requests from 
communities submitted mostly through their village shura to governors, RRD or direct to the aid 
provider. This is acceptable in an emergency and relief environment but was not valid for 
Afghanistan in 2004 anymore. An exception has been preliminary district surveys carried out by 
DACAAR25. Monitoring was seriously hampered by security especially for the UN agencies. UN 
staff expressed its dissatisfaction of the extremely tight regulations which have been difficult to 
understand at times. Impact measurement was not carried out by any of the aid providers. The 
construction of wells and gravity schemes has been relevant and addressed the needs of the 
beneficiaries. Drinking water and water for irrigation have been the first priorities of communities 
interviewed. Also in the NSP the main focus is on the provision of safe water and water for 
irrigation. In general sanitation and the construction of latrines is not a priority for most of the 
villages26. Hardly any of the villagers interviewed remembered that there was any health and 
hygiene education. Lack of sanitation facilities has never been mentioned as a major problem. 
                                                 
22 Interviews with HPM in Sokhrod district however showed that HPM could not live from repairing HP 
alone. 
23 This was experienced through a pipe scheme visited in Dur Baba. 
24 The MRRD has recently disseminated a paper: Hygiene Education Guideline for trainers and supervisors  
25 A rather comprehensive survey concerning the status of rural water supply in a district 
26 According to information from the MRRD only 1 CDC within NSP included latrines 
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3.2 Main actors, coverage and effectiveness 
The main APs financed through the 5 donors have been: MRRD, UNICEF, DACAAR, UNHCR, 
ICRC and SCA27. SCA however has not implemented any WP during 2002 and 2004 in Nangarhar.  
Important actors within the watsan sector in the region, PMS, GAA, Intersos, etc. are not included. 
Total amount of wells built in Nangarhar between 1990 and 2004
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27 DACAAR has constructed 30,000 WP and SCA app. 7,500 over 10 years. In Nangarhar DACAAR has 
constructed app. 5.150 wells and SCA 812 wells, UNHCR around 1.600. 
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Unfortunately detailed information on the actual situation coverage and status of WPs is not yet 
available for the whole of Afghanistan. Many programs and projects are currently actively 
compiling information of the status of rural water supply and sanitation28. (see annex for figures on 
distribution of wells in Nangarhar per district). Another problematic issue is that many of the 
organizations do not feed into the DACAAR data base29.  
 
Coverage was severely restricted by security, distance from the provincial capital, access to the area 
in terms of existing roads, technological problems and difficulties with monitoring and supervision. 
This resulted in uneven distribution of aid within the Eastern areas and also between the provinces 
(Nangarhar, Laghman, Konar, Nooristan, less covered according to sequence). One of the most 
significant (and neglected) districts in Nangarhar in this respect are Achin30 and Dar-i-noor. The 
following 2 charts are showing the numbers of wells which could be traced through information 
from APs. 
 
The total amount of WPs constructed during 1990 to 2004 in Nangarhar amounts to roughly 7,50031 
(9.2 % of national figure) while concerning the evaluation period from 2002 to 2004 approximately 
2,500 were installed in total (8.6% of national figure32). However, through funding from the 5 
donors approximately 850 WP have been constructed in Nangarhar. 
 
With respect to latrines / bath numbers were difficult to establish. Figures from UNHCR, SCA, 
DACAAR and MRRD indicate approximately 3,450 latrines and 1000 bath (UNHCR) built in 
Nangarhar during the evaluation period. An approximation of the total amount built nationwide 
until 2001 was not possible because of lack and inconsistency of data (a rough guess would be 
70,000 to 80,000). 
 
It was not possible to gather figures concerning the coverage of the districts with latrines. Up to 
now latrines have either been connected to a school or health clinic or they were constructed as 
demonstration latrines. People in the villages do not see latrines as a priority33. The recently 
published 5 years plan of MRRD foresees the construction of 1 Mio. latrines between 2004 and 
2008. 
 
Effectiveness of water points constructed could be confirmed in all interviews held in more than 16 
villages in Nangarhar. In none of the communities visited beneficiaries showed any sign of taking 
up project activities and e.g. start construction of wells or latrines themselves.  
3.3 Cost-effectiveness, efficiency and timing 
Beneficiaries in general had little idea on costs and had very modest information on planned 
interventions and budgets which caused considerable complaints. National programmes have not 
even been known by district governors interviewed34.  
 
                                                 
28 The TWG – Nangarhar is preparing a detailed survey on existing WP being the first province in 
Afghanistan. 
29 Even so contracts of MRRD with IP demand that the new wells are reported to DACAAR 
30 Achin district, as the neighbour to Shinwar district, has poppy money. 
31 DACAAR data base and information from aid providers.. 
32 This data is not absolute accurate but precise enough to show trends and tendencies. 
33 This is very much the view of men because they can use the open fields, whereas women and small children 
have to use either a traditional latrine or a designated place within the compound. 
34 Lalpur, Dur Baba, Goshta and Sokhrod 
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The majority of APs does not prepare their budgets in a way as to make it easy to assess the unit 
costs of investments. Figures in order to compare different aid channels have been difficult to obtain 
especially for UN agencies and government implemented programmes (except NSP). This refers 
especially to overheads, administrative costs for different organisations, also description of items in 
bill of quantities35. 
 
General costs for tube wells have increased more than 100 % to 150 % over the last 3 years. Costs 
for the construction of structures have been fairly similar for all aid providers but because of lack of 
uniform data on overheads and clear budgets, (except NGOs) comparisons with respect to cost-
efficiency of aid channels are difficult to make.  
 
A dug well is presently on average between 700 USD and a tube well between 1.500 and 2.500 
USD depending on the depth and on the geological strata. In the following different prices for WPs 
are listed. 
 
Timeliness is defined as the period until an aid provider reacted to the need of the beneficiaries. 
According to this definition the provision of safe drinking water was carried out in time by APs36. 
 
 
Aid provider Dug well 
(30 m) 
Tube well 
(35 m) 
Latrine  
single  
Latrine  
6-comp 
Pipe 
scheme  
 USD USD USD USD USD 
DACAAR 500 1.060 85   
SCA 500 1.100 100 1000  
UNHCR 700 1.650 100  12.4 / 
benef. 
MRRD 1.100 / 
BoQ37 
650 prop38 
1.350 83   
UNICEF 570 2.400 
2.150 mix39 
100 2.400  
LNGO (SADAAT) 650 2.200 120   
Private Company (Jalalabad) 500 1.300 – 
1.600 
--- ----  
Source: Different proposals BoQs of AP in 2004. Note: Overheads not included. 
3.4 Quantity and quality of aid as perceived by beneficiaries, impact 
Naturally the physical output of wells and latrines has increased (during 2002 and 2004 almost the 
same numbers have been constructed as the years (1990 – 2001) before (36.000 WPs compared to 
29.000 WPs). 
 
In districts which have been very well covered (Sokhrod, Kama, Behsood) beneficiaries have been 
conscious that they have received more aid than others. Beneficiaries have been also aware that the 
reason for this was being close to Jalalabad only. Except in these districts all persons interviewed 
                                                 
35 For example items could read: construct dug / or tube well followed by a unit price. 
36 Villages interviewed stated that it had needed 4 to 6 month until works on WP started 
37 Contract between MRRD and LNGO 
38 Proposal to DFID 
39 Proposal stated that either tube or dug well will be constructed 
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complaint that the aid was not sufficient, wells are dry, pumps not working. Especially in Achin 
people complaint bitterly that they have been neglected especially considering the fact that Achin is 
the most populous district in Nangarhar.  
 
Beneficiaries have generally been satisfied with the quality of wells and latrines constructed. The 
problem of wells falling dry has been named but people have been aware that it is not the fault of 
the APs. However people stressed that in some cases that tube wells might have been better but they 
had not the choice to choose the type of well. Selection of technology was in general done by the 
engineers of the AP40. 
 
An issue constantly raised in all interviews was the poor information policy of APs. “Organisations 
are coming, collecting data, interviewing us and leaving never to be seen again”, said one farmer in 
Achin. But even if APs are active in a village, people do not feel sufficiently informed and being 
part of the project. Particularly worse is the information policy of the ASP (4 district governors 
criticized that they have no information which building is going to be constructed, what size, how 
much funding or any contractual details). The visible effect of this was that people felt neglected, 
not taken seriously and therefore loose interest to participate. An exception in this respect is the 
NSP. 
 
There is no information on the NDF, NDB and individual national programmes on village level, 
only NSP is known to a certain extent. Information on NSP, however, is unclear. Villages have also 
expressed their wish to combine funds under the NSP for individual villages to finance bigger 
projects (e.g. factories) but this was not possible. Income generation was a focus for almost 
everyone interviewed. One farmer in Sokhrod said: “We could build wells and latrines on our own. 
We do not need this emergency projects anymore, we need jobs, factories”. 
 
On village level Afghans are often not “in the driver’s seat”. They are still heavily dependant on 
favours given to them through the traditional structures (Malik, Waliswal, provincial governor) as 
requests are mostly channelled through them. The unsatisfactory information policy of AP adds on 
to this. 
3.5 Coherence and connectedness 
As already mentioned, the provision of drinking water was basically dominated by UNICEF, SCA 
and most of all DACAARs implementation strategy since the 90ies. One effect of this was that all 
aid providers used similar approaches and technologies (e.g. coherent utilisation of the Afridev hand 
pump).  
 
Non-coherence between concepts of APs could be experienced with respect to community 
contribution and implementation of supporting measures (health and hygiene education, operation 
and maintenance system).  
 
Concerning wells and latrines hardly any replication has taken place. People were not copying the 
facilities41. Also aid providers paid too little attention to traditional sanitation practices. 
                                                 
40 The question whether APs should have reacted earlier and concentrate more on tube wells is valid. 
41 Villages interviewed showed hardly any interest in latrines. Only 1 NSP project included sanitation 
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3.6 Coordination 
On national level all actors in the water and sanitation sector are meeting monthly in the WSG 
meeting chaired by MRRD (see box 4.1-1). The meeting is most certainly one of the more efficient 
ones42. In the meeting agencies present their planned interventions and report existing problems. A 
technology development working group (TDWG) is part of the WSG. 
 
On provincial level activities are coordinated to a certain extent in TWG, but not all aid providers 
are part of it. There are a number of coordination fora (technical working groups, provincial 
coordinating body, meeting between PRT and NGOs, interagency meeting) but their efficiency and 
effectiveness is not measured through indicators or bench marks. The existing coordination fora in 
Nangarhar are: 
 
1. TWG for water and sanitation (in principle the WSG on provincial level) 
2. Health and hygiene meeting 
3. Civil engineering (on standardisation for construction work and material) 
4. NGO coordination through ACBAR 
5. PCB-Nangarhar 
 
On district level there is no sector coordination.  
With respect to general aid coordination there are major differences in coordination between the 
individual districts. In some the coordination of aid flow is quite efficient and communities are well 
informed. In others the Waliswal43 decides basically with some strongmen (Khans) without any 
transparency.  
4. Cross-cutting Issues 
4.1 Transition from emergency to development 
Transition from emergency to development has not taken place yet, but clear signs are showing that 
the process is starting. Especially the NGOs are seeing themselves more in the field of capacity 
building than implementing agencies44, providing their expertise and experience to the future line 
ministries. 
 
DACAAR data base on WP is going to be used as the national data base and its system of HIT 
teams might be sub-contracted by the MRRD for 2 years. The objective is to transfer the know-how 
to the staff of the ministry.  
 
LNGOs (which are essentially contractors) are involved more and more in the construction of wells 
and latrines. Efforts are underway to mobilize the private sector in order to provide the required 
services to the government ministries. 
 
However, truly development orientated projects are not yet on the agenda in Afghanistan and as one 
participant of the dissemination work shop to this evaluation has put it “….everything is still ad-
                                                 
42 The author of this report participated regularly over 18 month in this meetings 
43 District governor.  
44 Statement in interviews made with SCA and DACAAR. 
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hoc. People only talk about development but it is nowhere to be seen. It is high times to start 
concentrating on development orientated projects45”. 
 
In complex emergencies and crisis like Afghanistan activities designed for long term strategies are 
mostly recognized as being “really important” but now one (also not donors) seem to lobby for 
them and encourage APs to start them.  
4.2 Water resource management - Environment 
The construction of water points must necessarily be seen within the framework of water resource 
management – the management of surface water, groundwater and its use for human consumption, 
agriculture and animal consumption as a whole.  
 
At the moment there is no clear responsibility for the management of the water body as different 
ministries claim responsibility (MRRD, MoA, MoUP, MopW, MoM). 
 
Discussions with FAO in Jalalabad confirmed the fact that at present no whatsoever IWRM is 
carried out. As a matter of fact it is not possib le, because the necessary data collection tools in order 
to compile information on precipitation patterns, run-off data from rivers, (measuring gauges at 
rivers and intakes, rain water measurement devices, etc.) consumption figures of rural and urban 
population does not exist.  
 
The issue of IWRM and the creation of a data base for water sources and water points should have 
been taken much more seriously at an early stage by the donors. This work is almost equally 
important to the physically provision of water to the population, because is a pre-requisite for 
sustainable management for the most important commodity of Afghanistan. It would have been 
better to use a percentage of the money for constructing wells to provide “additional funding” for an 
absolute essential activity. It is also not a question whether or not it has to be introduced. It is more 
the question how long it will take until the detrimental effects of not investing in IWRM will 
become visible.  
 
Various farmers interviewed and also the FAO in Jalalabad reported that in reality „everyone with 
enough money can contract the drilling of a deep well equipped with a submersible pump”. This 
also has reportedly resulted in the draw-down of the ground water table which has caused wells and 
karezes to fall dry. The MRRD confirmed that the drilling of a productive well without submitting 
an application to the relevant ministry (acc. to information the Ministry of Mines) is forbidden by 
law but its enforcement is almost impossible. 
 
It is difficult to assess whether it could have been expected by donors and aid providers to leave 
their path of short term thinking with respect to water and sanitation earlier. Also considering the 
impediments presented by the security situation.  
- Re-forestation projects to increase the retention capacity of the soil and thus enlarge the 
recharge of the aquifers (still, such projects would show their impact after 10 to 15 years).  
- Comprehensively designed, implemented, followed-up and evaluated health and hygiene 
training campaigns to boost the awareness of the population (accompanied by a study to 
measure the extent of behavioural change and collection of health data in parallel) 
- Planning of interventions in water and sanitation using the ECOSAN principles trying to avoid 
mistakes made by developed countries.  
 
                                                 
45 Sida will stop funding emergency projects in 2006. 
CMI REPORT AFGHANISTAN: FINDING, SECTORS  ANDTHEMES REPORT R 2005: 15  
 116 
At least now (beginning of 2005) all that is mentioned above should be supported by donors and 
considered for funding (based on “common sense”). 
4.3 The role of the five donors 
There have been no clear policies from the five donors concerning their water and sanitation 
intervention in Afghanistan. None of the ministries and aid providers interviewed had been aware of 
any special concept. For background information on donor and donor policies please see Annex. 
4.4 DFID 
Priorities for DFID have been the elections, public administration reform, education, alternative 
livelihoods (mainly in connection with poppy cultivation), health and community development. 
Within the latter two sectors water activities have been funded.  
 
However, water and sanitation was not a priority for DFID having funded primarily the ARTF46. 
Main contribution to water and sanitation activities were realised through funding of UNHCR, the 
NSP programme47 and ICRC. 
4.5 MFA-Netherlands 
The Netherlands has been involved in Afghanistan for the past ten years. Since the mid-1990s, it 
has shared responsibility for the course taken by the international community, under the leadership 
of the United Nations, in the field of conflict management and humanitarian aid.  
 
The Netherlands contributed €35 million to the Afghan Reconstruction Trust Fund (ARTF) in 2003. 
The Afghan government uses money from this fund mainly to pay salaries and fund development 
projects. The Netherlands also allocated more than €14 million in humanitarian aid in 2003, €5.9 
million through UNHCR. Though the Netherlands believe that there is a gradual shift from 
humanitarian aid to reconstruction, humanitarian aid will still be needed for the next few years. The 
Netherlands has also contributed €5 million to ensure the elections proceeded safely, as well as €1 
million for police training and €0.8 million to the Constitutional Loya Jirga.  
 
The Netherlands is also looking into a possible military effort to help stabilise the country. Given its 
poverty, the need for continued international support to safeguard stability and development, the 
Netherlands’ major political and military involvement in the country and commitment to its 
development, bilateral cooperation with Afghanistan will be continued.  
 
Commitment of Netherlands to the water and sanitation sector was shown through funding of 
DACAAR (for development of applicable drinking water technology); even so funds have been 
limited. In addition to that the Netherlands have supported the UNHCR and ICRC. Through the 
latter intervention in the urban water supply sector. 
4.6 Sida 
The current strategy for development cooperation between Sweden and Afghanistan extended 
through 2004. In the future, too, Swedish support will deal primarily with education, health, food 
security, mine clearance and support to returning refugees.  
                                                 
46 ARTF funded primarily recurrent costs of the GoA. 
47 DFID supported the NSP programme with 18 Mio.  
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As in the past, most of the support will be channelled through the UN, other international channels 
and Swedish NGOs (SCA). Sweden also provided support to the Afghan government development 
programmes. To track developments at close hand and participate in the dialogue in the field, Sida 
has opened an office in Kabul. The situation in Afghanistan could change rapidly, so development 
assistance must be flexible. If the trend towards peace holds, and the situation becomes more stable, 
humanitarian aid gradually will be replaced by more long-term efforts. Sweden plans to change 
from emergency funding to development cooperation starting from 2006.  
 
Sweden has presumable invested the most in water and sanitation through primarily funding of 
SCA, UNHCR, UNICEF and ICRC.  
4.7 Danida 
Danida was and is the main funding channel for DACAAR. DACAAR applies for funds in 4-year 
terms through the so called Project Document submitted to Danida.  
 
However as a result of the changes brought by 9/11 DACAAR used most of Danida funding for 
sector management and development activities such as strategy development, standard 
development, technology development, development of hygiene education systems, and 
maintaining the sector database. Therefore only 950 WP have been installed using Danida funding 
during 2002 and 2004 (between 1991 and 2001 a total of 10.470 have been constructed through 
Danida funding, 1.000 wells per year). This is a consequence of the fact that it has been easier to for 
DACAAR to achieve funding for physical implementation from other donors; especially in 
response to the drought situation from 1999 onwards and the post 9/11 influx of additional 
emergency assistance funding. 
 
With the support of DACAAR, Danida has not only provided WP, but also supported coordination 
and the development of a coherent strategy for the water and sanitation sector. The direct funding of 
the MRRD shows the commitment of Danida with respect to rural water supply and sanitation48. 
The water and sanitation sector was also strengthened through the supported of the NSP as water is 
one of the top priorities for communities. 
4.8 DCI 
Ireland presumably placed the most emphasize on their NGOs (Goal, Concern and Troicare) while 
also supporting UNICEF. Development Cooperation Ireland policy emphasises the integration of 
water, sanitation and hygiene education. Community participation and management is promoted, as 
are appropriate technologies that can be maintained from affordable user charges.  
 
Gender and environmental issues are mainstreamed across all DCI programmes, but receive 
particular attention within the water and sanitation arena. This is shown through the specific 
objectives of DCI’s support to the sector:· 
 
- To promote the development of structures, processes and policies for water and sanitation at 
national and local level.  
- To strengthen the capacity within government to support communities in water and 
sanitation developments. 
- To increase the financial organisation capacity at government and community level.  
                                                 
48 According to the MRRD, DANIDA has been the only donor known to MRRD. 
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- To strengthen the awareness of the environmental impact of water supply, sanitation and 
waste water and on the long term sustainability of water resources for all users. 
- To support communities in establishing priorities and making informed choices on the type 
and level of services.  
- To promote changes in hygiene behaviour.  
- To support operation and maintenance systems at community level. 
5. Findings and Conclusions 
5.1 Relevance and coverage of the interventions 
Interventions in the water and sanitation sector are relevant as such especially in arid countries like 
Afghanistan. Presumably the strongest indicator from the evaluation was that drinking water was 
named as the first priority in all 16 villages interviewed. What is astonishing though is the relatively 
small amount of funds allocated for water and sanitation (app. 8 % to 9%, 65 million Euro) given its 
high importance both within the NDF / NDB and for the general population in the villages. It is the 
firm believe of the evaluator that too much funds have been allocated in order to strengthen the 
government structures in Kabul. Only now the NSP starts to efficiently channel funds down to 
village level. 
 
Interviews with the MRRD confirmed that the Rural/Urban Water and Sanitation Program 
(RUWSP) is now a priority area for the government and a key focus under the NDB (Livelihoods 
and Social Protection Programme). The 5-years plan of the MRRD has the ambitious goal to 
construct 100,000 WP and 1,000,000 latrines over the next 5 years. There is no doubt about the 
relevance of the funded interventions.  
 
Whether interventions have been relevant with respect to donor policies has been checked against 
existing strategies (see also Annex donor strategies). In the following some text samples are 
mentioned from 2 donors: 
 
DFID “…Every Afghan should have equal rights and opportunities. All should have access to 
water, electricity, housing and roads and….” Afghanistan, a changing nation, 2004. 
 
Sida “The current strategy for development cooperation between Sweden and Afghanistan extends 
through 2004. In the future, too, Swedish support will deal primarily with education, health, food 
security, mine clearance….”. 
 
Analysing the strategies presented in annex to this report it can be stated that donor strategies with 
respect to water and sanitation have been taken into account by APs. 
 
Nangarhar would have needed approximately 10,000 WP49 for its population of 1,242,515 people 50. 
Assuming the 21 % of the WP are dry or not functioning based on the figures calculated under 
chapter 4.2 would result in the fact that 5.900 WP are producing water at the moment. This would 
be a coverage of 59 % with respect to WPs needed, considerably higher than the nationwide figure 
of 11 %51.  
 
                                                 
49 20 families, 6 persons each per well 
50 Latest population estimates CSO 2004 
51 However the NVRA 2003, WFP reported that 24% of households have access to safe water points. 
CMI REPORT AFGHANISTAN: FINDING, SECTORS  ANDTHEMES REPORT R 2005: 15  
 119 
Donors have been responsible for roughly 850 wells in Nangarhar constructed between 2002 and 
2004 (total figure app. 2,500). Consequently the 5 donor have been funding 34 % of the wells in 
Nangarhar and thus have covered roughly 20 % of the WP which are needed to have full coverage 
(20 families per well). Coverage in general has not so much been driven by actual need of the 
population, but rather by one or more of the following reasons (in sequence of importance). One 
might argue that on occasions not the needy people have been supported but the one which have 
been accessible: 
 
1. Security within the area (especially the UN, but astonishing enough also INGOs52) 
2. Vicinity to the next urban centre (head office of the AP, under the existing needs of the 
population APs went for the easier option) 
3. Access to the area in terms of condition of existing roads 
4. Technological difficulties (geological hard strata, to permeable soils for latrines) 
 
Differences in number of wells constructed varied from a few (Dar-i-Noor, Achin) till hundreds 
(Khogiani, Behsood, Sokhrod). Another reason for the uneven distribution is the lack of data on 
existing WP (even WSG to make a report on WP constructed mandatory for APs) which does not 
allow an analysis of needs. 
 
There were no needs assessment carried out by any agency (except DACAAR prepares intervention 
through a district survey). In general the type of intervention has been pre-defined and community 
have been selected through collecting their requests either to district and / or provincial governors, 
the RRD or directly through them. 
6. Framework for the Interventions 
6.1 Coordination 
The main coordination tool with respect to water and sanitation is the WSG which is held monthly 
in Kabul. All main actors participate in this meeting chaired by MRRD and mainly supported by 
UNICEF and DACAAR. It attempts to harmonize, synchronize and coordinate all activities 
concerning water and sanitation.  
 
On provincial level there is the TWG – water and sanitation which basically does the same (in 
Nangarhar there is an additional engineering meeting on construction standards). In terms of 
quantity these coordination fora are sufficient to deal with the task at hand. 
 
Nevertheless efficiency and effectiveness of technical coordination is not measured, also because no 
indicators or benchmarks are existing. In order to evaluate the quality of coordination one has to list 
the facts which are known in this respect: 
 
- Technologies used are rather coherent 
- Members participate reliably 
- Information on who is doing what and where, gives a reasonable good overview  
- Information sharing is done sufficiently 
- Aid is not evenly distributed 
- Actors do not all report reliably to the national (DACAAR) data base 
                                                 
52 This was not the case before 9/11. In general INGOs are not as concerned on security as the UN. 
CMI REPORT AFGHANISTAN: FINDING, SECTORS  ANDTHEMES REPORT R 2005: 15  
 120 
 
The points described above give a good impression on the quality of coordination within this sector. 
It is satisfactory, also compared to other sectors, but unless clear indicators for efficiency and 
effectiveness are developed and used its value for the sector cannot be identified. 
6.2 Coherence 
The fact that 2 actors dominated the water and sanitation sector in Afghanistan since some time 
(from 1990, UNICEF, DACAAR) has had an extremely positive effect concerning coherence. The 
interventions in the water and sanitation sector have been coherent with respect to implementation 
strategies of different APs.  
Nevertheless, targeting and need assessment strategies have been different. 
 
- UNHCR per se targets returnees and through their VRFs has very consistent data. UNHCR 
provides WP, shelter and attached to them latrines 
- UNIFEC targets primarily schools / children, returnees and draught effected areas and 
extremely vulnerable groups (Kuchi nomads)  
- The MRRD is collecting requests from village elders coming to their offices and 
implements in certain areas according to donor preferences. MRRD states that they select 
areas based on vulnerability (VAM report, NVRA) however in practice it is often 
“connections” and family ties which determine the region to be supported. 
- DACAAR works based on district surveys which provides the required data in order to 
decide on their interventions. Based on the funds available number of wells will be decided. 
Additionally DACAAR reacts to requests from beneficiaries 
- SCA provides water and sanitation services in connection with their schools and health 
centres 
- ICRC sees its intervention as part of protecting returnees to the urban centres. However 
ICRC admits that the main reason for targeting urban population was security and the firm 
believe that the present actors do not produce tangible results 
 
APs have had complementary activities targeting different groups of vulnerable population. In 
general coherence was and is good for the interventions in the water and sanitation sector in 
Afghanistan.  
6.3 Connectedness and sustainability 
The aspects which are significant for the link between relief / emergency / rehabilitation and 
development in the Afghan context have been: 
 
- The established data base on wells (and partly latrines) constructed including mapping of 
water levels, coverage etc (in future maybe the national data base). 
- A standard type of hand pump used countrywide 
- Successful attempts to standardize well and latrine construction and materials used 
- Initiating of an operation and maintenance system including the system of the HIT-teams 
designed for countrywide use 
- A water quality monitoring system has not been established 
 
It was certainly not a neglect of AP that issues like water resource management have not been put 
earlier at the agenda. In this respect donors should have been the driving force.  
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Nevertheless especially the data base should have been taken more seriously (also by donors and the 
MRRD) in order to up-date it and assure that it covers the status quo on wells and sanitation 
facilities more precisely. In Afghanistan like in other emergency situations repeatedly the influx of 
agencies results in a excess of activities which are not properly recorded53.  
 
In essence rural communities still see it as the desired living standard to have “their own well in 
their backyard”. This might have been the main reason why, over all these years, communities 
never took up the initiative to construct common wells on their own. None of the communities 
interviewed even had any intention to do so. Latrines are still not a priority and communal latrines 
met strong cultural resistance. In this respect, there appears to be unmet challenges as how to 
connect intervention strategies with local traditions as traditional reluctance within Afghan society 
against (forced) communal activities and the sensitive nature of the sanitation topic  (especially in 
pashtun areas). IN addition, it does reflect the national policy of the responsible ministry (MRRD) 
and common wells are certainly the standard which should be promoted in the foreseeable future.  
 
The main requirements in order to promote sustainability, initiate a functioning operation and 
maintenance, was carried out satisfactory by aid providers (INGOs were more consistent than 
others) under the existing framework conditions. However, problems do exist. HPM cannot live 
from repairing pumps alone, salary through in-kind is frequently not paid and sometimes the hand 
pump mechanic and caretaker have moved or taken up other jobs. Data are still not reported to the 
data base even it is a contractual obligation of implementing agencies. Cut-price versions of the 
Afridev hand pump are entering the market in Kabul endangering quality and the use of a uniform 
pump nationwide. 
 
The evaluator has experience from more than 20 countries, and one challenge occur in almost every 
country: data on number of wells built in which location is difficult to cllect. 
 
The massive influx of aid has also influenced the willingness of communities to take their 
development into their own hands – “they sit back and wait”. There is a noticeable difference in 
willingness to contribute between communities in remote areas (less covered) and areas close to 
Jalalabad (good coverage). 
7. The Interventions carried out by aid providers 
Main focus in the following is put on UNHCR, DACAAR, MRRD and ICRC. The Irish NGO 
Concern only operates in the North (Taloqan) and SCA has not constructed WP during the 
evaluation period. 
7.1 Effectiveness and timeliness 
Effectiveness was differently for the various activities of APs.  
 
The construction of WP has certainly been effective and has been on time. This was clearly stated 
by all persons interviewed. Aid could have always been more, but a time of 2 to 4 month between 
approaching an AP till the moment water runs from a well into the bucket of the first beneficiary is 
good by all standards. 
                                                 
53 The evaluator has experiences from more than 20 countries and this problem creates almost a deja vu effect 
because it repeats itself in every country. – nobody knows precisely enough how much wells have been built 
where. 
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The situation is slightly different for gravity schemes, because here aspects of sustainability are 
crucial. The absence of O&M training, introduction of O&M routines, provision of tools, proper 
mapping of the constructed scheme, the assurance that the re-investments can be done from water 
sold or through organisation of user groups seriously reduces the effectiveness of the system build 
(similar issues are valid for intervention in the urban sector). Karzezes rely on traditional and 
proven techniques and interventions have been effective. 
 
Not much is effectively known concerning the construction of latrines. They are built because 
common sense dictates that it will improve the unhygienic situation and as such reduce diseases. 
Certainly it will do, but whether the technology applied has been the right one, whether traditional 
techniques have been taken into account sufficiently was never really tested54. The same applies to 
health and hygiene education. APs carry out the campaigns and then “tick-off” benefic iaries from 
their list. This appears to be the main achievement. No AP ever tried to do an assessment on the 
degree of behavioural change which was triggered by the campaign and subsequently re-designed 
and adapted the campaign accordingly. All of the AP confirmed this in the interviews. 
 
Structures built are cost-effective in comparison with international figures. A dug well in 
Afghanistan is financed through app. 4.8 Euro / beneficiary and a tube well between 7 and 14 Euro / 
beneficiary55. A latrine would be between 6 and 12 Euro / beneficiary. Even using 100 % support 
costs per structure would be still within acceptable limits56. The gravity schemes visited had 
invested 18 Euro / beneficiary a very economic value. The figures mentioned refer to material costs 
only (for information on support costs see next chapter). 
7.2 Efficiency 
Efficiency is as usual different between various APs even diverse between various offices of the 
same AP in different regions. It depends on the professionalism, dedication and training of staff, 
equipment available, applied management information system, economic procurement, etc. In 
addition monitoring and supervision will enhance efficiency because it assures quality.  
 
The evaluator could not collect financial data / project proposals which have been differentiated and 
most of all comparable enough to allow a detailed analysis of overheads, running costs and 
administrative costs necessary for the interventions. 
 
Proposal and documents submitted have been structured very differently or have only provided very 
general lump sums. Therefore efficiency, the assessment up to what extent and how economically 
resources and inputs have been converted into results57 was extremely difficult. 
 
The following figures on percentage relations between support costs and total costs were taken out 
of proposals by APs: 
 
UNHCR:  between 18.5 and 30 %58 
UNICEF  No data  
                                                 
54 Even so 2003 figures of UNICEF indicate that under 5 mortality has been reduced from 25.4 to 17.2 %. The 
reasons however are not known 
55 Assuming 1 well serves 20 families or 120 persons. 
56 For example ECHO financed operations in Sri Lanka had min. 18 Euro and max. 130 Euro investment cost 
per beneficiary (2002 to 2004). 
57 According to Sida Evaluation Manual 
58 18.5 % to 30 % of the total costs have been support costs (office, salary, transport, communication, etc.) 
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MRRD   1 proposal, 9.5 % 
SCA   (not possible based on their annual donor report) 
DACAAR  20 % 
LNGO   9 % 
 
Based on the criteria and information listed above it is the professional opinion of the evaluator that 
under normal circumstances and with respect to costs and quality most probably INGOs are the 
most efficient aid provider when it comes to the construction of water points and latrines. In all 
probability LNGO would be more economic, provided the organisation has commitment and 
experience in provision of humanitarian assistance. UN organisations are generally 10 to 20 % more 
expensive 59 than other APs. 
7.3 Impact 
Impact of the provision of wells or gravity schemes, the construction of private latrines or multi-
compartment latrines, the implementation of health and hygiene training has not systematically been 
measured. “We are working under emergency and this is not required” was the standard reply of 
almost all APs. DACAAR would have had a straightforward possibility of comparing one district 
survey with “the next one”, but this has not been done. During the interviews the following effects 
of well construction were named by beneficiaries: 
 
- Reduction of time for water collection 
- Reduction of diseases (no specific diseases were mentioned) 
- Water available for festivities and guests 
- Time for women to work on something else (questionable impact?) 
- Prevented people from leaving the village and encouraged return 
 
The wells have certainly had a very significant impact on the communities, however people without 
much “difficulty” returned back to their practice of drinking water from the irrigation canals or 
rivers. A significant quote in this respect was”…our forefathers have drunk that water. Why should 
we not drink it?” The question whether safe drinking water really has reduced water borne diseases 
can only be answered based on common sense60 but it is very likely. Health data in order to measure 
the impact however, have not been collected before and after the interventions. 
 
The visited gravity scheme in the village near Torkham (Gorgoro) had a remarkable impact. It 
prevented the people from leaving (because of draught) and brought people back. It provided the 
basis for the live of 2,500 families. 
 
As already stated in this report, the final impact of latrines is not really known. 
8. Performance of the Different Aid Channels 
8.1 Government of Afghanistan 
The relevant aid channels of the government were mainly the MRRD and funding of the NSP. The 
NSP project was experienced in Achin in Nangarhar. People in the villages seemed to be very 
                                                 
59 R&R of UN staff is not common for other APs. 
60 It is also the question whether pollution has not mainly taken place during collection, transport and storage. 
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satisfied, especially with the forming of the CDC and the fact that projects have been developed and 
identified by themselves and not by others. Beneficiaries had the feeling that they are the decision 
makers and development is in their hands and finally they are not dependant on a governor, khan, 
strongman or even an AP61. 
 
The MRRD is presumable the ministry which has the best reputation amongst donors because it has 
visions and works somehow transparent producing results. It actively shows any intention to take on 
the lead role in the sector and sees itself as a service provider to the population. 
 
In contrast to this stands its limited capacity in terms of resources and capacity of staff. The 
evaluator would like to point to an important finding in this respect. Government departments and 
ministries in Kabul but even more on provincial level are suffering from the brain drain caused by 
the organizations which are paying much higher salaries. Though understandable, donors (and also 
APs) have to acknowledge that this causes a serious drawback with respect to capacity building and 
is contra-productive to the objective of the donors that “Afghans should be in the driving seat”. 
8.2 UN 
The UN-agencies involved in the water and sanitation sector are UNICEF, UNHCR, UN-Habitat, 
WFP (through food for work initiatives) and UNOPS. WFP and UNOPS (being more active in 
irrigation) are neglected. UN-Habitat is mainly involved in urban water supply. This leaves 
basically UNICEF and UNHCR. 
 
UNICEF has 3 objectives when it comes to water and sanitation: schools, draught affected areas and 
extremely vulnerable groups (e.g. Kuchi nomads). UNICEF is implementing through implementing 
partners (IPs) which at present are LNGOs. Physical monitoring and supervision of activities is 
done randomly because the number of construction activities would require a significant amount of 
site engineers and technicians. Therefore quality control is basically carried out through the target 
group which, “hopefully”, ensure that the wells and latrines constructed are of the quality required.  
 
UNHCR targets returnees and implements similar to UNICEF. What restricts the movements of 
both organisations is security. From one day to the next a district can be off limits for UN staff. 
Both UN organisations do not always have water engineers employed in order to manage the 
activities for water and sanitation (this however is valid for all organisations). 
 
UN organisations are influential and as such are able to negotiate and broker deals which are out of 
reach for other organisations. On the other hand UN organisations are prone to restrictions imposed 
by security and in addition its huge apparatus makes them rather inflexible. 
8.3 NGO 
INGOs are still regarded as the most reliable APs at least by villages interviewed in Nangarhar. This 
is also based on their long term presence and visibility in the field. In the water and sanitation sector 
DACAAR is the most known organisation – DACAAR literally stands for water. 
 
The strength of NGOs is their flexibility and the fact that there monitoring and supervision system 
is much more rigorous than that of UN-organisations or the government. The UN simply lacks staff 
compared to the size of its interventions and the government sufficient resources and capacity. 
                                                 
61 This however has also limitations. In Achin district people had to use the drilling contractor and the workers 
proposed by the district governor which increased the costs for the wells built. 
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Compared to this NGOs have more possibilities, because they employ the number of personnel 
based on the size of their activit ies and can use “own funds62” if need be. LNGOs are under 
suspicion of misusing funds and producing inferior quality. Nevertheless, the organisations visited 
and interviewed in Jalalabad most certainly appeared from the administrative set up and procedures 
quite professional63 and not so much different to any INGO. They would certainly be the most 
economical option for service provision. 
8.4 International Organisations 
From the international organisation funded by the 5 donors ICRC is relevant within the water and 
sanitation sector. As already said they are heavily involved in the urban water supply sector.  
 
A problem of this sector is the lack of coordination between the actors involved (UN-habitat, ICRC 
and the World Bank-Consultant, KfW-Consultant).  
 
Negative results of this could be experienced in Jalalabad (details would be too long to present here, 
but problems of hydraulics, design parameter and standardisation of material will cause 
considerable problems for the future system). In addition activities in order to assure the 
sustainability of the structures are not planned to the extent necessary (operation and maintenance 
training, mapping of the scheme, provision of tools, water tariffs, etc.). 
 
The reason why ICRC focuses on urban water supply is (based on their own statements), firstly 
security (after the death of an ICRC employee in Kandahar) and secondly that no progress is being 
made by other actors (in principle World Bank projects are not showing results). Whereas the first 
reason is understandable the second one is quite unusual to be stated as a justification for an 
intervention64. 
9. Miscellaneous 
9.1 Water resource management - Environment 
The construction of water points must necessarily be seen within the framework of water resource 
management – the management of surface water, groundwater and its use for human consumption, 
agriculture and animal consumption as a whole.  
At the moment there is no clear responsibility for the management of the water body as different 
ministries claim responsibility (MRRD, MoA, MoUP, MopW, MoM). 
 
Discussions with FAO in Jalalabad confirmed the fact that at present no whatsoever IWRM is 
carried out. As a matter of fact it is not possible, because the necessary data collection tools in order 
to compile information on precipitation patterns, run-off data from rivers, (measuring gauges at 
rivers and intakes, rain water measurement devices, etc.) consumption figures of rural and urban 
population does not exist.  
 
The issue of IWRM and creating a data base for water sources and water points should have been 
taken much more seriously at an early stage by the donors. This work does not represent a “fancy” 
add-on to the more important work of actually physically providing water to the population, but is a 
                                                 
62 From public donations 
63 At least FWO and SADAAT 
64 A constructive dialogue with the other actors should be more the way of addressing this problem 
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pre-requisite for sustainable management for the most important commodity of Afghanistan. The 
question is not to cut money which was used to construct wells, but to provide “additional funding” 
for an absolute essential activity – providing the basis for sustainable management of the water 
body as whole. It is not a question whether or not it has to be introduced. It is more the question 
how long it will take until the detrimental effects of not investing in IWRM will become visible.  
 
Various farmers interviewed and also the FAO in Jalalabad reported that in reality „everyone with 
enough money can contract the drilling of a deep well equipped with a submersible pump”. This 
also has reportedly resulted in the draw-down of the ground water table which has caused wells and 
karezes to fall dry. The MRRD confirmed that the drilling of a productive well without submitting 
an application to the relevant ministry (acc. to information the Ministry of Mines) is forbidden by 
law but its enforcement is almost impossible. 
 
It is difficult to assess when it could have been expected by donors and aid providers to leave their 
path of short term thinking with respect to water and sanitation earlier. Also considering the 
impediments presented by the security situation. Re-forestation projects to increase the retention 
capacity of the soil and thus enlarge the recharge of the aquifers (still, such projects would show 
their impact after 10 to 15 years). Comprehensively designed, implemented, followed-up and 
evaluated health and hygiene training campaigns to boost the awareness of rural population (in 
cities sanitation is quite technical and health and hygiene education campagn would presumably not 
have a similar impact). Planning of interventions in water and sanitation using the ECOSAN 
principles trying to avoid mistakes made by developed countries. At least now (beginning of 2005) 
all that is mentioned above should be seriously promoted by donors and considered for project 
planning (under the background of “common sense”). 
10. Overall Conclusions 
Under the prevailing condition and cultural background of Afghanistan the aspect of clientelism had 
a seriously impact of aid distribution. More powerful maliks, commanders, district and provincial 
governors even individual decision makers always managed to a certain extent to direct the flow of 
aid to their clientele (even employees within NGO influenced decisions of organisations to prefer 
one village to another). This naturally leads to the effect that aid is not distributed according to 
need.  
 
In order to counteract this, systematic need assessments should have been started at an earlier state 
(DACAAR at least had their system of district survey). In addition elaborated monitoring and 
supervision strategies should have been developed by aid providers but also demanded by donors.  
 
Even so coordination fora are plenty on various level their effectiveness and efficiency is never 
measured. It seems that “to meet” is already sufficient. In complex emergencies the quality of 
coordination is a key to address needs and to start an early link between, relief rehabilitation and 
development. Donors have to develop practical tools which allow them to measure whether 
coordination is efficient and effective and does what it is supposed to do. 
 
The enormous amount of wells which are dry asks for the question whether or not it would have 
been possible to adapt the technology used to the circumstance, in this case to the draught. The 
problems mainly refers to the dug wells which as a result of the lack of drainage pumps could not be 
dug deep enough below the static water level (max 1 m to 2 m, in comparison tube wells have 15 m 
water column). Assuming 12,000 wells dry and costs of 1,000 Euro for deepening them this results 
in 12 million Euro in damage. Whatever the solution would have been the evaluator is of the 
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opinion that APs should have taken this problem more serious and develop an adequate technical 
solution to react to this dilemma. 
11. Recommendations 
The following recommendations are resulting from the observations and findings in the previous 
chapters. They have been structured to address both donors, aid providers and subsequently grouped 
into short, medium and long term action. 
12. Donors 
Short Term 
- Donors should make sure that sector expertise is available for their representatives in the 
country to allow for a better judgment of proposed interventions and proposals submitted by 
aid providers 
- Donor should make a lead agency mandatory (like DACAAR in Afghanistan) in the water 
and sanitation sector in complex emergency. A dedicated UN-agency should be made 
responsible for water and sanitation in a country being the interface between the UN and 
this lead agency. 
- The preparation (and of course funding) of a comprehensive data base on structures build at 
an very early stage should be standard in complex emergencies to allow for an easy 
overview and follow up (a problem prominent in many crisis interventions throughout the 
world). This will facilitate need assessment and assure that an overview on coverage would 
be much easier. 
- The drilling of productive wells without permission from the relevant ministry must be 
counteracted immediately in order to protect the ground water. An immediate solution to 
the problem of the authorities of not being able to enforce the existing law must be found. 
Setting the necessary framework conditions is here simply not enough: Action is required. 
- The present interventions in urban water supply have to be coordinated more efficiently in 
order to assure that impact is maximised and funds are not wasted. 
- Water resource management and especially the protection of the ground water aquifer 
against over exploitation and pollution must be given highest priority within donor policies 
in order to safeguard the future of Afghanistan. This should have been done at an earlier 
stage 
 
Medium Term 
- Donors should insist on setting up indicators in order to get more information on the quality 
of coordination and its effectiveness 
- Donor should ask for an increased transparency from UN-agencies in terms of details on 
funds spent including break down of costs for sector interventions 
- Coordination amongst donors and aid providers is vital in complex emergencies and 
indicators for efficiency and effectiveness of coordination should be developed 
- The fact that capable and professional personnel for rebuilding the country is not available 
because they are all working in international organisation must be taken much more 
seriously in a complex emergency like Afghanistan Donor should stop ignoring this issue 
because it is clearly one reason why capacity building is so slow and as a consequence 
donors have to stay longer in a country. 
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Long Term 
- The emergency and relief phase is definitely over in Afghanistan and activities focusing on 
sustainability, comprehensive approaches, capacity building must be more in the focus. 
- Funding of long term strategy for integrated water resource management in Afghanistan 
- Donors should insist on a code of conduct by all organisations involved in humanitarian 
works (size of cars, houses, salary, etc.). The perception of the general population has to be 
taken into account in this respect. 
13. Aid Providers 
- Basic and simple need assessment including impact measurements should be carried out by 
aid providers 
- Interventions strategies and development plans have to be communicated down to village 
level in order to make sure that beneficiaries are really “taken on board”. 
- Systematic impact measurements are crucial for activities and programmes which have 
behavioural changes as its objective (health and hygiene education) even under an 
emergency / relief background. 
- Improved data management and hand over to new personnel from the beginning must be 
implemented more stringently 
- Working and practical concepts to include women in the projects have to be developed 
much more. It should be ascertained that inclusion of women is not only a “lip-service” 
paid to donors and used for public relation purposes 
14. Lessons learned 
If one lesson has been central as a result of this valuation, then it is the importance of coordination 
not only amongst aid providers but also amongst donors. But not only coordination itself is 
important but most of all to ensure that it actually has an impact (“the quality of the meeting 
culture”). There is a plethora of meetings taking place especially in Kabul and any organisation 
could have a full time employee for meetings. But “to meet” is not sufficient. A meeting should be 
seen like it would have to deliver a product not only a free afternoon for the participants. Sector 
coordination meetings should be constantly checked whether they produce tangible result. 
Participation should be made mandatory for any organisation or else activities in a certain sector 
should be made impossible. 
 
Another lesson refers to data management. It took the evaluator considerable effort to receive 
simple data from organisations on their interventions. Precise figures on how much structures have 
been build for whom and where – almost impossible. Especially challenging are the requests, if a 
long term employee on a key-position leaves. It almost seems that all the knowledge and even 
somehow the data leaves with him65. Quite often during the evaluation the sentence was heard 
“…this was before my time. I have absolutely no clue…..”. This does not reflect professional 
standards. After 40 years of humanitarian and development work, organisations are still not able to 
have proper knowledge management, data management based on structured and thorough hand-over 
from one person to the other.  
 
                                                 
65 Because nobody knows where it is stored. 
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Another issue concerning data is a general data base e.g. on wells / latrines constructed. The 
evaluator is sure that the similar problems existing in the “epicentres” of the humanitarian crisis 
right now (e.g. Indonesia, Sudan, etc.) data is not properly recorded. After a while nobody knows, 
who did what and where. Donor should make sure that in emergency interventions a coordinating 
body or organisation is entrusted with collecting all necessary data and additionally make it absolute 
mandatory for any aid provider to report to this organisation. Or else, like for coordination, work 
should be restricted for an aid provider. 
 
Finally it must be said that the amount of funds which have been put for an important sector like 
water and sanitation has definitely not been sufficient (8% to 9%) especially in an arid country like 
Afghanistan. The political process of nation building and state building has used up the majority of 
funds and has left crucial sectors under-funded. 
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